From 460988a472be8dc2d8a43238c75a3196fd9b16a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2019 17:05:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fixup! CTR_DRBG: support set_entropy_len() before seed() Remove a comment that documented a now-removed restriction. --- include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h index 676b96e49..05b4e95a2 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h @@ -301,11 +301,6 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, * * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN. * - * \note mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() always sets the entropy length - * to #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN, so this function - * only has an effect when it is called after - * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). - * * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the * entropy length. Thus: * - When using AES-256