diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 46bfd6665..f7974fe60 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ Security
      option if needed.
    * Fixed offset in FALLBACK_SCSV parsing that caused TLS server to fail to
      detect it sometimes. Reported by Hugo Leisink. #810
+   * Tighten ASN.1 parsing of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, to avoid a
+     potential Bleichenbacher-style attack.
 
 Bugfix
    * Remove macros from compat-1.3.h that correspond to deleted items from most
diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c
index 8d4da5349..29e8e32fb 100644
--- a/library/rsa.c
+++ b/library/rsa.c
@@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
 {
     int ret;
     size_t len, siglen, asn1_len;
-    unsigned char *p, *end;
+    unsigned char *p, *p0, *end;
     unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
     mbedtls_md_type_t msg_md_alg;
     const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@@ -1524,24 +1524,30 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
 
     end = p + len;
 
-    // Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure
-    //
+    /*
+     * Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure.
+     * Insist on 2-byte length tags, to protect against variants of
+     * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification.
+     */
+    p0 = p;
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
             MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
-
-    if( asn1_len + 2 != len )
+    if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 2 != len )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
 
+    p0 = p;
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
             MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
-
-    if( asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
+    if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
 
+    p0 = p;
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
+    if( p != p0 + 2 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
 
     oid.p = p;
     p += oid.len;
@@ -1555,13 +1561,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
     /*
      * assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL
      */
+    p0 = p;
     if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
-
-    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
+    if( p != p0 + 2 )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
 
-    if( asn1_len != hashlen )
+    p0 = p;
+    if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
+        return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
+    if( p != p0 + 2 || asn1_len != hashlen )
         return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
 
     if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 )