From 6d6018383e352fac95df95401189a0dbf6d976bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 1 Oct 2015 18:20:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Fix typos in ChangeLog and comments --- ChangeLog | 2 +- include/polarssl/base64.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 651ee4fc6..4e3ed30ff 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Security of close to or larger than 1GB to exploit; on 64 bit machines, would require reading a string of close to or larger than 2^62 bytes. * Fix potential random memory allocation in mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() - on crafted PEM input data. Found an fix provided by Guid Vranken. + on crafted PEM input data. Found and fix provided by Guido Vranken. Not triggerable remotely in TLS. Triggerable remotely if you accept PEM data from an untrusted source. * Fix potential double-free if ssl_set_psk() is called repeatedly on diff --git a/include/polarssl/base64.h b/include/polarssl/base64.h index dd11bdab6..f86219248 100644 --- a/include/polarssl/base64.h +++ b/include/polarssl/base64.h @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ extern "C" { * *dlen is always updated to reflect the amount * of data that has (or would have) been written. * If that length cannot be represented, then no data is - * written to the buffer and *olen is set to SIZE_T_MAX. + * written to the buffer and *dlen is set to SIZE_T_MAX. * * \note Call this function with *dlen = 0 to obtain the * required buffer size in *dlen