diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 1e20f47cc..96150f854 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -4791,7 +4791,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, #endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ -static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_raw( +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_key_derivation_step_t step, const uint8_t *data, @@ -4856,8 +4856,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *ope case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: - return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( operation, step, - data, data_length ) ); + return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + data, data_length ) ); default: return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); } @@ -4884,10 +4884,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *opera * and leak values derived from the key. So be conservative. */ if( step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ) return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); - return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( operation, - step, - slot->data.raw.data, - slot->data.raw.bytes ) ); + return( psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, + step, + slot->data.raw.data, + slot->data.raw.bytes ) ); } @@ -4999,8 +4999,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal( psa_key_derivation_operation_t * /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from * the shared secret. */ - status = psa_key_derivation_input_raw( operation, step, - shared_secret, shared_secret_length ); + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal( operation, step, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length ); exit: mbedtls_platform_zeroize( shared_secret, shared_secret_length );