From c26741f8ca4d4d2aa43cad6504ec6935b8774b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hanno Becker Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2017 13:52:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As `n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory. This commit replaces the check by a safe version. --- library/ssl_srv.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_srv.c b/library/ssl_srv.c index 01b4ada30..27ed25836 100644 --- a/library/ssl_srv.c +++ b/library/ssl_srv.c @@ -3252,7 +3252,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha /* * Receive client pre-shared key identity name */ - if( *p + 2 > end ) + if( end - *p < 2 ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); @@ -3261,7 +3261,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned cha n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; *p += 2; - if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end ) + if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || n > (size_t) ( end - *p ) ) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );