mbedtls/programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c

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/*
* SSL client with certificate authentication
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2010-07-18 20:36:00 +00:00
*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
2009-01-04 16:27:10 +00:00
*
2015-09-04 12:21:07 +00:00
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
2015-09-04 12:21:07 +00:00
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "ssl_test_lib.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE)
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf( MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE );
mbedtls_exit( 0 );
}
#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
int main( void )
{
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C not defined.\n" );
mbedtls_exit( 0 );
}
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/* Size of memory to be allocated for the heap, when using the library's memory
* management and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C is enabled. */
#define MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE 120000
#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 20000
#define MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR "20000"
#define DFL_SERVER_NAME "localhost"
#define DFL_SERVER_ADDR NULL
#define DFL_SERVER_PORT "4433"
#define DFL_REQUEST_PAGE "/"
#define DFL_REQUEST_SIZE -1
#define DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL 0
#define DFL_CONTEXT_CRT_CB 0
#define DFL_NBIO 0
#define DFL_EVENT 0
#define DFL_READ_TIMEOUT 0
#define DFL_MAX_RESEND 0
#define DFL_CA_FILE ""
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#define DFL_CA_PATH ""
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#define DFL_CRT_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_FILE ""
#define DFL_KEY_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_KEY_PWD ""
#define DFL_PSK ""
#define DFL_PSK_OPAQUE 0
#define DFL_PSK_IDENTITY "Client_identity"
#define DFL_ECJPAKE_PW NULL
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#define DFL_EC_MAX_OPS -1
#define DFL_FORCE_CIPHER 0
#define DFL_RENEGOTIATION MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
#define DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY -2
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#define DFL_RENEGOTIATE 0
#define DFL_EXCHANGES 1
#define DFL_MIN_VERSION -1
#define DFL_MAX_VERSION -1
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#define DFL_ARC4 -1
#define DFL_SHA1 -1
#define DFL_AUTH_MODE -1
#define DFL_MFL_CODE MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE
#define DFL_TRUNC_HMAC -1
#define DFL_RECSPLIT -1
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#define DFL_DHMLEN -1
#define DFL_RECONNECT 0
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#define DFL_RECO_DELAY 0
#define DFL_RECO_MODE 1
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED 0
#define DFL_CID_VALUE ""
#define DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO -1
#define DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO NULL
#define DFL_RECONNECT_HARD 0
#define DFL_TICKETS MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED
#define DFL_ALPN_STRING NULL
#define DFL_CURVES NULL
#define DFL_TRANSPORT MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM
#define DFL_HS_TO_MIN 0
#define DFL_HS_TO_MAX 0
#define DFL_DTLS_MTU -1
#define DFL_DGRAM_PACKING 1
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#define DFL_FALLBACK -1
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS -1
#define DFL_ETM -1
#define DFL_SERIALIZE 0
#define DFL_CONTEXT_FILE ""
#define DFL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE -1
#define DFL_CA_CALLBACK 0
#define DFL_EAP_TLS 0
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#define DFL_REPRODUCIBLE 0
#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG 0
#define DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE NULL
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
#define DFL_SKIP_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0
#define DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE 0
#define DFL_USE_SRTP 0
#define DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE 0
#define DFL_SRTP_MKI ""
#define GET_REQUEST "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\nExtra-header: "
#define GET_REQUEST_END "\r\n\r\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
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#define USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB \
" context_crt_cb=%%d This determines whether the CRT verification callback is bound\n" \
" to the SSL configuration of the SSL context.\n" \
" Possible values:\n"\
" - 0 (default): Use CRT callback bound to configuration\n" \
" - 1: Use CRT callback bound to SSL context\n"
#else
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#define USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
#define USAGE_IO \
" ca_file=%%s The single file containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" ca_path=%%s The path containing the top-level CA(s) you fully trust\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded) (overrides ca_file)\n" \
" use \"none\" to skip loading any top-level CAs.\n" \
" crt_file=%%s Your own cert and chain (in bottom to top order, top may be omitted)\n" \
" default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n" \
" key_file=%%s default: \"\" (pre-loaded)\n"\
" key_pwd=%%s Password for key specified by key_file argument\n"\
" default: none\n"
#else
#define USAGE_IO \
" No file operations available (MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined)\n"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
#else /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#define USAGE_IO ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
" key_opaque=%%d Handle your private key as if it were opaque\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define USAGE_CID \
" cid=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension.\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" cid_renego=%%d Disable (0) or enable (1) the use of the DTLS Connection ID extension during renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid' parameter\n" \
" cid_val=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x).\n" \
" default: \"\"\n" \
" cid_val_renego=%%s The CID to use for incoming messages (in hex, without 0x) after renegotiation.\n" \
" default: same as 'cid_val' parameter\n"
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#define USAGE_CID ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_PSK_RAW \
" psk=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \
" The PSK values are in hex, without 0x.\n" \
" psk_identity=%%s default: \"Client_identity\"\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT \
" psk_opaque=%%d default: 0 (don't use opaque static PSK)\n" \
" Enable this to store the PSK configured through command line\n" \
" parameter `psk` in a PSA-based key slot.\n" \
" Note: Currently only supported in conjunction with\n" \
" the use of min_version to force TLS 1.2 and force_ciphersuite \n" \
" to force a particular PSK-only ciphersuite.\n" \
" Note: This is to test integration of PSA-based opaque PSKs with\n" \
" Mbed TLS only. Production systems are likely to configure Mbed TLS\n" \
" with prepopulated key slots instead of importing raw key material.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_PSK_SLOT ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#define USAGE_PSK USAGE_PSK_RAW USAGE_PSK_SLOT
#else
#define USAGE_PSK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \
" ca_callback=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" Enable this to use the trusted certificate callback function\n"
#else
#define USAGE_CA_CALLBACK ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define USAGE_TICKETS \
" tickets=%%d default: 1 (enabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TICKETS ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
#define USAGE_EAP_TLS \
" eap_tls=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG \
" nss_keylog=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" This cannot be used with eap_tls=1\n"
#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE \
" nss_keylog_file=%%s\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
#define USAGE_SRTP \
" use_srtp=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" This cannot be used with eap_tls=1 or "\
" nss_keylog=1\n" \
" srtp_force_profile=%%d default: 0 (all enabled)\n" \
" available profiles:\n" \
" 1 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \
" 2 - SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \
" 3 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80\n" \
" 4 - SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32\n" \
" mki=%%s default: \"\" (in hex, without 0x)\n"
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#define USAGE_SRTP ""
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
#define USAGE_EAP_TLS ""
#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG ""
#define USAGE_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE ""
#define USAGE_SRTP ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
" trunc_hmac=%%d default: library default\n"
#else
#define USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
" max_frag_len=%%d default: 16384 (tls default)\n" \
" options: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096\n"
#else
#define USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
#define USAGE_RECSPLIT \
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" recsplit=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_RECSPLIT
#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
#define USAGE_DHMLEN \
" dhmlen=%%d default: (library default: 1024 bits)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_DHMLEN
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
#define USAGE_ALPN \
" alpn=%%s default: \"\" (disabled)\n" \
" example: spdy/1,http/1.1\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ALPN ""
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#define USAGE_CURVES \
" curves=a,b,c,d default: \"default\" (library default)\n" \
" example: \"secp521r1,brainpoolP512r1\"\n" \
" - use \"none\" for empty list\n" \
" - see mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()\n" \
" for acceptable curve names\n"
#else
#define USAGE_CURVES ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
#define USAGE_DTLS \
" dtls=%%d default: 0 (TLS)\n" \
" hs_timeout=%%d-%%d default: (library default: 1000-60000)\n" \
" range of DTLS handshake timeouts in millisecs\n" \
" mtu=%%d default: (library default: unlimited)\n" \
" dgram_packing=%%d default: 1 (allowed)\n" \
" allow or forbid packing of multiple\n" \
" records within a single datgram.\n"
#else
#define USAGE_DTLS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
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#define USAGE_FALLBACK \
" fallback=0/1 default: (library default: off)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_FALLBACK ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
#define USAGE_EMS \
" extended_ms=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_EMS ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
#define USAGE_ETM \
" etm=0/1 default: (library default: on)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ETM ""
#endif
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#define USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \
" reproducible=0/1 default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
#define USAGE_RENEGO \
" renegotiation=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" renegotiate=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_RENEGO ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE \
" ecjpake_pw=%%s default: none (disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ECJPAKE ""
#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
#define USAGE_ECRESTART \
" ec_max_ops=%%s default: library default (restart disabled)\n"
#else
#define USAGE_ECRESTART ""
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" serialize=%%d default: 0 (do not serialize/deserialize)\n" \
" options: 1 (serialize)\n" \
" 2 (serialize with re-initialization)\n" \
" context_file=%%s The file path to write a serialized connection\n"\
" in the form of base64 code (serialize option\n" \
" must be set)\n" \
" default: \"\" (do nothing)\n" \
" option: a file path\n"
#else
#define USAGE_SERIALIZATION ""
#endif
/* USAGE is arbitrarily split to stay under the portable string literal
* length limit: 4095 bytes in C99. */
#define USAGE1 \
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"\n usage: ssl_client2 param=<>...\n" \
"\n acceptable parameters:\n" \
" server_name=%%s default: localhost\n" \
" server_addr=%%s default: given by name\n" \
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" server_port=%%d default: 4433\n" \
" request_page=%%s default: \".\"\n" \
" request_size=%%d default: about 34 (basic request)\n" \
" (minimum: 0, max: " MAX_REQUEST_SIZE_STR ")\n" \
" If 0, in the first exchange only an empty\n" \
" application data message is sent followed by\n" \
" a second non-empty message before attempting\n" \
" to read a response from the server\n" \
" debug_level=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" nbio=%%d default: 0 (blocking I/O)\n" \
" options: 1 (non-blocking), 2 (added delays)\n" \
" event=%%d default: 0 (loop)\n" \
" options: 1 (level-triggered, implies nbio=1),\n" \
" read_timeout=%%d default: 0 ms (no timeout)\n" \
" max_resend=%%d default: 0 (no resend on timeout)\n" \
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
" skip_close_notify=%%d default: 0 (send close_notify)\n" \
"\n" \
USAGE_DTLS \
USAGE_CID \
USAGE_SRTP \
"\n"
#define USAGE2 \
" auth_mode=%%s default: (library default: none)\n" \
" options: none, optional, required\n" \
USAGE_IO \
USAGE_KEY_OPAQUE \
USAGE_CA_CALLBACK \
"\n" \
USAGE_PSK \
USAGE_ECJPAKE \
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USAGE_ECRESTART \
"\n"
#define USAGE3 \
" allow_legacy=%%d default: (library default: no)\n" \
USAGE_RENEGO \
" exchanges=%%d default: 1\n" \
" reconnect=%%d number of reconnections using session resumption\n" \
" default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
" reco_delay=%%d default: 0 seconds\n" \
" reco_mode=%%d 0: copy session, 1: serialize session\n" \
" default: 1\n" \
" reconnect_hard=%%d default: 0 (disabled)\n" \
USAGE_TICKETS \
USAGE_EAP_TLS \
USAGE_MAX_FRAG_LEN \
USAGE_TRUNC_HMAC \
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USAGE_CONTEXT_CRT_CB \
USAGE_ALPN \
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USAGE_FALLBACK \
USAGE_EMS \
USAGE_ETM \
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USAGE_REPRODUCIBLE \
USAGE_CURVES \
USAGE_RECSPLIT \
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USAGE_DHMLEN \
"\n"
#define USAGE4 \
" arc4=%%d default: (library default: 0)\n" \
" allow_sha1=%%d default: 0\n" \
" min_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1)\n" \
" max_version=%%s default: (library default: tls1_2)\n" \
" force_version=%%s default: \"\" (none)\n" \
" options: ssl3, tls1, tls1_1, tls1_2, dtls1, dtls1_2\n" \
"\n" \
" force_ciphersuite=<name> default: all enabled\n"\
" query_config=<name> return 0 if the specified\n" \
" configuration macro is defined and 1\n" \
" otherwise. The expansion of the macro\n" \
" is printed if it is defined\n" \
USAGE_SERIALIZATION \
" acceptable ciphersuite names:\n"
#define ALPN_LIST_SIZE 10
#define CURVE_LIST_SIZE 20
/*
* global options
*/
struct options
{
const char *server_name; /* hostname of the server (client only) */
const char *server_addr; /* address of the server (client only) */
const char *server_port; /* port on which the ssl service runs */
int debug_level; /* level of debugging */
int nbio; /* should I/O be blocking? */
int event; /* loop or event-driven IO? level or edge triggered? */
uint32_t read_timeout; /* timeout on mbedtls_ssl_read() in milliseconds */
int max_resend; /* DTLS times to resend on read timeout */
const char *request_page; /* page on server to request */
int request_size; /* pad request with header to requested size */
const char *ca_file; /* the file with the CA certificate(s) */
const char *ca_path; /* the path with the CA certificate(s) reside */
const char *crt_file; /* the file with the client certificate */
const char *key_file; /* the file with the client key */
int key_opaque; /* handle private key as if it were opaque */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int psk_opaque;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
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int ca_callback; /* Use callback for trusted certificate list */
#endif
const char *key_pwd; /* the password for the client key */
const char *psk; /* the pre-shared key */
const char *psk_identity; /* the pre-shared key identity */
const char *ecjpake_pw; /* the EC J-PAKE password */
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int ec_max_ops; /* EC consecutive operations limit */
int force_ciphersuite[2]; /* protocol/ciphersuite to use, or all */
int renegotiation; /* enable / disable renegotiation */
int allow_legacy; /* allow legacy renegotiation */
int renegotiate; /* attempt renegotiation? */
int renego_delay; /* delay before enforcing renegotiation */
int exchanges; /* number of data exchanges */
int min_version; /* minimum protocol version accepted */
int max_version; /* maximum protocol version accepted */
int arc4; /* flag for arc4 suites support */
int allow_sha1; /* flag for SHA-1 support */
int auth_mode; /* verify mode for connection */
unsigned char mfl_code; /* code for maximum fragment length */
int trunc_hmac; /* negotiate truncated hmac or not */
int recsplit; /* enable record splitting? */
2015-06-11 15:02:29 +00:00
int dhmlen; /* minimum DHM params len in bits */
int reconnect; /* attempt to resume session */
int reco_delay; /* delay in seconds before resuming session */
int reco_mode; /* how to keep the session around */
int reconnect_hard; /* unexpectedly reconnect from the same port */
int tickets; /* enable / disable session tickets */
const char *curves; /* list of supported elliptic curves */
const char *alpn_string; /* ALPN supported protocols */
int transport; /* TLS or DTLS? */
uint32_t hs_to_min; /* Initial value of DTLS handshake timer */
uint32_t hs_to_max; /* Max value of DTLS handshake timer */
int dtls_mtu; /* UDP Maximum tranport unit for DTLS */
int fallback; /* is this a fallback connection? */
int dgram_packing; /* allow/forbid datagram packing */
int extended_ms; /* negotiate extended master secret? */
int etm; /* negotiate encrypt then mac? */
int context_crt_cb; /* use context-specific CRT verify callback */
int eap_tls; /* derive EAP-TLS keying material? */
int nss_keylog; /* export NSS key log material */
const char *nss_keylog_file; /* NSS key log file */
int cid_enabled; /* whether to use the CID extension or not */
int cid_enabled_renego; /* whether to use the CID extension or not
* during renegotiation */
const char *cid_val; /* the CID to use for incoming messages */
int serialize; /* serialize/deserialize connection */
const char *context_file; /* the file to write a serialized connection
* in the form of base64 code (serialize
* option must be set) */
const char *cid_val_renego; /* the CID to use for incoming messages
* after renegotiation */
2019-06-11 15:50:23 +00:00
int reproducible; /* make communication reproducible */
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
int skip_close_notify; /* skip sending the close_notify alert */
int query_config_mode; /* whether to read config */
int use_srtp; /* Support SRTP */
int force_srtp_profile; /* SRTP protection profile to use or all */
const char *mki; /* The dtls mki value to use */
} opt;
#include "ssl_test_common_source.c"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
static unsigned char peer_crt_info[1024];
/*
* Enabled if debug_level > 1 in code below
*/
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
static int my_verify( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int depth, uint32_t *flags )
{
char buf[1024];
((void) data);
mbedtls_x509_crt_info( buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, "", crt );
if( depth == 0 )
memcpy( peer_crt_info, buf, sizeof( buf ) );
if( opt.debug_level == 0 )
return( 0 );
mbedtls_printf( "\nVerify requested for (Depth %d):\n", depth );
mbedtls_printf( "%s", buf );
if ( ( *flags ) == 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " This certificate has no flags\n" );
else
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( buf, sizeof( buf ), " ! ", *flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", buf );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
int report_cid_usage( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const char *additional_description )
{
int ret;
unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
size_t peer_cid_len;
int cid_negotiated;
if( opt.transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 0 );
/* Check if the use of a CID has been negotiated,
* but don't ask for the CID value and length.
*
* Note: Here and below, we're demonstrating the various ways
* in which mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid() can be called,
* depending on whether or not the length/value of the
* peer's CID is needed.
*
* An actual application, however, should use
* just one call to mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(). */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
NULL, NULL );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
return( ret );
}
if( cid_negotiated == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED )
{
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID was rejected by the server.\n",
additional_description );
}
}
else
{
size_t idx=0;
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Use of Connection ID has been negotiated.\n",
additional_description );
/* Ask for just the length of the peer's CID. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
NULL, &peer_cid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Ask for just length + value of the peer's CID. */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid( ssl, &cid_negotiated,
peer_cid, &peer_cid_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_printf( "(%s) Peer CID (length %u Bytes): ",
additional_description,
(unsigned) peer_cid_len );
while( idx < peer_cid_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", peer_cid[ idx ] );
idx++;
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
2015-06-30 13:40:39 +00:00
int ret = 0, len, tail_len, i, written, frags, retry_left;
int query_config_ret = 0;
2015-06-30 13:40:39 +00:00
mbedtls_net_context server_fd;
io_ctx_t io_ctx;
unsigned char buf[MAX_REQUEST_SIZE + 1];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char psk[MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN];
size_t psk_len = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
unsigned char cid_renego[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
size_t cid_len = 0;
size_t cid_renego_len = 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char *alpn_list[ALPN_LIST_SIZE];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
unsigned char alloc_buf[MEMORY_HEAP_SIZE];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve_list[CURVE_LIST_SIZE];
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_cur;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
unsigned char mki[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH];
size_t mki_len=0;
#endif
const char *pers = "ssl_client2";
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_id_t slot = 0;
psa_algorithm_t alg = 0;
2019-08-08 10:38:18 +00:00
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
psa_status_t status;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_profile crt_profile_for_test = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
#endif
rng_context_t rng;
mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
2015-05-04 12:56:36 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session;
unsigned char *session_data = NULL;
size_t session_data_len = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
mbedtls_timing_delay_context timer;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
uint32_t flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt cacert;
mbedtls_x509_crt clicert;
mbedtls_pk_context pkey;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_key_id_t key_slot = 0; /* invalid key slot */
#endif
#endif
char *p, *q;
const int *list;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
unsigned char *context_buf = NULL;
size_t context_buf_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
unsigned char eap_tls_keymaterial[16];
unsigned char eap_tls_iv[8];
const char* eap_tls_label = "client EAP encryption";
eap_tls_keys eap_tls_keying;
#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP )
/*! master keys and master salt for SRTP generated during handshake */
unsigned char dtls_srtp_key_material[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_KEY_MATERIAL_LENGTH];
const char* dtls_srtp_label = "EXTRACTOR-dtls_srtp";
dtls_srtp_keys dtls_srtp_keying;
const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile default_profiles[] = {
MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80,
MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32,
MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80,
MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32,
MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init( alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf) );
#endif
/*
* Make sure memory references are valid.
*/
2015-06-30 13:40:39 +00:00
mbedtls_net_init( &server_fd );
2015-04-28 22:48:22 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl );
2015-05-04 12:56:36 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_config_init( &conf );
memset( &saved_session, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
rng_init( &rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &cacert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( &clicert );
mbedtls_pk_init( &pkey );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
memset( (void * ) alpn_list, 0, sizeof( alpn_list ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
status = psa_crypto_init();
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
mbedtls_fprintf( stderr, "Failed to initialize PSA Crypto implementation: %d\n",
(int) status );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
mbedtls_test_enable_insecure_external_rng( );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( argc == 0 )
{
usage:
if( ret == 0 )
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( USAGE1 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE2 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE3 );
mbedtls_printf( USAGE4 );
list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites();
while( *list )
{
mbedtls_printf(" %-42s", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
if( !*list )
break;
mbedtls_printf(" %s\n", mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( *list ) );
list++;
}
mbedtls_printf("\n");
goto exit;
}
opt.server_name = DFL_SERVER_NAME;
opt.server_addr = DFL_SERVER_ADDR;
opt.server_port = DFL_SERVER_PORT;
opt.debug_level = DFL_DEBUG_LEVEL;
opt.cid_enabled = DFL_CID_ENABLED;
opt.cid_val = DFL_CID_VALUE;
opt.cid_enabled_renego = DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO;
opt.cid_val_renego = DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO;
opt.nbio = DFL_NBIO;
opt.event = DFL_EVENT;
opt.context_crt_cb = DFL_CONTEXT_CRT_CB;
opt.read_timeout = DFL_READ_TIMEOUT;
opt.max_resend = DFL_MAX_RESEND;
opt.request_page = DFL_REQUEST_PAGE;
opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE;
opt.ca_file = DFL_CA_FILE;
2012-06-04 12:46:42 +00:00
opt.ca_path = DFL_CA_PATH;
2010-07-18 08:28:20 +00:00
opt.crt_file = DFL_CRT_FILE;
opt.key_file = DFL_KEY_FILE;
opt.key_opaque = DFL_KEY_OPAQUE;
opt.key_pwd = DFL_KEY_PWD;
opt.psk = DFL_PSK;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
opt.psk_opaque = DFL_PSK_OPAQUE;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
opt.ca_callback = DFL_CA_CALLBACK;
#endif
opt.psk_identity = DFL_PSK_IDENTITY;
opt.ecjpake_pw = DFL_ECJPAKE_PW;
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
opt.ec_max_ops = DFL_EC_MAX_OPS;
opt.force_ciphersuite[0]= DFL_FORCE_CIPHER;
opt.renegotiation = DFL_RENEGOTIATION;
opt.allow_legacy = DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY;
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
opt.renegotiate = DFL_RENEGOTIATE;
opt.exchanges = DFL_EXCHANGES;
opt.min_version = DFL_MIN_VERSION;
opt.max_version = DFL_MAX_VERSION;
opt.arc4 = DFL_ARC4;
opt.allow_sha1 = DFL_SHA1;
opt.auth_mode = DFL_AUTH_MODE;
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
opt.mfl_code = DFL_MFL_CODE;
2013-07-19 09:08:52 +00:00
opt.trunc_hmac = DFL_TRUNC_HMAC;
opt.recsplit = DFL_RECSPLIT;
2015-06-11 15:02:29 +00:00
opt.dhmlen = DFL_DHMLEN;
opt.reconnect = DFL_RECONNECT;
2014-02-20 21:50:56 +00:00
opt.reco_delay = DFL_RECO_DELAY;
opt.reco_mode = DFL_RECO_MODE;
opt.reconnect_hard = DFL_RECONNECT_HARD;
2013-08-03 11:02:31 +00:00
opt.tickets = DFL_TICKETS;
opt.alpn_string = DFL_ALPN_STRING;
opt.curves = DFL_CURVES;
opt.transport = DFL_TRANSPORT;
opt.hs_to_min = DFL_HS_TO_MIN;
opt.hs_to_max = DFL_HS_TO_MAX;
opt.dtls_mtu = DFL_DTLS_MTU;
2014-10-20 11:34:59 +00:00
opt.fallback = DFL_FALLBACK;
opt.extended_ms = DFL_EXTENDED_MS;
opt.etm = DFL_ETM;
opt.dgram_packing = DFL_DGRAM_PACKING;
opt.serialize = DFL_SERIALIZE;
opt.context_file = DFL_CONTEXT_FILE;
opt.eap_tls = DFL_EAP_TLS;
2019-06-06 19:24:31 +00:00
opt.reproducible = DFL_REPRODUCIBLE;
opt.nss_keylog = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG;
opt.nss_keylog_file = DFL_NSS_KEYLOG_FILE;
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
opt.skip_close_notify = DFL_SKIP_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
opt.query_config_mode = DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE;
opt.use_srtp = DFL_USE_SRTP;
opt.force_srtp_profile = DFL_SRTP_FORCE_PROFILE;
opt.mki = DFL_SRTP_MKI;
for( i = 1; i < argc; i++ )
{
p = argv[i];
if( ( q = strchr( p, '=' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*q++ = '\0';
if( strcmp( p, "server_name" ) == 0 )
opt.server_name = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "server_addr" ) == 0 )
opt.server_addr = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "server_port" ) == 0 )
opt.server_port = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "dtls" ) == 0 )
{
int t = atoi( q );
if( t == 0 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM;
else if( t == 1 )
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "debug_level" ) == 0 )
{
opt.debug_level = atoi( q );
if( opt.debug_level < 0 || opt.debug_level > 65535 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "context_crt_cb" ) == 0 )
{
opt.context_crt_cb = atoi( q );
if( opt.context_crt_cb != 0 && opt.context_crt_cb != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "nbio" ) == 0 )
{
opt.nbio = atoi( q );
if( opt.nbio < 0 || opt.nbio > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "event" ) == 0 )
{
opt.event = atoi( q );
if( opt.event < 0 || opt.event > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "read_timeout" ) == 0 )
opt.read_timeout = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "max_resend" ) == 0 )
{
opt.max_resend = atoi( q );
if( opt.max_resend < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "request_page" ) == 0 )
opt.request_page = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "request_size" ) == 0 )
{
opt.request_size = atoi( q );
if( opt.request_size < 0 ||
opt.request_size > MAX_REQUEST_SIZE )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_file" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_file = q;
2012-06-04 12:46:42 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_path" ) == 0 )
opt.ca_path = q;
2010-07-18 08:28:20 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "crt_file" ) == 0 )
opt.crt_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_file" ) == 0 )
opt.key_file = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "key_pwd" ) == 0 )
opt.key_pwd = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
else if( strcmp( p, "key_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.key_opaque = atoi( q );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
else if( strcmp( p, "cid" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled != 0 && opt.cid_enabled != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_enabled_renego = atoi( q );
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego != 0 && opt.cid_enabled_renego != 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "cid_val_renego" ) == 0 )
{
opt.cid_val_renego = q;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
else if( strcmp( p, "psk" ) == 0 )
opt.psk = q;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_opaque" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_opaque = atoi( q );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
else if( strcmp( p, "ca_callback" ) == 0)
opt.ca_callback = atoi( q );
#endif
else if( strcmp( p, "psk_identity" ) == 0 )
opt.psk_identity = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "ecjpake_pw" ) == 0 )
opt.ecjpake_pw = q;
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "ec_max_ops" ) == 0 )
opt.ec_max_ops = atoi( q );
else if( strcmp( p, "force_ciphersuite" ) == 0 )
{
opt.force_ciphersuite[0] = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id( q );
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] == 0 )
{
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.force_ciphersuite[1] = 0;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiation" ) == 0 )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
opt.renegotiation = (atoi( q )) ?
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED :
MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_legacy" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
case -1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE;
break;
case 0:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
case 1:
opt.allow_legacy = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "renegotiate" ) == 0 )
{
opt.renegotiate = atoi( q );
if( opt.renegotiate < 0 || opt.renegotiate > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "exchanges" ) == 0 )
{
opt.exchanges = atoi( q );
if( opt.exchanges < 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reconnect = atoi( q );
2013-08-02 13:04:36 +00:00
if( opt.reconnect < 0 || opt.reconnect > 2 )
goto usage;
}
2014-02-20 21:50:56 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "reco_delay" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reco_delay = atoi( q );
if( opt.reco_delay < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reco_mode" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reco_mode = atoi( q );
if( opt.reco_mode < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "reconnect_hard" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reconnect_hard = atoi( q );
if( opt.reconnect_hard < 0 || opt.reconnect_hard > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2013-08-03 11:02:31 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "tickets" ) == 0 )
{
opt.tickets = atoi( q );
if( opt.tickets < 0 || opt.tickets > 2 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "alpn" ) == 0 )
{
opt.alpn_string = q;
}
2014-10-20 11:34:59 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "fallback" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_NOT_FALLBACK; break;
case 1: opt.fallback = MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK; break;
2014-10-20 11:34:59 +00:00
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "extended_ms" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
case 0:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED;
break;
case 1:
opt.extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "curves" ) == 0 )
opt.curves = q;
else if( strcmp( p, "etm" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.etm = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "min_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "max_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "arc4" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "allow_sha1" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.allow_sha1 = 0; break;
case 1: opt.allow_sha1 = 1; break;
default: goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "force_version" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "ssl3" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0;
}
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1;
}
2014-03-26 11:16:44 +00:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
2014-03-26 11:16:44 +00:00
else if( strcmp( q, "tls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
2014-03-26 11:16:44 +00:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
2014-03-26 11:16:44 +00:00
}
else if( strcmp( q, "dtls1_2" ) == 0 )
{
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3;
opt.transport = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM;
}
else
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "auth_mode" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "none" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
else if( strcmp( q, "optional" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL;
else if( strcmp( q, "required" ) == 0 )
opt.auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
else
goto usage;
}
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "max_frag_len" ) == 0 )
{
if( strcmp( q, "512" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512;
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
else if( strcmp( q, "1024" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024;
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
else if( strcmp( q, "2048" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048;
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
else if( strcmp( q, "4096" ) == 0 )
opt.mfl_code = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096;
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
else
goto usage;
}
2013-07-19 09:08:52 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "trunc_hmac" ) == 0 )
{
switch( atoi( q ) )
{
case 0: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED; break;
case 1: opt.trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; break;
default: goto usage;
}
2013-07-19 09:08:52 +00:00
}
else if( strcmp( p, "hs_timeout" ) == 0 )
{
if( ( p = strchr( q, '-' ) ) == NULL )
goto usage;
*p++ = '\0';
opt.hs_to_min = atoi( q );
opt.hs_to_max = atoi( p );
if( opt.hs_to_min == 0 || opt.hs_to_max < opt.hs_to_min )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "mtu" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dtls_mtu = atoi( q );
if( opt.dtls_mtu < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "dgram_packing" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dgram_packing = atoi( q );
if( opt.dgram_packing != 0 &&
opt.dgram_packing != 1 )
{
goto usage;
}
}
else if( strcmp( p, "recsplit" ) == 0 )
{
opt.recsplit = atoi( q );
if( opt.recsplit < 0 || opt.recsplit > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2015-06-11 15:02:29 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "dhmlen" ) == 0 )
{
opt.dhmlen = atoi( q );
if( opt.dhmlen < 0 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "query_config" ) == 0 )
{
opt.query_config_mode = 1;
query_config_ret = query_config( q );
goto exit;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "serialize") == 0 )
{
opt.serialize = atoi( q );
if( opt.serialize < 0 || opt.serialize > 2)
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "context_file") == 0 )
{
opt.context_file = q;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "eap_tls" ) == 0 )
{
opt.eap_tls = atoi( q );
if( opt.eap_tls < 0 || opt.eap_tls > 1 )
goto usage;
}
2019-06-06 19:24:31 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "reproducible" ) == 0 )
{
opt.reproducible = 1;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog" ) == 0 )
{
opt.nss_keylog = atoi( q );
if( opt.nss_keylog < 0 || opt.nss_keylog > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "nss_keylog_file" ) == 0 )
{
opt.nss_keylog_file = q;
}
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
else if( strcmp( p, "skip_close_notify" ) == 0 )
{
opt.skip_close_notify = atoi( q );
if( opt.skip_close_notify < 0 || opt.skip_close_notify > 1 )
goto usage;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "use_srtp" ) == 0 )
{
opt.use_srtp = atoi ( q );
}
else if( strcmp( p, "srtp_force_profile" ) == 0 )
{
opt.force_srtp_profile = atoi( q );
}
else if( strcmp( p, "mki" ) == 0 )
{
opt.mki = q;
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
}
else
goto usage;
}
if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 && opt.eap_tls != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Error: eap_tls and nss_keylog options cannot be used together.\n" );
goto usage;
}
/* Event-driven IO is incompatible with the above custom
* receive and send functions, as the polling builds on
* refers to the underlying net_context. */
if( opt.event == 1 && opt.nbio != 1 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( "Warning: event-driven IO mandates nbio=1 - overwrite\n" );
opt.nbio = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
mbedtls_debug_set_threshold( opt.debug_level );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/*
* Unhexify the pre-shared key if any is given
*/
if( strlen( opt.psk ) )
{
if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( psk, sizeof( psk ),
opt.psk, &psk_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "pre-shared key not valid\n" );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
if( opt.psk == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "psk_opaque set but no psk to be imported specified.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] <= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] > 0 )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
ciphersuite_info =
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] );
if( opt.max_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver > opt.max_version )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
if( opt.min_version != -1 &&
ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver < opt.min_version )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced ciphersuite not allowed with this protocol version\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* If the server selects a version that's not supported by
* this suite, then there will be no common ciphersuite... */
if( opt.max_version == -1 ||
opt.max_version > ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver )
{
opt.max_version = ciphersuite_info->max_minor_ver;
}
if( opt.min_version < ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver )
{
opt.min_version = ciphersuite_info->min_minor_ver;
/* DTLS starts with TLS 1.1 */
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
opt.min_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
opt.min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2;
}
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
/* Enable RC4 if needed and not explicitly disabled */
if( ciphersuite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
{
if( opt.arc4 == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED )
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( "forced RC4 ciphersuite with RC4 disabled\n" );
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
opt.arc4 = MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_ENABLED;
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* Ensure that the chosen ciphersuite is PSK-only; we must know
* the ciphersuite in advance to set the correct policy for the
* PSK key slot. This limitation might go away in the future. */
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
opt.min_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "opaque PSKs are only supported in conjunction with forcing TLS 1.2 and a PSK-only ciphersuite through the 'force_ciphersuite' option.\n" );
ret = 2;
goto usage;
}
/* Determine KDF algorithm the opaque PSK will be used in. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
if( ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384);
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid, sizeof( cid ),
opt.cid_val, &cid_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid\n" );
goto exit;
}
/* Keep CID settings for renegotiation unless
* specified otherwise. */
if( opt.cid_enabled_renego == DFL_CID_ENABLED_RENEGO )
opt.cid_enabled_renego = opt.cid_enabled;
if( opt.cid_val_renego == DFL_CID_VALUE_RENEGO )
opt.cid_val_renego = opt.cid_val;
if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( cid_renego, sizeof( cid_renego ),
opt.cid_val_renego, &cid_renego_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID not valid\n" );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( opt.curves != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.curves;
i = 0;
if( strcmp( p, "none" ) == 0 )
{
curve_list[0] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
else if( strcmp( p, "default" ) != 0 )
{
/* Leave room for a final NULL in curve list */
while( i < CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
q = p;
/* Terminate the current string */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
if( ( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name( q ) ) != NULL )
{
curve_list[i++] = curve_cur->grp_id;
}
else
{
mbedtls_printf( "unknown curve %s\n", q );
mbedtls_printf( "supported curves: " );
for( curve_cur = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
curve_cur->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
curve_cur++ )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%s ", curve_cur->name );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf("Number of curves: %d\n", i );
if( i == CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
mbedtls_printf( "curves list too long, maximum %d",
CURVE_LIST_SIZE - 1 );
goto exit;
}
curve_list[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
p = (char *) opt.alpn_string;
i = 0;
/* Leave room for a final NULL in alpn_list */
while( i < ALPN_LIST_SIZE - 1 && *p != '\0' )
{
alpn_list[i++] = p;
/* Terminate the current string and move on to next one */
while( *p != ',' && *p != '\0' )
p++;
if( *p == ',' )
*p++ = '\0';
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
/*
* 0. Initialize the RNG and the session data
*/
mbedtls_printf( "\n . Seeding the random number generator..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( rng_seed( &rng, opt.reproducible, pers ) != 0 )
goto exit;
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 1.1. Load the trusted CA
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the CA root certificate ..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) == 0 ||
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) == 0 )
{
ret = 0;
}
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2012-06-04 12:46:42 +00:00
if( strlen( opt.ca_path ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( &cacert, opt.ca_path );
2012-06-04 12:46:42 +00:00
else if( strlen( opt.ca_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &cacert, opt.ca_file );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
if( ret == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
for( i = 0; mbedtls_test_cas_der[i] != NULL; i++ )
{
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( &cacert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cas_der[i],
mbedtls_test_cas_der_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 )
break;
}
}
#else
{
ret = 1;
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CERTS_C */
if( ret < 0 )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok (%d skipped)\n", ret );
/*
* 1.2. Load own certificate and private key
*
* (can be skipped if client authentication is not required)
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Loading the client cert. and key..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) == 0 )
ret = 0;
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2010-07-18 08:28:20 +00:00
if( strlen( opt.crt_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &clicert, opt.crt_file );
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( &clicert,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_crt,
mbedtls_test_cli_crt_len );
#else
{
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_x509_crt_parse returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) == 0 )
ret = 0;
else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
2010-07-18 08:28:20 +00:00
if( strlen( opt.key_file ) )
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile( &pkey, opt.key_file, opt.key_pwd );
2010-07-18 08:28:20 +00:00
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CERTS_C)
ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key( &pkey,
(const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_cli_key,
mbedtls_test_cli_key_len, NULL, 0 );
#else
{
ret = 1;
mbedtls_printf( "MBEDTLS_CERTS_C not defined." );
}
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_pk_parse_key returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.key_opaque != 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque( &pkey, &key_slot,
PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! "
"mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque returned -0x%x\n\n", -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
mbedtls_printf( " ok (key type: %s)\n", mbedtls_pk_get_name( &pkey ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/*
* 2. Start the connection
*/
if( opt.server_addr == NULL)
opt.server_addr = opt.server_name;
mbedtls_printf( " . Connecting to %s/%s/%s...",
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ? "tcp" : "udp",
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd,
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port,
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ?
MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio > 0 )
2015-06-30 13:40:39 +00:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd );
else
2015-06-30 13:40:39 +00:00
ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd );
if( ret != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 3. Setup stuff
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Setting up the SSL/TLS structure..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults( &conf,
MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
opt.transport,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT ) ) != 0 )
2015-05-04 12:56:36 +00:00
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
2015-05-04 12:56:36 +00:00
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/* The default algorithms profile disables SHA-1, but our tests still
rely on it heavily. */
if( opt.allow_sha1 > 0 )
{
crt_profile_for_test.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile( &conf, &crt_profile_for_test );
mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes( &conf, ssl_sig_hashes_for_test );
}
if( opt.context_crt_cb == 0 )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify( &conf, my_verify, NULL );
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 || opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 )
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 12:06:44 +00:00
{
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 &&
opt.cid_enabled_renego == 1 &&
cid_len != cid_renego_len )
{
mbedtls_printf( "CID length must not change during renegotiation\n" );
goto usage;
}
if( opt.cid_enabled == 1 )
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
else
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid( &conf, cid_renego_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 12:06:44 +00:00
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len returned -%#04x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 12:06:44 +00:00
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Add CID configuration API Context: The CID draft does not require that the length of CIDs used for incoming records must not change in the course of a connection. Since the record header does not contain a length field for the CID, this means that if CIDs of varying lengths are used, the CID length must be inferred from other aspects of the record header (such as the epoch) and/or by means outside of the protocol, e.g. by coding its length in the CID itself. Inferring the CID length from the record's epoch is theoretically possible in DTLS 1.2, but it requires the information about the epoch to be present even if the epoch is no longer used: That's because one should silently drop records from old epochs, but not the entire datagrams to which they belong (there might be entire flights in a single datagram, including a change of epoch); however, in order to do so, one needs to parse the record's content length, the position of which is only known once the CID length for the epoch is known. In conclusion, it puts a significant burden on the implementation to infer the CID length from the record epoch, which moreover mangles record processing with the high-level logic of the protocol (determining which epochs are in use in which flights, when they are changed, etc. -- this would normally determine when we drop epochs). Moreover, with DTLS 1.3, CIDs are no longer uniquely associated to epochs, but every epoch may use a set of CIDs of varying lengths -- in that case, it's even theoretically impossible to do record header parsing based on the epoch configuration only. We must therefore seek a way for standalone record header parsing, which means that we must either (a) fix the CID lengths for incoming records, or (b) allow the application-code to configure a callback to implement an application-specific CID parsing which would somehow infer the length of the CID from the CID itself. Supporting multiple lengths for incoming CIDs significantly increases complexity while, on the other hand, the restriction to a fixed CID length for incoming CIDs (which the application controls - in contrast to the lengths of the CIDs used when writing messages to the peer) doesn't appear to severely limit the usefulness of the CID extension. Therefore, the initial implementation of the CID feature will require a fixed length for incoming CIDs, which is what this commit enforces, in the following way: In order to avoid a change of API in case support for variable lengths CIDs shall be added at some point, we keep mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(), which includes a CID length parameter, but add a new API mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len() which applies to an SSL configuration, and which fixes the CID length that any call to mbetls_ssl_set_cid() which applies to an SSL context that is bound to the given SSL configuration must use. While this creates a slight redundancy of parameters, it allows to potentially add an API like mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid_len_cb() later which could allow users to register a callback which dynamically infers the length of a CID at record header parsing time, without changing the rest of the API.
2019-05-03 12:06:44 +00:00
if( opt.auth_mode != DFL_AUTH_MODE )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode( &conf, opt.auth_mode );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.hs_to_min != DFL_HS_TO_MIN || opt.hs_to_max != DFL_HS_TO_MAX )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout( &conf, opt.hs_to_min,
opt.hs_to_max );
if( opt.dgram_packing != DFL_DGRAM_PACKING )
mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( &ssl, opt.dgram_packing );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len( &conf, opt.mfl_code ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
2013-07-16 11:39:57 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile forced_profile[] =
{ opt.force_srtp_profile, MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET };
if( opt.use_srtp == 1 )
{
if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles ( &conf, forced_profile );
}
else
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles ( &conf, default_profiles );
}
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! "
"mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else if( opt.force_srtp_profile != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! must enable use_srtp to force srtp profile\n\n" );
goto exit;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
if( opt.trunc_hmac != DFL_TRUNC_HMAC )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_truncated_hmac( &conf, opt.trunc_hmac );
#endif
2013-07-19 09:08:52 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( opt.extended_ms != DFL_EXTENDED_MS )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret( &conf, opt.extended_ms );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( opt.etm != DFL_ETM )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac( &conf, opt.etm );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
if( opt.eap_tls != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, eap_tls_key_derivation,
&eap_tls_keying );
}
else if( opt.nss_keylog != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf,
nss_keylog_export,
NULL );
}
#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP )
else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb( &conf, dtls_srtp_key_derivation,
&dtls_srtp_keying );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
if( opt.recsplit != DFL_RECSPLIT )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_cbc_record_splitting( &conf, opt.recsplit
? MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_ENABLED
: MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED );
#endif
2015-06-11 15:02:29 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
if( opt.dhmlen != DFL_DHMLEN )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( &conf, opt.dhmlen );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols( &conf, alpn_list ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
2019-06-07 13:04:32 +00:00
if (opt.reproducible)
{
2019-06-11 14:02:43 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
2019-06-06 19:24:31 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT)
mbedtls_platform_set_time( dummy_constant_time );
#else
2019-06-11 10:11:36 +00:00
fprintf( stderr, "Warning: reproducible option used without constant time\n" );
2019-06-11 10:15:17 +00:00
#endif
2019-06-06 19:24:31 +00:00
#endif
2019-06-07 13:04:32 +00:00
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng( &conf, rng_get, &rng );
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg( &conf, my_debug, stdout );
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout( &conf, opt.read_timeout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets( &conf, opt.tickets );
#endif
2013-08-03 11:02:31 +00:00
if( opt.force_ciphersuite[0] != DFL_FORCE_CIPHER )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites( &conf, opt.force_ciphersuite );
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
2015-03-20 19:44:04 +00:00
if( opt.arc4 != DFL_ARC4 )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_arc4_support( &conf, opt.arc4 );
#endif
if( opt.allow_legacy != DFL_ALLOW_LEGACY )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation( &conf, opt.allow_legacy );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation( &conf, opt.renegotiation );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( strcmp( opt.ca_path, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.ca_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
if( opt.ca_callback != 0 )
2019-03-28 14:14:22 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb( &conf, ca_callback, &cacert );
else
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain( &conf, &cacert, NULL );
}
if( strcmp( opt.crt_file, "none" ) != 0 &&
strcmp( opt.key_file, "none" ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert( &conf, &clicert, &pkey ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
if( opt.curves != NULL &&
strcmp( opt.curves, "default" ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves( &conf, curve_list );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
2019-08-08 10:38:18 +00:00
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, alg );
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE );
2019-08-08 10:38:18 +00:00
status = psa_import_key( &key_attributes, psk, psk_len, &slot );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque( &conf, slot,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( psk_len > 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk( &conf, psk, psk_len,
(const unsigned char *) opt.psk_identity,
strlen( opt.psk_identity ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
if( opt.min_version != DFL_MIN_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
opt.min_version );
if( opt.max_version != DFL_MAX_VERSION )
mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
opt.max_version );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
2014-10-20 11:34:59 +00:00
if( opt.fallback != DFL_FALLBACK )
2015-05-11 07:50:24 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_conf_fallback( &conf, opt.fallback );
2014-10-20 11:34:59 +00:00
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname( &ssl, opt.server_name ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( opt.ecjpake_pw != DFL_ECJPAKE_PW )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password( &ssl,
(const unsigned char *) opt.ecjpake_pw,
strlen( opt.ecjpake_pw ) ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( opt.context_crt_cb == 1 )
mbedtls_ssl_set_verify( &ssl, my_verify, NULL );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
io_ctx.ssl = &ssl;
io_ctx.net = &server_fd;
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &io_ctx, send_cb, recv_cb,
opt.nbio == 0 ? recv_timeout_cb : NULL );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled,
cid, cid_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( opt.dtls_mtu != DFL_DTLS_MTU )
mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( &ssl, opt.dtls_mtu );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer, mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
#endif
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( opt.ec_max_ops != DFL_EC_MAX_OPS )
mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( opt.ec_max_ops );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
if( opt.use_srtp != 0 && strlen( opt.mki ) != 0 )
{
if( mbedtls_test_unhexify( mki, sizeof( mki ),
opt.mki,&mki_len ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "mki value not valid hex\n" );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported( &conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value( &ssl, mki,
(uint16_t) strlen( opt.mki ) / 2 ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value returned %d\n\n", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/*
* 4. Handshake
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Performing the SSL/TLS handshake..." );
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )
mbedtls_printf(
" Unable to verify the server's certificate. "
"Either it is invalid,\n"
" or you didn't set ca_file or ca_path "
"to an appropriate value.\n"
" Alternatively, you may want to use "
"auth_mode=optional for testing purposes.\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
goto exit;
}
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
continue;
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
#endif
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
ret = idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
ret = idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n [ Protocol is %s ]\n [ Ciphersuite is %s ]\n",
mbedtls_ssl_get_version( &ssl ),
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite( &ssl ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( &ssl ) ) >= 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is %d ]\n", ret );
2014-10-14 15:47:31 +00:00
else
mbedtls_printf( " [ Record expansion is unknown (compression) ]\n" );
2014-10-14 15:47:31 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum input fragment length is %u ]\n",
(unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( &ssl ) );
mbedtls_printf( " [ Maximum output fragment length is %u ]\n",
(unsigned int) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( &ssl ) );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
if( opt.alpn_string != NULL )
{
const char *alp = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol( &ssl );
mbedtls_printf( " [ Application Layer Protocol is %s ]\n",
alp ? alp : "(none)" );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS)
if( opt.eap_tls != 0 )
{
size_t j = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type,
eap_tls_keying.master_secret,
sizeof( eap_tls_keying.master_secret ),
eap_tls_label,
eap_tls_keying.randbytes,
sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ),
eap_tls_keymaterial,
sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ) ) )
!= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS key material is:" );
for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_keymaterial ); j++ )
{
if( j % 8 == 0 )
mbedtls_printf("\n ");
mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_keymaterial[j] );
}
mbedtls_printf("\n");
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( eap_tls_keying.tls_prf_type, NULL, 0,
eap_tls_label,
eap_tls_keying.randbytes,
sizeof( eap_tls_keying.randbytes ),
eap_tls_iv,
sizeof( eap_tls_iv ) ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " EAP-TLS IV is:" );
for( j = 0; j < sizeof( eap_tls_iv ); j++ )
{
if( j % 8 == 0 )
mbedtls_printf("\n ");
mbedtls_printf("%02x ", eap_tls_iv[j] );
}
mbedtls_printf("\n");
}
#if defined( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP )
else if( opt.use_srtp != 0 )
{
size_t j = 0;
mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info dtls_srtp_negotiation_result;
mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result( &ssl, &dtls_srtp_negotiation_result );
if( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile
== MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
{
mbedtls_printf( " Unable to negotiate "
"the use of DTLS-SRTP\n" );
}
else
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf( dtls_srtp_keying.tls_prf_type,
dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret,
sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.master_secret ),
dtls_srtp_label,
dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes,
sizeof( dtls_srtp_keying.randbytes ),
dtls_srtp_key_material,
sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ) ) )
!= 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP key material is:" );
for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ )
{
if( j % 8 == 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "\n " );
mbedtls_printf( "%02x ", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
/* produce a less readable output used to perform automatic checks
* - compare client and server output
* - interop test with openssl which client produces this kind of output
*/
mbedtls_printf( " Keying material: " );
for( j = 0; j < sizeof( dtls_srtp_key_material ); j++ )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_key_material[j] );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
if ( dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len > 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP mki value: " );
for( j = 0; j < dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_len; j++ )
{
mbedtls_printf( "%02X", dtls_srtp_negotiation_result.mki_value[j] );
}
}
else
{
mbedtls_printf( " DTLS-SRTP no mki value negotiated" );
}
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS */
if( opt.reconnect != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf(" . Saving session for reuse..." );
fflush( stdout );
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
/* free any previously saved data */
if( session_data != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
mbedtls_free( session_data );
session_data = NULL;
}
/* get size of the buffer needed */
mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ),
NULL, 0, &session_data_len );
session_data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, session_data_len );
if( session_data == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! alloc %u bytes for session data\n",
(unsigned) session_data_len );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
/* actually save session data */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save( mbedtls_ssl_get_session_pointer( &ssl ),
session_data, session_data_len,
&session_data_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_saved returned -0x%04x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
else
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session( &ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_get_session returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " [ Saved %u bytes of session data]\n",
(unsigned) session_data_len );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* 5. Verify the server certificate
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Verifying peer X.509 certificate..." );
2015-05-11 17:54:43 +00:00
if( ( flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
char vrfy_buf[512];
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n" );
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( vrfy_buf, sizeof( vrfy_buf ),
" ! ", flags );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", vrfy_buf );
}
else
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
mbedtls_printf( " . Peer certificate information ...\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "%s\n", peer_crt_info );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "initial handshake" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_cid( &ssl, opt.cid_enabled_renego,
cid_renego,
cid_renego_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_cid returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
if( opt.renegotiate )
{
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
/*
* Perform renegotiation (this must be done when the server is waiting
* for input from our side).
*/
mbedtls_printf( " . Performing renegotiation..." );
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
fflush( stdout );
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-06 15:19:31 +00:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate returned %d\n\n",
ret );
2014-02-20 16:19:59 +00:00
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
continue;
#endif
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ret = report_cid_usage( &ssl, "after renegotiation" );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/*
* 6. Write the GET request
*/
2014-10-14 09:47:21 +00:00
retry_left = opt.max_resend;
send_request:
mbedtls_printf( " > Write to server:" );
fflush( stdout );
len = mbedtls_snprintf( (char *) buf, sizeof( buf ) - 1, GET_REQUEST,
opt.request_page );
tail_len = (int) strlen( GET_REQUEST_END );
/* Add padding to GET request to reach opt.request_size in length */
if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE &&
len + tail_len < opt.request_size )
{
memset( buf + len, 'A', opt.request_size - len - tail_len );
len += opt.request_size - len - tail_len;
}
strncpy( (char *) buf + len, GET_REQUEST_END, sizeof( buf ) - len - 1 );
len += tail_len;
/* Truncate if request size is smaller than the "natural" size */
if( opt.request_size != DFL_REQUEST_SIZE &&
len > opt.request_size )
{
len = opt.request_size;
/* Still end with \r\n unless that's really not possible */
if( len >= 2 ) buf[len - 2] = '\r';
if( len >= 1 ) buf[len - 1] = '\n';
}
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
written = 0;
frags = 0;
do
{
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf + written,
len - written ) ) < 0 )
{
2015-05-06 15:19:31 +00:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
frags++;
written += ret;
}
while( written < len );
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
while( 1 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write( &ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
continue;
#endif
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
if( ret < 0 )
{
2017-10-27 12:43:58 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_write returned %d\n\n",
ret );
goto exit;
}
frags = 1;
written = ret;
if( written < len )
{
mbedtls_printf( " warning\n ! request didn't fit into single datagram and "
"was truncated to size %u", (unsigned) written );
}
}
buf[written] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes written in %d fragments\n\n%s\n",
written, frags, (char *) buf );
/* Send a non-empty request if request_size == 0 */
if ( len == 0 )
{
opt.request_size = DFL_REQUEST_SIZE;
goto send_request;
}
/*
* 7. Read the HTTP response
*/
mbedtls_printf( " < Read from server:" );
fflush( stdout );
/*
* TLS and DTLS need different reading styles (stream vs datagram)
*/
if( opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
do
{
len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
continue;
#endif
2015-05-06 15:19:31 +00:00
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
{
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
continue;
}
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
ret = 0;
goto close_notify;
case 0:
case MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was reset by peer\n" );
ret = 0;
goto reconnect;
default:
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf );
/* End of message should be detected according to the syntax of the
* application protocol (eg HTTP), just use a dummy test here. */
if( ret > 0 && buf[len-1] == '\n' )
{
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
while( 1 );
}
else /* Not stream, so datagram */
{
len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
memset( buf, 0, sizeof( buf ) );
while( 1 )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read( &ssl, buf, len );
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
Merge branch 'development' into iotssl-1260-non-blocking-ecc-restricted Summary of merge conflicts: include/mbedtls/ecdh.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h -> documentation style include/mbedtls/ecp.h -> alt style, new error codes, documentation style include/mbedtls/error.h -> new error codes library/error.c -> new error codes (generated anyway) library/ecp.c: - code of an extracted function was changed library/ssl_cli.c: - code addition on one side near code change on the other side (ciphersuite validation) library/x509_crt.c -> various things - top fo file: helper structure added near old zeroize removed - documentation of find_parent_in()'s signature: improved on one side, added arguments on the other side - documentation of find_parent()'s signature: same as above - verify_chain(): variables initialised later to give compiler an opportunity to warn us if not initialised on a code path - find_parent(): funcion structure completely changed, for some reason git tried to insert a paragraph of the old structure... - merge_flags_with_cb(): data structure changed, one line was fixed with a cast to keep MSVC happy, this cast is already in the new version - in verify_restratable(): adjacent independent changes (function signature on one line, variable type on the next) programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c: - testing for IN_PROGRESS return code near idle() (event-driven): don't wait for data in the the socket if ECP_IN_PROGRESS tests/data_files/Makefile: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_ecdsa.data: adjacent independent additions tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data: adjacent independent additions * development: (1059 commits) Change symlink to hardlink to avoid permission issues Fix out-of-tree testing symlinks on Windows Updated version number to 2.10.0 for release Add a disabled CMAC define in the no-entropy configuration Adapt the ARIA test cases for new ECB function Fix file permissions for ssl.h Add ChangeLog entry for PR#1651 Fix MicroBlaze register typo. Fix typo in doc and copy missing warning Fix edit mistake in cipher_wrap.c Update CTR doc for the 64-bit block cipher Update CTR doc for other 128-bit block ciphers Slightly tune ARIA CTR documentation Remove double declaration of mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites Update CTR documentation Use zeroize function from new platform_util Move to new header style for ALT implementations Add ifdef for selftest in header file Fix typo in comments Use more appropriate type for local variable ...
2018-06-12 10:40:54 +00:00
continue;
#endif
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
break;
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
if( ret <= 0 )
{
switch( ret )
{
2015-05-06 15:19:31 +00:00
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT:
mbedtls_printf( " timeout\n" );
2014-10-14 09:47:21 +00:00
if( retry_left-- > 0 )
goto send_request;
goto exit;
case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
mbedtls_printf( " connection was closed gracefully\n" );
ret = 0;
goto close_notify;
default:
mbedtls_printf( " mbedtls_ssl_read returned -0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
len = ret;
buf[len] = '\0';
mbedtls_printf( " %d bytes read\n\n%s", len, (char *) buf );
ret = 0;
}
/*
* 7b. Simulate hard reset and reconnect from same port?
*/
if( opt.reconnect_hard != 0 )
{
opt.reconnect_hard = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " . Restarting connection from same port..." );
fflush( stdout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
/* For event-driven IO, wait for socket to become available */
if( opt.event == 1 /* level triggered IO */ )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
idle( &server_fd, &timer, ret );
#else
idle( &server_fd, ret );
#endif
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
goto send_request;
}
/*
* 7c. Simulate serialize/deserialize and go back to data exchange
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( opt.serialize != 0 )
{
2019-06-06 12:10:07 +00:00
size_t buf_len;
mbedtls_printf( " . Serializing live connection..." );
2019-06-06 12:10:07 +00:00
ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, NULL, 0, &buf_len );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
2019-06-06 12:10:07 +00:00
if( ( context_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, buf_len ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for "
"serialized context" );
goto exit;
}
context_buf_len = buf_len;
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_save( &ssl, context_buf,
buf_len, &buf_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_save returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
/* Save serialized context to the 'opt.context_file' as a base64 code */
if( 0 < strlen( opt.context_file ) )
{
FILE *b64_file;
uint8_t *b64_buf;
size_t b64_len;
mbedtls_printf( " . Save serialized context to a file... " );
mbedtls_base64_encode( NULL, 0, &b64_len, context_buf, buf_len );
if( ( b64_buf = mbedtls_calloc( 1, b64_len ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Couldn't allocate buffer for "
"the base64 code\n" );
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_base64_encode( b64_buf, b64_len, &b64_len,
context_buf, buf_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_base64_encode returned "
"-0x%x\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
mbedtls_free( b64_buf );
goto exit;
}
if( ( b64_file = fopen( opt.context_file, "w" ) ) == NULL )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! Cannot open '%s' for writing.\n",
opt.context_file );
mbedtls_free( b64_buf );
goto exit;
}
if( b64_len != fwrite( b64_buf, 1, b64_len, b64_file ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! fwrite(%ld bytes) failed\n",
(long) b64_len );
mbedtls_free( b64_buf );
fclose( b64_file );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_free( b64_buf );
fclose( b64_file );
mbedtls_printf( "ok\n" );
}
if( opt.serialize == 1 )
{
/* nothing to do here, done by context_save() already */
mbedtls_printf( " . Context has been reset... ok\n" );
}
if( opt.serialize == 2 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " . Freeing and reinitializing context..." );
mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_init( &ssl );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_setup( &ssl, &conf ) ) != 0 )
{
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_setup returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio == 2 )
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, delayed_send,
delayed_recv, NULL );
else
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( &ssl, &server_fd, mbedtls_net_send,
mbedtls_net_recv,
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
opt.nbio == 0 ? mbedtls_net_recv_timeout : NULL );
2019-06-13 08:45:06 +00:00
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb( &ssl, &timer,
mbedtls_timing_set_delay,
mbedtls_timing_get_delay );
2019-06-13 08:45:06 +00:00
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
mbedtls_printf( " . Deserializing connection..." );
2019-06-13 09:22:50 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_context_load( &ssl, context_buf,
buf_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_context_load returned "
"-0x%x\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
context_buf = NULL;
context_buf_len = 0;
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
/*
* 7d. Continue doing data exchanges?
*/
if( --opt.exchanges > 0 )
goto send_request;
/*
* 8. Done, cleanly close the connection
*/
close_notify:
mbedtls_printf( " . Closing the connection..." );
fflush( stdout );
Fix possible close_notify/ClientHello confusion The ssl-opt.sh test cases using session resumption tend to fail occasionally on the CI due to a race condition in how ssl_server2 and ssl_client2 handle the reconnection cycle. The server does the following in order: - S1 send application data - S2 send a close_notify alert - S3 close the client socket - S4 wait for a "new connection" (actually a new datagram) - S5 start a handshake The client does the following in order: - C1 wait for and read application data from the server - C2 send a close_notify alert - C3 close the server socket - C4 reset session data and re-open a server socket - C5 start a handshake If the client has been able to send the close_notify (C2) and if has been delivered to the server before if closes the client socket (S3), when the server reaches S4, the datagram that we start the new connection will be the ClientHello and everything will be fine. However if S3 wins the race and happens before the close_notify is delivered, in S4 the close_notify is what will be seen as the first datagram in a new connection, and then in S5 this will rightfully be rejected as not being a valid ClientHello and the server will close the connection (and go wait for another one). The client will then fail to read from the socket and exit non-zero and the ssl-opt.sh harness will correctly report this as a failure. In order to avoid this race condition in test using ssl_client2 and ssl_server2, this commits introduces a new command-line option skip_close_notify to ssl_client2 and uses it in all ssl-opt.sh tests that use session resumption with DTLS and ssl_server2. This works because ssl_server2 knows how many messages it expects in each direction and in what order, and closes the connection after that rather than relying on close_notify (which is also why there was a race in the first place). Tests that use another server (in practice there are two of them, using OpenSSL as a server) wouldn't work with skip_close_notify, as the server won't close the connection until the client sends a close_notify, but for the same reason they don't need it (there is no race between receiving close_notify and closing as the former is the cause of the later). An alternative approach would be to make ssl_server2 keep the connection open until it receives a close_notify. Unfortunately it creates problems for tests where we simulate a lossy network, as the close_notify could be lost (and the client can't retransmit it). We could modify udp_proxy with an option to never drop alert messages, but when TLS 1.3 comes that would no longer work as the type of messages will be encrypted. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2020-02-17 10:04:33 +00:00
/*
* Most of the time sending a close_notify before closing is the right
* thing to do. However, when the server already knows how many messages
* are expected and closes the connection by itself, this alert becomes
* redundant. Sometimes with DTLS this redundancy becomes a problem by
* leading to a race condition where the server might close the connection
* before seeing the alert, and since UDP is connection-less when the
* alert arrives it will be seen as a new connection, which will fail as
* the alert is clearly not a valid ClientHello. This may cause spurious
* failures in tests that use DTLS and resumption with ssl_server2 in
* ssl-opt.sh, avoided by enabling skip_close_notify client-side.
*/
if( opt.skip_close_notify == 0 )
{
/* No error checking, the connection might be closed already */
do ret = mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( &ssl );
while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE );
ret = 0;
}
mbedtls_printf( " done\n" );
/*
* 9. Reconnect?
*/
reconnect:
if( opt.reconnect != 0 )
{
2013-08-02 13:04:36 +00:00
--opt.reconnect;
mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
2014-02-20 21:50:56 +00:00
if( opt.reco_delay > 0 )
mbedtls_net_usleep( 1000000 * opt.reco_delay );
#endif
mbedtls_printf( " . Reconnecting with saved session..." );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
memset( peer_crt_info, 0, sizeof( peer_crt_info ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
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mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_reset returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.reco_mode == 1 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load( &saved_session,
session_data,
session_data_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_session_load returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session( &ssl, &saved_session ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_set_session returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
if( ( ret = mbedtls_net_connect( &server_fd,
opt.server_addr, opt.server_port,
opt.transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ?
MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP : MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ) ) != 0 )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_net_connect returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
if( opt.nbio > 0 )
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ret = mbedtls_net_set_nonblock( &server_fd );
else
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ret = mbedtls_net_set_block( &server_fd );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! net_set_(non)block() returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
while( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( &ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
2015-05-06 15:19:31 +00:00
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
2017-05-16 06:50:24 +00:00
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE &&
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
{
2017-10-10 14:59:57 +00:00
mbedtls_printf( " failed\n ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n\n",
(unsigned int) -ret );
goto exit;
}
}
mbedtls_printf( " ok\n" );
goto send_request;
}
/*
* Cleanup and exit
*/
exit:
#ifdef MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
if( ret != 0 )
{
char error_buf[100];
mbedtls_strerror( ret, error_buf, 100 );
mbedtls_printf("Last error was: -0x%X - %s\n\n", (unsigned int) -ret, error_buf );
}
#endif
mbedtls_net_free( &server_fd );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &clicert );
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( &cacert );
mbedtls_pk_free( &pkey );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_destroy_key( key_slot );
#endif
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &saved_session );
mbedtls_ssl_free( &ssl );
2015-05-04 12:56:36 +00:00
mbedtls_ssl_config_free( &conf );
rng_free( &rng );
if( session_data != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( session_data, session_data_len );
mbedtls_free( session_data );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
if( context_buf != NULL )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( context_buf, context_buf_len );
mbedtls_free( context_buf );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( opt.psk_opaque != 0 )
{
/* This is ok even if the slot hasn't been
* initialized (we might have jumed here
* immediately because of bad cmd line params,
* for example). */
status = psa_destroy_key( slot );
if( ( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) &&
( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE ) )
{
mbedtls_printf( "Failed to destroy key slot %u - error was %d",
(unsigned) slot, (int) status );
if( ret == 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED &&
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status();
#endif
mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
#endif
#if defined(_WIN32)
if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE )
{
mbedtls_printf( " + Press Enter to exit this program.\n" );
fflush( stdout ); getchar();
}
#endif
// Shell can not handle large exit numbers -> 1 for errors
if( ret < 0 )
ret = 1;
if( opt.query_config_mode == DFL_QUERY_CONFIG_MODE )
mbedtls_exit( ret );
else
mbedtls_exit( query_config_ret );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */