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Rename PSA_KDF_STEP_xxx -> PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx

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More consistent with the new function names.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2019-05-16 16:05:19 +02:00
parent a99d3fbd05
commit 03410b5c5f
3 changed files with 33 additions and 33 deletions
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18
include/psa/crypto_values.h
View file

@ -1216,12 +1216,12 @@
* For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256. * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
* *
* This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs: * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
* - #PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
* It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt. * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
* - #PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
* - #PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step. * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
* You must pass #PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT before #PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET. * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
* You may pass #PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO at any time after steup and before * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
* starting to generate output. * starting to generate output.
* *
* \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
@ -1590,25 +1590,25 @@
* *
* This must be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. * This must be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE.
*/ */
#define PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101) #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0101)
/** A label for key derivation. /** A label for key derivation.
* *
* This must be a direct input. * This must be a direct input.
*/ */
#define PSA_KDF_STEP_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201) #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0201)
/** A salt for key derivation. /** A salt for key derivation.
* *
* This must be a direct input. * This must be a direct input.
*/ */
#define PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202) #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0202)
/** An information string for key derivation. /** An information string for key derivation.
* *
* This must be a direct input. * This must be a direct input.
*/ */
#define PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203) #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t)0x0203)
/**@}*/ /**@}*/

14
library/psa_crypto.c
View file

@ -4914,7 +4914,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
psa_status_t status; psa_status_t status;
switch( step ) switch( step )
{ {
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT ) if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac, status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
@ -4924,7 +4924,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
return( status ); return( status );
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
return( PSA_SUCCESS ); return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
/* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */ /* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT ) if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
{ {
@ -4950,7 +4950,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
hkdf->block_number = 0; hkdf->block_number = 0;
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
return( PSA_SUCCESS ); return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT ) if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( hkdf->info_set ) if( hkdf->info_set )
@ -5029,9 +5029,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *gen
{ {
switch( step ) switch( step )
{ {
case PSA_KDF_STEP_LABEL: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO: case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:
return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, step, return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, step,
data, data_length ) ); data, data_length ) );
default: default:
@ -5058,7 +5058,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *gener
* the material should be dedicated to a particular input step, * the material should be dedicated to a particular input step,
* otherwise this may allow the key to be used in an unintended way * otherwise this may allow the key to be used in an unintended way
* and leak values derived from the key. So be conservative. */ * and leak values derived from the key. So be conservative. */
if( step != PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET ) if( step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator,
step, step,

34
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function
View file

@ -538,14 +538,14 @@ static int exercise_key_derivation_key( psa_key_handle_t handle,
{ {
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) ); PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
label, label,
label_length ) ); label_length ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
handle ) ); handle ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
seed, seed,
seed_length ) ); seed_length ) );
} }
@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ static psa_status_t key_agreement_with_self( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *gen
public_key, public_key_length, public_key, public_key_length,
&public_key_length ) ); &public_key_length ) );
status = psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, handle, status = psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( generator, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, handle,
public_key, public_key_length ); public_key, public_key_length );
exit: exit:
mbedtls_free( public_key ); mbedtls_free( public_key );
@ -4188,13 +4188,13 @@ void derive_output( int alg_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &generator,
requested_capacity ) ); requested_capacity ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
salt->x, salt->len ) ); salt->x, salt->len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
handle ) ); handle ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
label->x, label->len ) ); label->x, label->len ) );
} }
else else
@ -4284,13 +4284,13 @@ void derive_full( int alg_arg,
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_set_capacity( &generator,
requested_capacity ) ); requested_capacity ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT,
salt->x, salt->len ) ); salt->x, salt->len ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
handle ) ); handle ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
label->x, label->len ) ); label->x, label->len ) );
} }
else else
@ -4502,7 +4502,7 @@ void key_agreement_setup( int alg_arg,
status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ); status = psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg );
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
{ {
TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, TEST_EQUAL( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
our_key, our_key,
peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ), peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ),
expected_status ); expected_status );
@ -4580,14 +4580,14 @@ void key_agreement_capacity( int alg_arg,
&our_key ) ); &our_key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) ); PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
our_key, our_key,
peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) ); peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) );
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) ) if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) )
{ {
/* The test data is for info="" */ /* The test data is for info="" */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
NULL, 0 ) ); NULL, 0 ) );
} }
@ -4641,14 +4641,14 @@ void key_agreement_output( int alg_arg,
&our_key ) ); &our_key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) ); PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_key_agreement( &generator, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
our_key, our_key,
peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) ); peer_key_data->x, peer_key_data->len ) );
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) ) if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF( alg ) ) )
{ {
/* The test data is for info="" */ /* The test data is for info="" */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
NULL, 0 ) ); NULL, 0 ) );
} }
@ -4935,10 +4935,10 @@ void persistent_key_load_key_from_storage( data_t *data,
/* Derive a key. */ /* Derive a key. */
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, derive_alg ) ); PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_setup( &generator, derive_alg ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_key( &generator,
PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
base_key ) ); base_key ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
&generator, PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO, &generator, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO,
NULL, 0 ) ); NULL, 0 ) );
PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &generator, PSA_ASSERT( psa_key_derivation_output_key( &attributes, &generator,
&handle ) ); &handle ) );