Merge pull request #3876 from maroneze/development

Fix another use of uinitialized memory in ssl_parse_encrypted_pms
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Gilles Peskine 2020-11-18 18:40:47 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit 11ead84049
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@ -3929,11 +3929,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than
* 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't
* matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to
* peer_pmslen being less than 48, and we only care whether diff is 0.
* But do initialize peer_pms for robustness anyway. This also makes
* memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, even
* if it's an unsigned char). */
* ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0.
* But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This
* also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory,
* even if it's an unsigned char). */
peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0;
peer_pmslen = 0;
ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end,
peer_pms,