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Make use of CRT acquire/release for child in CRT chain verification

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During CRT verification, `x509_crt_check_signature()` checks whether a
candidate parent CRT correctly signs the current child CRT.

This commit rewrites this function to use the new acquire/release
framework for using CRTs.
This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker 2019-02-25 14:58:22 +00:00
parent 337088aa2d
commit 1e0677acc1
1 changed files with 78 additions and 35 deletions
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113
library/x509_crt.c
View file

@ -2162,38 +2162,66 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( unsigned char *crt_serial,
/*
* Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
*/
static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt_frame *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
int ret;
size_t hash_len;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
mbedtls_md_type_t sig_md;
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_pk;
void *sig_opts;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
{
/* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
return( -1 );
/* Get signature options -- currently only
* necessary for RSASSA-PSS. */
unsigned char *p = child->sig_alg.p;
unsigned char *end = p + child->sig_alg.len;
ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg_raw( &p, end, &sig_md,
&sig_pk, &sig_opts );
if( ret != 0 )
{
/* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */
return( -1 );
}
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
sig_md = child->sig_md;
sig_pk = child->sig_pk;
sig_opts = NULL;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( sig_md );
if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, sig_pk ) )
return( -1 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
{
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
}
#else
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_pk, sig_opts, &parent->pk,
sig_md, hash, hash_len,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len );
mbedtls_free( sig_opts );
return( ret );
}
/*
@ -2202,14 +2230,14 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
*
* top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate
*/
static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt_frame *child,
const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
int top )
{
int need_ca_bit;
/* Parent must be the issuer */
if( mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &child->issuer_raw_no_hdr,
if( mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &child->issuer_raw,
&parent->subject_raw_no_hdr,
NULL, NULL ) != 0 )
{
@ -2281,7 +2309,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame const *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
int *r_signature_is_good,
@ -2406,7 +2434,8 @@ check_signature:
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static int x509_crt_find_parent(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame const *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *rest,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
int *parent_is_trusted,
@ -2430,7 +2459,7 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent(
#endif
while( 1 ) {
search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : rest;
ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list,
parent, signature_is_good,
@ -2473,14 +2502,14 @@ static int x509_crt_find_parent(
* check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)
*/
static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca )
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame const *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt const *trust_ca )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *cur;
mbedtls_x509_crt const *cur;
/* must be self-issued */
if( mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &crt->issuer_raw_no_hdr,
&crt->subject_raw_no_hdr,
if( mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &crt->issuer_raw,
&crt->subject_raw,
NULL, NULL ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
@ -2553,7 +2582,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
int ret;
uint32_t *flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child_crt;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int parent_is_trusted;
int child_is_trusted;
@ -2570,20 +2599,24 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* restore derived state */
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
child = cur->crt;
child_crt = cur->crt;
child_is_trusted = 0;
goto find_parent;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
child = crt;
child_crt = crt;
self_cnt = 0;
parent_is_trusted = 0;
child_is_trusted = 0;
while( 1 ) {
mbedtls_x509_crt_frame *child;
/* Add certificate to the verification chain */
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
cur->crt = child;
cur->crt = child_crt;
cur->flags = 0;
ver_chain->len++;
@ -2591,6 +2624,10 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
find_parent:
#endif
ret = x509_crt_frame_acquire( child_crt, &child );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
flags = &cur->flags;
/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
@ -2602,7 +2639,7 @@ find_parent:
/* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
if( child_is_trusted )
return( 0 );
goto release;
/* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
@ -2615,13 +2652,13 @@ find_parent:
if( ver_chain->len == 1 &&
x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
goto release;
}
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent,
&parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
&parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
@ -2631,7 +2668,7 @@ find_parent:
rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
return( ret );
goto release;
}
#else
(void) ret;
@ -2641,15 +2678,15 @@ find_parent:
if( parent == NULL )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( 0 );
goto release;
}
/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
if( ver_chain->len != 1 &&
mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &child->issuer_raw_no_hdr,
&child->subject_raw_no_hdr,
mbedtls_x509_name_cmp_raw( &child->issuer_raw,
&child->subject_raw,
NULL, NULL ) == 0 )
{
self_cnt++;
@ -2661,7 +2698,8 @@ find_parent:
ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
goto release;
}
/* signature was checked while searching parent */
@ -2682,11 +2720,16 @@ find_parent:
#endif
/* prepare for next iteration */
child = parent;
x509_crt_frame_release( child_crt, child );
child_crt = parent;
parent = NULL;
child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
signature_is_good = 0;
}
release:
x509_crt_frame_release( child_crt, child );
return( ret );
}
/*