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Add ChangeLog entry
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ChangeLog
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ChangeLog
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@ -2,8 +2,22 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
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= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
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= mbed TLS x.x.x branch released xxxx-xx-xx
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Bugfix
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Security
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* Fix a vulnerability in TLS ciphersuites based on CBC and using SHA-384,
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in (D)TLS 1.0 to 1.2, that allowed an active network attacker to
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partially recover the plaintext of messages under some conditions by
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exploiting timing measurements. With DTLS, the attacker could perform
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this recovery by sending many messages in the same connection. With TLS
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or if mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit() was used, the attack only
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worked if the same secret (for example a HTTP Cookie) has been repeatedly
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sent over connections manipulated by the attacker. Connections using GCM
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or CCM instead of CBC, using hash sizes other than SHA-384, or using
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Encrypt-then-Mac (RFC 7366) were not affected. The vulnerability was
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caused by a miscalculation (for SHA-384) in a countermeasure to the
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original Lucky 13 attack. Found by Kenny Paterson, Eyal Ronen and Adi
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Shamir.
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Bugfix
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* Fix braces in mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(). Found by sbranden, #552.
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* Fix braces in mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(). Found by sbranden, #552.
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* Added the macro MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN that enables the user to
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* Added the macro MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN that enables the user to
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configure the maximum length of a file path that can be buffered when
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configure the maximum length of a file path that can be buffered when
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