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- Added x509_get_sig_alg() to allow easy future X509 signature algorithm determination expansion

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This commit is contained in:
Paul Bakker 2010-03-17 06:56:01 +00:00
parent 41d13f4af8
commit 27d661657b
3 changed files with 38 additions and 27 deletions
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6
ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
PolarSSL ChangeLog
= Version 0.12.2 released on XXXXXXXX
Changes
Features
* Added option parsing for host and port selection to
ssl_client2
* Added support for GeneralizedTime in X509 parsing
Changes
* Added const correctness for main code base
* X509 signature algorithm determination is now
in a function to allow easy future expansion
Bug fixes
* Fixed bug resulting in failure to send the last

2
include/polarssl/x509.h
View file

@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ typedef struct _x509_cert
x509_buf sig_oid2;
x509_buf sig;
int sig_alg;
struct _x509_cert *next;
}
@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ typedef struct _x509_crl
x509_buf sig_oid2;
x509_buf sig;
int sig_alg;
struct _x509_crl *next;
}

57
library/x509parse.c
View file

@ -790,6 +790,29 @@ static int x509_get_entries( unsigned char **p,
return( 0 );
}
static int x509_get_sig_alg( const x509_buf *sig_oid, int *sig_alg )
{
if( sig_oid->len == 9 &&
memcmp( sig_oid->p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) == 0 )
{
if( sig_oid->p[8] >= 2 && sig_oid->p[8] <= 5 )
{
*sig_alg = sig_oid->p[8];
return( 0 );
}
if ( sig_oid->p[8] >= 11 && sig_oid->p[8] <= 14 )
{
*sig_alg = sig_oid->p[8];
return( 0 );
}
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
}
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
}
/*
* Parse one or more certificates and add them to the chained list
*/
@ -957,19 +980,10 @@ int x509parse_crt( x509_cert *chain, const unsigned char *buf, int buflen )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
}
if( crt->sig_oid1.len != 9 ||
memcmp( crt->sig_oid1.p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid1, &crt->sig_alg ) ) != 0 )
{
x509_free( crt );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
}
if( crt->sig_oid1.p[8] < 2 ||
( crt->sig_oid1.p[8] > 5 && crt->sig_oid1.p[8] < 11 ) ||
crt->sig_oid1.p[8] > 14 )
{
x509_free( crt );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
return( ret );
}
/*
@ -1313,16 +1327,7 @@ int x509parse_crl( x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, int buflen )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_VERSION );
}
if( crl->sig_oid1.len != 9 ||
memcmp( crl->sig_oid1.p, OID_PKCS1, 8 ) != 0 )
{
x509_crl_free( crl );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
}
if( crl->sig_oid1.p[8] < 2 ||
( crl->sig_oid1.p[8] > 5 && crl->sig_oid1.p[8] < 11 ) ||
crl->sig_oid1.p[8] > 14 )
if( ( ret = x509_get_sig_alg( &crl->sig_oid1, &crl->sig_alg ) ) != 0 )
{
x509_crl_free( crl );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG );
@ -2011,7 +2016,7 @@ int x509parse_cert_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : RSA+", prefix );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
switch( crt->sig_oid1.p[8] )
switch( crt->sig_alg )
{
case SIG_RSA_MD2 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD2" ); break;
case SIG_RSA_MD4 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD4" ); break;
@ -2102,7 +2107,7 @@ int x509parse_crl_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
ret = snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : RSA+", prefix );
SAFE_SNPRINTF();
switch( crl->sig_oid1.p[8] )
switch( crl->sig_alg )
{
case SIG_RSA_MD2 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD2" ); break;
case SIG_RSA_MD4 : ret = snprintf( p, n, "MD4" ); break;
@ -2265,7 +2270,7 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
continue;
}
hash_id = crt->sig_oid1.p[8];
hash_id = crt->sig_alg;
x509_hash( crt->tbs.p, crt->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
@ -2296,7 +2301,7 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
trust_ca->max_pathlen < pathlen )
break;
hash_id = crt->sig_oid1.p[8];
hash_id = crt->sig_alg;
x509_hash( crt->tbs.p, crt->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );
@ -2336,7 +2341,7 @@ int x509parse_verify( x509_cert *crt,
/*
* Check if CRL is correctry signed by the trusted CA
*/
hash_id = ca_crl->sig_oid1.p[8];
hash_id = ca_crl->sig_alg;
x509_hash( ca_crl->tbs.p, ca_crl->tbs.len, hash_id, hash );