Remove dependency from SSL on PK internals

So far, with MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE disabled, the SSL module relied
on a undocumented feature of the PK module: that you can distinguish between
contexts that have been setup and context that haven't. This feature is going
to go away in the case of PK_SINGLE_TYPE, as we'll soon (as in: the next
commit does that) no longer be storing the (now two-valued) pk_info member.

Note even with this change, we could still distinguish if the context has been
set up by look if pk_ctx is NULL or not, but this is also going away in the
near future (a few more commits down the road), so not a good option either.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2019-09-19 10:45:14 +02:00
parent 4223ce4fca
commit 2829bbf59b
4 changed files with 8 additions and 16 deletions

View file

@ -382,9 +382,9 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
{
/*
* Handshake specific crypto variables
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
uint8_t got_peer_pubkey; /*!< Did we store the peer's public key from its certificate? */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
Srv: flag for sending a cookie */

View file

@ -2379,11 +2379,7 @@ static int ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != MBEDTLS_PK_INVALID_HANDLE )
if( ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey )
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )

View file

@ -4454,15 +4454,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/* Skip if we haven't received a certificate from the client.
* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is set, this can be
* inferred from the setting of mbedtls_ssl_session::peer_cert.
* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is not set, it can
* be inferred from whether we've held back the peer CRT's
* public key in mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::peer_pubkey. */
* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is not set, it is tracked in a
* specific variable. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != MBEDTLS_PK_INVALID_HANDLE )
if( ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey )
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )

View file

@ -7357,6 +7357,7 @@ static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey = 1;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */