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Remove dependency from SSL on PK internals
So far, with MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE disabled, the SSL module relied on a undocumented feature of the PK module: that you can distinguish between contexts that have been setup and context that haven't. This feature is going to go away in the case of PK_SINGLE_TYPE, as we'll soon (as in: the next commit does that) no longer be storing the (now two-valued) pk_info member. Note even with this change, we could still distinguish if the context has been set up by look if pk_ctx is NULL or not, but this is also going away in the near future (a few more commits down the road), so not a good option either.
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@ -382,9 +382,9 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
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*/
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struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
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{
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/*
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* Handshake specific crypto variables
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*/
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
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uint8_t got_peer_pubkey; /*!< Did we store the peer's public key from its certificate? */
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#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
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unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
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Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
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@ -2379,11 +2379,7 @@ static int ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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}
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
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/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
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* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
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* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
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* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
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if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != MBEDTLS_PK_INVALID_HANDLE )
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if( ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey )
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peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
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#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
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if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
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@ -4454,15 +4454,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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/* Skip if we haven't received a certificate from the client.
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* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is set, this can be
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* inferred from the setting of mbedtls_ssl_session::peer_cert.
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* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is not set, it can
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* be inferred from whether we've held back the peer CRT's
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* public key in mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params::peer_pubkey. */
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* If MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE is not set, it is tracked in a
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* specific variable. */
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
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/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
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* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
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* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
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* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
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if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != MBEDTLS_PK_INVALID_HANDLE )
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if( ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey )
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peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
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#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
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if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
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@ -7357,6 +7357,7 @@ static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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ssl->handshake->got_peer_pubkey = 1;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
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