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Correct buffer size check
Further in the code the next field from the binary buffer is read. The check contained an off by one error.
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@ -2675,7 +2675,17 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
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n = cert_type_len;
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if( ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
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/*
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* In the subsequent code there are two paths that make read from buf:
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* * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
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* SSL is 3),
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* * distinguished name length otherwise.
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* Both reach at most the index:
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* ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
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* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
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* regardless of the actual code path.
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*/
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if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
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mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
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