Merge fix of IOTSSL-496 - Potential heap overflow

Fix for potential overflow in ssl_write_certificate_request()
This commit is contained in:
Simon Butcher 2015-10-05 11:57:54 +01:00
commit 475cf0a98a
2 changed files with 12 additions and 3 deletions

View file

@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ Security
* Fix potential double-free if mbedtls_conf_psk() is called repeatedly on
the same mbedtls_ssl_config object and memory allocation fails. Found by
Guido Vranken, Intelworks. Cannot be forced remotely.
* Fix potential heap buffer overflow in servers that perform client
authentication against a crafted CA cert. Cannot be triggered remotely
unless you allow third parties to pick trust CAs for client auth.
Found by Guido Vranken, Intelworks.
Changes
* Added checking of hostname length in mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to ensure

View file

@ -2351,6 +2351,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
unsigned char *buf, *p;
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
int authmode;
@ -2471,10 +2472,14 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
total_dn_size = 0;
while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 )
{
if( p - buf > 4096 )
break;
dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len;
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
break;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size );
memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size );