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Merge branch 'pr_1045' into mbedtls-1.3

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This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2017-12-04 17:29:13 +01:00
parent 6e206364d9 046fff12fa
commit 4905e6c4e7
3 changed files with 11 additions and 11 deletions
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1
ChangeLog
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@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ Bugfix
POLARSSL_SSL_DISABLE_RENEGOTIATION is set. Found by erja-gp.
* Add a check for invalid private parameters in ecdsa_sign.
Reported by Yolan Romailler.
* Fix word size check in in pk.c to not depend on MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64.
Changes
* Extend cert_write example program by options to set the CRT version

7
library/pk.c
View file

@ -30,8 +30,6 @@
#include "polarssl/pk.h"
#include "polarssl/pk_wrap.h"
#include "polarssl/bignum.h"
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
#include "polarssl/rsa.h"
#endif
@ -43,6 +41,7 @@
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
static void polarssl_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
@ -212,10 +211,10 @@ int pk_verify_ext( pk_type_t type, const void *options,
int ret;
const pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64)
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
if( md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#endif /* POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 */
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
if( options == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

14
library/pk_wrap.c
View file

@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
#include "polarssl/rsa.h"
#include "polarssl/bignum.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -52,6 +51,7 @@
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
static void polarssl_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) {
@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
{
int ret;
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64)
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
if( md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#endif /* POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 */
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
if( sig_len < ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
@ -100,10 +100,10 @@ static int rsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64)
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
if( md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#endif /* POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 */
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
*sig_len = ((rsa_context *) ctx)->len;
@ -424,10 +424,10 @@ static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap( void *ctx, md_type_t md_alg,
{
rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = (rsa_alt_context *) ctx;
#if defined(POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64)
#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
if( UINT_MAX < hash_len )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#endif /* POLARSSL_HAVE_INT64 */
#endif /* SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX */
*sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func( rsa_alt->key );