mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
synced 2025-02-26 05:46:53 +00:00
Merge pull request #3456 from AndrzejKurek/aes-fi-improvements
Minor AES module improvements
This commit is contained in:
commit
4b700a3db3
|
@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memmove( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num );
|
|||
*/
|
||||
int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num );
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* \brief RNG-function for getting a random 32-bit integer.
|
||||
*
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \note Currently the function is dependent of hardware providing an
|
||||
* rng with MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT. By default, 0 is
|
||||
* returned.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* \return The generated random number.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_uint32( void );
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* \brief RNG-function for getting a random in given range.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
|
|||
int i = 0, j, is_even_pos, dummy_rounds, num;
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_memset( tbl, 0, tbl_len );
|
||||
// get random from 0x0fff (each f will be used separately)
|
||||
// get random from 0x0fff
|
||||
num = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 0x1000 );
|
||||
|
||||
// Randomize execution order of initial round key addition
|
||||
|
@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
|
|||
tbl_len = tbl_len - (AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS - dummy_rounds);
|
||||
|
||||
// randomize positions for the dummy rounds
|
||||
num = ( num & 0x000f ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
|
||||
num = ( num & 0x0fff ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
|
||||
|
||||
// add dummy rounds after initial round key addition (if needed)
|
||||
for ( ; i < num + 2; i++ )
|
||||
|
@ -725,7 +725,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
|||
return( mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits ) );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, ( keybits >> 5 ) * 4 );
|
||||
/* Three least significant bits are truncated from keybits, which is
|
||||
* expected to be a multiple of 8. */
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, keybits >> 3 );
|
||||
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( keybits >> 5 );
|
||||
|
||||
for( j = offset; j < ( keybits >> 5 ); j++ )
|
||||
|
@ -1089,7 +1091,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
|
|||
do
|
||||
{
|
||||
GET_UINT32_LE( aes_data_real.xy_values[i], input, ( i * 4 ) );
|
||||
aes_data_fake.xy_values[i] = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 0xffffffff );
|
||||
aes_data_fake.xy_values[i] = mbedtls_platform_random_uint32();
|
||||
flow_control++;
|
||||
} while( ( i = ( i + 1 ) % 4 ) != offset );
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -172,6 +172,20 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num )
|
|||
return( (int) diff | (int) ( flow_counter ^ num ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_uint32( )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
uint32_t result = 0;
|
||||
size_t olen = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_hardware_poll( NULL, (unsigned char *) &result, sizeof( result ),
|
||||
&olen );
|
||||
return( result );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( size_t num )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue