Merge pull request #3456 from AndrzejKurek/aes-fi-improvements

Minor AES module improvements
This commit is contained in:
Andrzej Kurek 2020-07-30 16:29:48 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 4b700a3db3
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
3 changed files with 32 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memmove( void *dst, const void *src, size_t num );
*/
int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num );
/**
* \brief RNG-function for getting a random 32-bit integer.
*
*
* \note Currently the function is dependent of hardware providing an
* rng with MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT. By default, 0 is
* returned.
*
* \return The generated random number.
*/
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_uint32( void );
/**
* \brief RNG-function for getting a random in given range.
*

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@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
int i = 0, j, is_even_pos, dummy_rounds, num;
mbedtls_platform_memset( tbl, 0, tbl_len );
// get random from 0x0fff (each f will be used separately)
// get random from 0x0fff
num = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 0x1000 );
// Randomize execution order of initial round key addition
@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static int aes_sca_cm_data_randomize( uint8_t *tbl, uint8_t tbl_len )
tbl_len = tbl_len - (AES_SCA_CM_ROUNDS - dummy_rounds);
// randomize positions for the dummy rounds
num = ( num & 0x000f ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
num = ( num & 0x0fff ) % ( dummy_rounds + 1 );
// add dummy rounds after initial round key addition (if needed)
for ( ; i < num + 2; i++ )
@ -725,7 +725,9 @@ int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
return( mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc( (unsigned char *) ctx->rk, key, keybits ) );
#endif
mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, ( keybits >> 5 ) * 4 );
/* Three least significant bits are truncated from keybits, which is
* expected to be a multiple of 8. */
mbedtls_platform_memset( RK, 0, keybits >> 3 );
offset = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( keybits >> 5 );
for( j = offset; j < ( keybits >> 5 ); j++ )
@ -1089,7 +1091,7 @@ int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt( mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
do
{
GET_UINT32_LE( aes_data_real.xy_values[i], input, ( i * 4 ) );
aes_data_fake.xy_values[i] = mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( 0xffffffff );
aes_data_fake.xy_values[i] = mbedtls_platform_random_uint32();
flow_control++;
} while( ( i = ( i + 1 ) % 4 ) != offset );

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@ -172,6 +172,20 @@ int mbedtls_platform_memcmp( const void *buf1, const void *buf2, size_t num )
return( (int) diff | (int) ( flow_counter ^ num ) );
}
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_uint32( )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
return 0;
#else
uint32_t result = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
mbedtls_hardware_poll( NULL, (unsigned char *) &result, sizeof( result ),
&olen );
return( result );
#endif
}
uint32_t mbedtls_platform_random_in_range( size_t num )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)