RSA: Fix another buffer overflow in PSS signature verification

Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS signature verification when the masking
operation results in an all-zero buffer. This could happen at any key size.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2017-10-17 19:02:13 +02:00
parent 55db24ca50
commit 511bb84c60
3 changed files with 17 additions and 10 deletions

View file

@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Security
* Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the hash is too
large for the key size. Found by Seth Terashima, Qualcomm Product
Security Initiative, Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
* Fix buffer overflow in RSA-PSS verification when the unmasked
data is all zeros.
= mbed TLS 1.3.21 branch released 2017-08-10

View file

@ -1325,10 +1325,11 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
size_t siglen;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char *hash_start;
unsigned char result[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char zeros[8];
unsigned int hlen;
size_t slen, msb;
size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
const md_info_t *md_info;
md_context_t md_ctx;
@ -1370,7 +1371,7 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
if( siglen < hlen + 2 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */
hash_start = buf + siglen - hlen - 1;
memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
@ -1385,6 +1386,7 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
p++;
siglen -= 1;
}
else
if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1395,25 +1397,24 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
return( ret );
}
mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx );
buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 )
while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 )
p++;
if( p == buf + siglen ||
if( p == hash_start ||
*p++ != 0x01 )
{
md_free( &md_ctx );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
}
/* Actual salt len */
slen -= p - buf;
observed_salt_len = hash_start - p;
if( expected_salt_len != RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
{
md_free( &md_ctx );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
@ -1424,12 +1425,12 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
md_starts( &md_ctx );
md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len );
md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
md_free( &md_ctx );
if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) == 0 )
return( 0 );
else
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );

View file

@ -819,3 +819,7 @@ RSASSA-PSS verify ext, 521-bit key, SHA-512, empty salt, bad signature
depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA512_C
pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:521:16:"0131b69860f3cb9bf85ea358fdf2bd2990f1b77a80d6a4fdf817a43dd896bdf7dd26af8ac0237f526e0d33b105c971fdbd4ffa9ece99fc469f31ecf429e8f562c1c3":16:"010001":POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:POLARSSL_MD_SHA512:0:"":"00471794655837da498cbf27242807b40593a353c707eb22fd2cc5a3259e728ac4f1df676043eeec8e16c1175b3d9ac8cae72ec1d5772dd69de71c5677f19031568e":POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING
RSASSA-PSS verify ext, all-zero padding, automatic salt length
depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA256_C
pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify_ext:512:16:"00b076d23250816f9aab02307e452b97f0cae7598369b41624e8afc7971a59a13892f64b07eaa6ec928c160b2d6ec8f9d0dd5b63c8b3ac0767b4f65c892f56c10f":16:"010001":POLARSSL_MD_NONE:POLARSSL_MD_SHA256:POLARSSL_MD_SHA256:RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY:"":"63a35294577c7e593170378175b7df27c293dae583ec2a971426eb2d66f2af483e897bfae5dc20300a9d61a3644e08c3aee61a463690a3498901563c46041056":POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING:POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING