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Don't call ssl_fetch_input for record hdr size check in DTLS
In DTLS, if mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input() is called multiple times without resetting the input buffer in between, the non-initial calls are functionally equivalent to mere bounds checks ensuring that the incoming datagram is large enough to hold the requested data. In the interest of code-size and modularity (removing a call to a non-const function which is logically const in this instance), this commit replaces such a call to mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input() by an explicit bounds check in ssl_parse_record_header().
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@ -4894,7 +4894,6 @@ static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type )
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static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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int major_ver, minor_ver;
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int ret;
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/* Parse and validate record content type and version */
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@ -4930,11 +4929,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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* This would fail, for example, if we received a datagram of
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* size 13 + n Bytes where n is less than the size of incoming CIDs.
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*/
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) );
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if( ret != 0 )
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if( ssl->in_left < mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
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return( ret );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram too short to contain DTLS record header including CID of length %u.",
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(unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_cid_len( ssl->conf ) ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
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}
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}
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else
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