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Fix memory leak while parsing some X.509 certs

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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2014-10-17 12:41:41 +02:00
parent 64938c63f0
commit 5d8618539f
3 changed files with 24 additions and 30 deletions
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5
ChangeLog
View file

@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ PolarSSL ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
Security
* Lowest common hash was selected from signature_algorithms extension in
TLS 1.2 (found by Darren Bane) (introduced in 1.3.8).
* Remotely-triggerable memory leak when parsing some X.509 certificates
(server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate).
(Found using Codenomicon Defensics.)
Bugfix
* Support escaping of commas in x509_string_to_names()
@ -36,6 +39,8 @@ Changes
* POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE now defaults to 1024 in order to allow 8192 bits
RSA keys.
* Accept spaces at end of line or end of buffer in base64_decode().
* X.509 certificates with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue per
RelativeDistinguishedName are not accepted any more.
= PolarSSL 1.3.8 released 2014-07-11
Security

47
library/x509.c
View file

@ -409,58 +409,47 @@ static int x509_get_attr_type_value( unsigned char **p,
* AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
*
* AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
*
* We restrict RelativeDistinguishedName to be a set of 1 element. This is
* the most common case, and our x509_name structure currently can't handle
* more than that.
*/
int x509_get_name( unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
x509_name *cur )
{
int ret;
size_t len;
const unsigned char *end2;
x509_name *use;
size_t set_len;
const unsigned char *end_set;
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,
/*
* parse first SET, restricted to 1 element
*/
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( p, end, &set_len,
ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SET ) ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + ret );
end2 = end;
end = *p + len;
use = cur;
end_set = *p + set_len;
do
{
if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end, use ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ( ret = x509_get_attr_type_value( p, end_set, cur ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( *p != end )
{
use->next = (x509_name *) polarssl_malloc(
sizeof( x509_name ) );
if( use->next == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED );
memset( use->next, 0, sizeof( x509_name ) );
use = use->next;
}
}
while( *p != end );
if( *p != end_set )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
/*
* recurse until end of SEQUENCE is reached
*/
if( *p == end2 )
if( *p == end )
return( 0 );
cur->next = (x509_name *) polarssl_malloc(
sizeof( x509_name ) );
cur->next = (x509_name *) polarssl_malloc( sizeof( x509_name ) );
if( cur->next == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED );
memset( cur->next, 0, sizeof( x509_name ) );
return( x509_get_name( p, end2, cur->next ) );
return( x509_get_name( p, end, cur->next ) );
}
/*

2
tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data
View file

@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ X509 Certificate ASN1 (TBSCertificate, issuer, no string data)
x509parse_crt:"30253023a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d0101020500300731053003060013":"":POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA
X509 Certificate ASN1 (TBSCertificate, issuer, no full following string)
x509parse_crt:"302b3029a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d0101020500300d310b3009060013045465737400":"":POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME + POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG
x509parse_crt:"302b3029a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d0101020500300d310b3009060013045465737400":"":POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
X509 Certificate ASN1 (TBSCertificate, valid issuer, no validity)
x509parse_crt:"302a3028a0030201028204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d0101020500300c310a30080600130454657374":"":POLARSSL_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA