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Fix potential timing issue in RSA pms handling

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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-02-06 10:30:58 +00:00
parent 555fbf8758
commit 6674cce892
2 changed files with 41 additions and 18 deletions
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3
ChangeLog
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@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ Security
* Fix potential stack overflow while parsing crafted X.509 certificates
(TLS server is not affected if it doesn't ask for a client certificate)
(found using Codenomicon Defensics).
* Fix timing difference that could theoretically lead to a
Bleichenbacher-style attack in the RSA and RSA-PSK key exchanges
(reported by Sebastian Schinzel).
Features
* Add support for FALLBACK_SCSV (draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv).

56
library/ssl_srv.c
View file

@ -2884,6 +2884,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl_context *ssl,
int ret;
size_t len = pk_get_len( ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
unsigned char mask;
unsigned int uret;
size_t i;
if( ! pk_can_do( ssl_own_key( ssl ), POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) )
{
@ -2913,31 +2917,47 @@ static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl_context *ssl,
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
/*
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
* Also, avoid data-dependant branches here to protect against
* timing-based variants.
*/
ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = pk_decrypt( ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len,
pms, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset,
peer_pms, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
sizeof( peer_pms ),
ssl->f_rng, ssl->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 || ssl->handshake->pmslen != 48 ||
pms[0] != ssl->handshake->max_major_ver ||
pms[1] != ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver )
{
ret |= ssl->handshake->pmslen - 48;
ret |= peer_pms[0] - ssl->handshake->max_major_ver;
ret |= peer_pms[1] - ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( ret != 0 )
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
#endif
/*
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack:
* invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding must not cause
* the connection to end immediately; instead,
* send a bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
*/
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
ret = ssl->f_rng( ssl->p_rng, pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset ||
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
return( ret );
uret = (unsigned) ret;
uret |= -uret; /* msb = ( ret != 0 ) */
uret >>= 8 * sizeof( uret ) - 1; /* uret = ( ret != 0 ) */
mask = (unsigned char)( -uret ) ; /* ret ? 0xff : 0x00 */
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
POLARSSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */