mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
synced 2024-10-19 00:41:14 +00:00
Introduce helper function for peer CRT chain verification
This commit is contained in:
Hanno Becker
parent
fcd9e71cdf
commit
6863619a2f
|
|
@ -5981,11 +5981,155 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|||
return( SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||||
int authmode,
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
|
||||
void *rs_ctx )
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||||
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
|
||||
|
||||
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
|
||||
return( 0 );
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||||
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
|
||||
ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
|
||||
ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Main check: verify certificate
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
|
||||
chain,
|
||||
ca_chain, ca_crl,
|
||||
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
|
||||
ssl->hostname,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
|
||||
ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
|
||||
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
||||
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
|
||||
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
|
||||
if( ret == 0 )
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
||||
|
||||
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( chain,
|
||||
ciphersuite_info,
|
||||
! ssl->conf->endpoint,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
|
||||
if( ret == 0 )
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
|
||||
* verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
|
||||
* with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
|
||||
* of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
|
||||
* functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
|
||||
* ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
|
||||
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
|
||||
( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
|
||||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t alert;
|
||||
|
||||
/* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
|
||||
Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
|
||||
may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
|
||||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
|
||||
else
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||||
alert );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
||||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
|
||||
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
int crt_expected;
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||||
const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
|
||||
|
|
@ -6050,140 +6194,11 @@ crt_verify:
|
|||
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
|
||||
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
||||
if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
|
||||
ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
|
||||
ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Main check: verify certificate
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
||||
ca_chain, ca_crl,
|
||||
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
|
||||
ssl->hostname,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
|
||||
ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
|
||||
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
||||
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
||||
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK */
|
||||
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) &&
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (EC key curve)" ) );
|
||||
if( ret == 0 )
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
||||
|
||||
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
||||
ciphersuite_info,
|
||||
! ssl->conf->endpoint,
|
||||
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate (usage extensions)" ) );
|
||||
if( ret == 0 )
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
|
||||
* verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
|
||||
* with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
|
||||
* of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
|
||||
* functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
|
||||
* ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
|
||||
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
|
||||
( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
|
||||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no CA chain" ) );
|
||||
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t alert;
|
||||
|
||||
/* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
|
||||
Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
|
||||
may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
|
||||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
|
||||
else if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED )
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
|
||||
else
|
||||
alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
||||
alert );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
||||
if( ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "! Certificate verification flags %x",
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Certificate verification flags clear" ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl, authmode,
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
||||
rs_ctx );
|
||||
if( ret != 0 )
|
||||
return( ret );
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue