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	Avoid seemingly-possible overflow
By looking just at that test, it looks like 2 + dn_size could overflow. In fact that can't happen as that would mean we've read a CA cert of size is too big to be represented by a size_t. However, it's best for code to be more obviously free of overflow without having to reason about the bigger picture.
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				|  | @ -2474,7 +2474,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) | |||
|     { | ||||
|         dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|         if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) | ||||
|         if( end < p || | ||||
|             (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || | ||||
|             (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) | ||||
|         { | ||||
|             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); | ||||
|             break; | ||||
|  |  | |||
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