mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
synced 2024-12-23 09:25:38 +00:00
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/360' into mbedtls-2.1-restricted-proposed
Conflicts: * scripts/config.pl: reconciled parallel edits in a comment.
This commit is contained in:
commit
8c1217984b
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@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ Security
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implementation allowed an offline 2^80 brute force attack on the
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HMAC key of a single, uninterrupted connection (with no
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resumption of the session).
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* Verify results of RSA private key operations to defend
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against Bellcore glitch attack.
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Features
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* Extend PKCS#8 interface by introducing support for the entire SHA
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@ -51,6 +53,7 @@ Bugfix
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structure. Do not assume that zeroizing a context is a correct way to
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reset it. Found independently by ccli8 on Github.
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* In mbedtls_entropy_free(), properly free the message digest context.
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* Fix memory leak in RSA self test.
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Changes
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* Clarified the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_setup.
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@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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* \brief Do an RSA private key operation
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*
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* \param ctx RSA context
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* \param f_rng RNG function (Needed for blinding)
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* \param f_rng RNG function (used for blinding)
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* \param p_rng RNG parameter
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* \param input input buffer
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* \param output output buffer
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@ -229,6 +229,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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*
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* \note The input and output buffers must be large
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* enough (eg. 128 bytes if RSA-1024 is used).
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*
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* \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided.
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*
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* \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentation
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* and the exponent are blinded, providing protection
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* against some side-channel attacks.
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*
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* \warning It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide
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* a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding.
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* Future versions of the library may enforce the presence
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* of a PRNG.
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*
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*/
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int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
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@ -1613,7 +1613,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
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mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[ 2 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ], Apos;
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int neg;
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) < 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 )
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( N, 0 ) <= 0 || ( N->p[0] & 1 ) == 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( E, 0 ) < 0 )
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116
library/rsa.c
116
library/rsa.c
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@ -403,9 +403,41 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ;
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#endif
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/* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double
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* checked result; should be the same in the end. */
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mbedtls_mpi I, C;
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/* Make sure we have private key info, prevent possible misuse */
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if( ctx->P.p == NULL || ctx->Q.p == NULL || ctx->D.p == NULL )
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT)
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 ||
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( f_rng != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ) ||
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( f_rng != NULL && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ) )
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{
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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}
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#else /* ! MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ, 0 ) == 0 ||
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mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP, 0 ) == 0 )
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{
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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}
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#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
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#endif
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mbedtls_mpi_init( &I );
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mbedtls_mpi_init( &C );
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mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 );
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mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R );
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@ -421,12 +453,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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#endif
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
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if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
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return( ret );
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
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{
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@ -434,6 +460,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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goto cleanup;
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &I, &T ) );
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if( f_rng != NULL )
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{
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/*
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
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}
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/* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &C, &T, &ctx->E,
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&ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &C, &I ) != 0 )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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olen = ctx->len;
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
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#endif
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}
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &C );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &I );
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if( ret != 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret );
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@ -705,7 +745,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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olen = ctx->len;
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// first comparison checks for overflow
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if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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@ -1167,11 +1207,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
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unsigned char *p = sig;
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const char *oid = NULL;
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unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
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size_t i;
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unsigned char diff;
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volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
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int ret;
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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@ -1237,42 +1272,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
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if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC )
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return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
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/*
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* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
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* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
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*/
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sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
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if( sig_try == NULL )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
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verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len );
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if( verif == NULL )
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{
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mbedtls_free( sig_try );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED );
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}
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
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/* Compare in constant time just in case */
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for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
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diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
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diff_no_optimize = diff;
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if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
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{
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
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cleanup:
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mbedtls_free( sig_try );
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mbedtls_free( verif );
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return( ret );
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return( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
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@ -1792,7 +1792,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( verbose != 0 )
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@ -1806,7 +1807,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( verbose != 0 )
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@ -1819,7 +1821,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
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@ -1827,7 +1830,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( verbose != 0 )
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@ -1845,7 +1849,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( verbose != 0 )
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@ -1857,7 +1862,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose )
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if( verbose != 0 )
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mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
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return( 1 );
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ret = 1;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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if( verbose != 0 )
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@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ Options
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EOU
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# The following options are disabled instead of enabled with "full".
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# Notes:
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# - MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3 and
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# MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION could be enabled if the
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# respective tests were adapted
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my @excluded = qw(
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MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
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MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
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@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
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MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
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MBEDTLS_REMOVE_ARC4_CIPHERSUITES
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MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL
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MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
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MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3
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MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
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MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
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@ -478,6 +478,23 @@ make test
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msg "test: !MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION - ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
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if_build_succeeded tests/ssl-opt.sh
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msg "build: Default + RSA_NO_CRT (ASan build)" # ~ 6 min
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cleanup
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cp "$CONFIG_H" "$CONFIG_BAK"
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scripts/config.pl set MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
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CC=gcc cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan .
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make
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msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - main suites (inc. selftests) (ASan build)" # ~ 50s
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make test
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msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of ssl-opt.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 5s
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tests/ssl-opt.sh -f RSA
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msg "test: RSA_NO_CRT - RSA-related part of compat.sh (ASan build)" # ~ 3 min
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tests/compat.sh -t RSA
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msg "build: cmake, full config, clang" # ~ 50s
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cleanup
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cp "$CONFIG_H" "$CONFIG_BAK"
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|
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@ -43,16 +43,19 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func( void *ctx, int mode, size_t *olen,
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const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
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size_t output_max_len )
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{
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return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, NULL, NULL, mode, olen,
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input, output, output_max_len ) );
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return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx,
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rnd_std_rand, NULL, mode, olen,
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input, output, output_max_len ) );
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}
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int mbedtls_rsa_sign_func( void *ctx,
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int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
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int mode, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen,
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const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig )
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{
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return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
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md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ) );
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((void) f_rng);
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((void) p_rng);
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return( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( (mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx, rnd_std_rand, NULL, mode,
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md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig ) );
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}
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size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func( void *ctx )
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue