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Merge pull request #295 from ARMmbed/mbedtls-1.3-restricted

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Merge of mbedtls-1.3-restricted
This commit is contained in:
Simon Butcher 2015-09-17 00:46:07 +01:00
parent b0282eaf14 a1cdcd2364
commit 9c4859ff15
3 changed files with 66 additions and 3 deletions
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8
ChangeLog
View file

@ -2,6 +2,14 @@ mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 1.3.13 reladsed 2015-??-??
Security
* Fix possible client-side NULL pointer dereference (read) when the client
tries to continue the handshake after it failed (a misuse of the API).
(Found by GDS Labs using afl-fuzz, patch provided by GDS Labs.)
* Add countermeasure against Lenstra's RSA-CRT attack for PKCS#1 v1.5
signatures. (Found by Florian Weimer, Red Hat.)
https://securityblog.redhat.com/2015/09/02/factoring-rsa-keys-with-tls-perfect-forward-secrecy/
Bugfix
* Setting SSL_MIN_DHM_BYTES in config.h had no effect (overriden in ssl.h)
(found by Fabio Solari) (#256)

43
library/rsa.c
View file

@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#define polarssl_printf printf
#define polarssl_malloc malloc
#define polarssl_free free
#endif
/*
@ -1005,6 +1007,11 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
unsigned char *p = sig;
const char *oid = NULL;
unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
int ret;
if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1067,9 +1074,39 @@ int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
}
return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
: rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
return( rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
/*
* In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
* temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
*/
sig_try = polarssl_malloc( ctx->len );
verif = polarssl_malloc( ctx->len );
if( sig_try == NULL || verif == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED );
MPI_CHK( rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
MPI_CHK( rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
/* Compare in constant time just in case */
for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
diff_no_optimize = diff;
if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
{
ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
cleanup:
polarssl_free( sig_try );
polarssl_free( verif );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */

18
library/ssl_cli.c
View file

@ -1602,6 +1602,12 @@ static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl_context *ssl,
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Now write it out, encrypted
*/
@ -1699,6 +1705,12 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl_context *ssl )
int ret;
const ecp_keypair *peer_key;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ! pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
POLARSSL_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
@ -2012,6 +2024,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl_context *ssl )
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen :
(unsigned int) ( md_info_from_type( md_alg ) )->size );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "certificate required" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* Verify signature
*/