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Fix typos in recently-added documentation
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@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg,
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* \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash.
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* \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash.
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* \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
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* \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
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* \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.
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* \param[out] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.
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* \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
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* \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
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*
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.
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* The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.
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@ -1068,7 +1068,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(psa_key_handle_t handle,
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
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*/
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*/
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psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_algorithm_t alg,
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psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_key_handle_t handle,
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psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t *input,
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const uint8_t *input,
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size_t input_length,
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size_t input_length,
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const uint8_t *mac,
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const uint8_t *mac,
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@ -1459,39 +1460,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(psa_key_handle_t handle,
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size_t output_size,
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size_t output_size,
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size_t *output_length);
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size_t *output_length);
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/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.
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*
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* \param handle Handle to the key to use for the operation.
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* \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
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* such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true).
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* \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message.
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* \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
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* \param[out] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
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* \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
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* The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
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* differs from the expected value.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
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* \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
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* \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
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*/
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psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_algorithm_t alg,
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const uint8_t *input,
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size_t input_length,
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const uint8_t *mac,
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const size_t mac_length);
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/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
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/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
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*
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*
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* Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application
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* Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application
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@ -2013,7 +1981,7 @@ static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
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* -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
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* of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
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* -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* of the message each time.
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* of the message to encrypt each time.
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* -# Call psa_aead_finish().
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* -# Call psa_aead_finish().
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*
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*
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* The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
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* The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
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@ -2071,8 +2039,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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* -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
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* of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
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* -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
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* of the message each time.
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* of the ciphertext to decrypt each time.
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* -# Call psa_aead_finish().
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* -# Call psa_aead_verify().
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*
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*
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* The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
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* The application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
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* has been initialized.
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* has been initialized.
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@ -2159,13 +2127,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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*
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*
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* If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
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* If this function returns an error status, the operation becomes inactive.
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*
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*
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* \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_iv()
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* \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce()
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* instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
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* instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
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* a non-random IV.
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* a non-random IV.
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*
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*
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* \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
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* \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
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* \param[in] iv Buffer containing the nonce to use.
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* \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use.
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* \param iv_length Size of the nonce in bytes.
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* \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes.
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*
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* Success.
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* Success.
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@ -2319,9 +2287,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
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* \retval #PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED
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*/
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*/
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psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
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uint8_t *output,
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uint8_t *ciphertext,
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size_t output_size,
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size_t ciphertext_size,
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size_t *output_length,
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size_t *ciphertext_length,
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uint8_t *tag,
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uint8_t *tag,
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size_t tag_size,
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size_t tag_size,
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size_t *tag_length);
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size_t *tag_length);
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