Fix version-major intolerance again

This time doing minimal changes to avoid introducing other issues.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2015-04-10 14:12:14 +02:00
parent 9b4c5d9f21
commit aa695be983

View file

@ -438,15 +438,20 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl )
buf[1], buf[2] ) );
/*
* SSLv3 Client Hello
* SSLv3/TLS Client Hello
*
* Record layer:
* 0 . 0 message type
* 1 . 2 protocol version
* 3 . 4 message length
*/
/* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically
* "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the
* value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here
* is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */
if( buf[0] != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
buf[1] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
buf[1] < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
@ -503,7 +508,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl_context *ssl )
* Check the handshake type and protocol version
*/
if( buf[0] != SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ||
buf[4] != SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
buf[4] < SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );