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CBC mode: Allow zero-length message fragments (100% padding)

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Fixes https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/1632
This commit is contained in:
Angus Gratton 2018-06-19 15:57:50 +10:00 committed by Simon Butcher
parent 7d728bd70e
commit b512bc1d29
2 changed files with 12 additions and 7 deletions
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5
ChangeLog
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@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ Bugfix
i386 with SSE2. Found by László Langó. Fixes #1550 i386 with SSE2. Found by László Langó. Fixes #1550
* Fix namespacing in header files. Remove the `mbedtls` namespacing in * Fix namespacing in header files. Remove the `mbedtls` namespacing in
the `#include` in the header files. Resolves #857 the `#include` in the header files. Resolves #857
* Fix decryption of zero length messages (all padding) in some circumstances:
DTLS 1.0 and 1.2, and CBC ciphersuites using encrypt-then-MAC. Most often
seen when communicating with OpenSSL using TLS 1.0. Reported by @kFYatek
(#1632) and by Conor Murphy on the forum. Fix contributed by Espressif
Systems.
Changes Changes
* Change the shebang line in Perl scripts to look up perl in the PATH. * Change the shebang line in Perl scripts to look up perl in the PATH.

14
library/ssl_tls.c
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@ -1979,28 +1979,28 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding * and fake check up to 256 bytes of padding
*/ */
size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1; size_t pad_count = 0, real_count = 1;
size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen - 1; size_t padding_idx = ssl->in_msglen - padlen;
size_t i; size_t i;
/* /*
* Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if: * Padding is guaranteed to be incorrect if:
* 1. padlen >= ssl->in_msglen * 1. padlen > ssl->in_msglen
* *
* 2. padding_idx >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + * 2. padding_idx > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
* ssl->transform_in->maclen * ssl->transform_in->maclen
* *
* In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to * In both cases we reset padding_idx to a safe value (0) to
* prevent out-of-buffer reads. * prevent out-of-buffer reads.
*/ */
correct &= ( ssl->in_msglen >= padlen + 1 ); correct &= ( padlen <= ssl->in_msglen );
correct &= ( padding_idx < MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + correct &= ( padding_idx <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN +
ssl->transform_in->maclen ); ssl->transform_in->maclen );
padding_idx *= correct; padding_idx *= correct;
for( i = 1; i <= 256; i++ ) for( i = 0; i < 256; i++ )
{ {
real_count &= ( i <= padlen ); real_count &= ( i < padlen );
pad_count += real_count * pad_count += real_count *
( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 ); ( ssl->in_msg[padding_idx + i] == padlen - 1 );
} }