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Unify similar functions

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Use common funtion for psa_sign_hash and psa_sign_message and one for
psa_verify_hash and psa_verify_message to unify them.

Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
gabor-mezei-arm 2021-04-20 12:11:35 +02:00
parent 1f8036b05e
commit bc0088b99b
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 106F5A41ECC305BD
1 changed files with 148 additions and 126 deletions
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192
library/psa_crypto.c
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@ -2842,7 +2842,22 @@ cleanup:
/* Asymmetric cryptography */
/****************************************************************/
psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
typedef enum
{
PSA_SIGN_INVALID = 0,
PSA_SIGN_HASH = 1,
PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE
} psa_sign_operation_t;
typedef enum
{
PSA_VERIFY_INVALID = 0,
PSA_VERIFY_HASH = 1,
PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE
} psa_verify_operation_t;
static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_sign_operation_t operation,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
@ -2853,16 +2868,26 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
*signature_length = 0;
if( operation == PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
/* Curently only hash-then-sign algorithms are supported. */
else
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
else if( operation == PSA_SIGN_INVALID )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
@ -2871,9 +2896,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
if( signature_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot,
operation == PSA_SIGN_HASH ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH :
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
@ -2887,23 +2915,33 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
.core = slot->attr
};
if( operation == PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE )
{
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ),
&hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
goto exit;
}
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
else if( operation == PSA_SIGN_HASH )
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
@ -2923,7 +2961,8 @@ exit:
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_verify_operation_t operation,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
@ -2933,18 +2972,31 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if ( PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN( alg ) )
{
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
/* Curently only hash-then-sign algorithms are supported. */
else
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
}
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
else if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_INVALID )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot,
operation == PSA_VERIFY_HASH ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH :
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
@ -2952,28 +3004,62 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
.core = slot->attr
};
if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE )
{
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ),
&hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
goto exit;
}
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
}
else if( operation == PSA_VERIFY_HASH )
{
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t * signature_length )
{
return psa_sign_internal(
key, PSA_SIGN_MESSAGE, alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
return psa_verify_internal(
key, PSA_VERIFY_MESSAGE, alg, input, input_length,
signature, signature_length );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
@ -3042,54 +3128,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
size_t signature_size,
size_t *signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
*signature_length = signature_size;
/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
* buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
* to be a hash.) */
if( signature_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
return psa_sign_internal(
key, PSA_SIGN_HASH, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
* the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid mac
* (barring an attack on the mac and deliberately-crafted input),
* in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
signature_size - *signature_length );
else
memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
/* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
* memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_internal(
@ -3156,28 +3197,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
const uint8_t *signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
return psa_verify_internal(
key, PSA_VERIFY_HASH, alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP)