Simplify bounds check in ssl_write_certificate_request

It is sufficient to check for the strongest limit only. Using a smaller
type ensures there is no overflow (assuming size_t is at least 32 bits).

Fixes #2916

Signed-off-by: irwir <irwir@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
irwir 2020-04-01 13:46:36 +03:00
parent 65cc9a2e68
commit c9bc300724

View file

@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */
size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */
unsigned char *buf, *p; unsigned char *buf, *p;
const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
@ -2969,11 +2969,11 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 )
{ {
dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length
* can be represented in at most 11 bits. */
dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len;
if( end < p || if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size )
(size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size ||
(size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size )
{ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) );
break; break;