Revert a part of sensitive information duplication from tinycrypt

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrzej Kurek 2020-07-15 22:32:08 -04:00
parent afec8853c5
commit cf3e35cc58
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 89A90840DC388527
3 changed files with 1 additions and 21 deletions

View file

@ -1239,8 +1239,6 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
int ret = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(
_private,
@ -1266,8 +1264,6 @@ int uECC_compute_public_key(const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *public_key)
uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(
public_key +
NUM_ECC_BYTES, NUM_ECC_BYTES, _public + NUM_ECC_WORDS);
if (private_key_dup != private_key || public_key_dup != public_key){
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
}
return ret;
}

View file

@ -170,9 +170,6 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
wordcount_t num_words = NUM_ECC_WORDS;
wordcount_t num_bytes = NUM_ECC_BYTES;
int r = UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
volatile const uint8_t *private_key_dup = private_key;
volatile const uint8_t *secret_dup = secret;
/* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */
uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private,
@ -190,11 +187,6 @@ int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key,
/* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(_private, sizeof(_private));
if (public_key_dup != public_key || private_key_dup != private_key || secret_dup != secret) {
/* Erase secret in case of FI */
mbedtls_platform_memset(secret, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES);
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
}
return r;
}

View file

@ -204,10 +204,6 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
bitcount_t i;
bitcount_t flow_control;
volatile uECC_word_t diff;
volatile const uint8_t *public_key_dup = public_key;
volatile const uint8_t *message_hash_dup = message_hash;
volatile unsigned hash_size_dup = hash_size;
volatile const uint8_t *signature_dup = signature;
uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2];
uECC_word_t r[NUM_ECC_WORDS], s[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
@ -309,10 +305,6 @@ int uECC_verify(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
* 1 (base value) + num_bits - 1 (from the loop) + 5 incrementations.
*/
if (diff == 0 && flow_control == (num_bits + 5)) {
if (public_key_dup != public_key || message_hash_dup != message_hash ||
hash_size_dup != hash_size || signature_dup != signature) {
return UECC_FAULT_DETECTED;
}
return UECC_SUCCESS;
}
else {