Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point

Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback.
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-07-10 11:31:01 +02:00 committed by Simon Butcher
parent 8af7bfa982
commit d0e755716f
7 changed files with 21 additions and 5 deletions

View file

@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ Changes
* Certificate verification functions now set flags to -1 in case the full
chain was not verified due to an internal error (including in the verify
callback) or chain length limitations.
* With authmode set to optional, handshake is now aborted if the
verification of the peer's certificate failed due to an overlong chain or
a fatal error in the vrfy callback.
= mbed TLS 1.3.20 released 2017-06-21

View file

@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2800 /**< Input invalid. */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_MALLOC_FAILED -0x2880 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900 /**< Read/write of file failed. */
#define POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000 /**< A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
/* \} name */
/**

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@ -232,7 +232,13 @@ int x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
*
* All flags left after returning from the callback
* are also returned to the application. The function should
* return 0 for anything but a fatal error.
* return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates)
* other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code
* immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal
* errors, a specific error code should be used (different
* from POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not
* be returned at this point), or POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
* can be used if no better code is available.
*
* \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed
* using \c x509_crt_verify_info()

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@ -496,6 +496,8 @@ void polarssl_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
polarssl_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" );
if( use_ret == -(POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR) )
polarssl_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - Read/write of file failed" );
if( use_ret == -(POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR) )
polarssl_snprintf( buf, buflen, "X509 - A fatal error occured, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
#endif /* POLARSSL_X509_USE,X509_CREATE_C */
// END generated code

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@ -1957,8 +1957,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_child(
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA */
if( 1 + path_cnt > POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
/* return immediately as the goal is to avoid unbounded recursion */
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
if( x509_time_expired( &child->valid_to ) )
@ -2174,6 +2174,10 @@ int x509_crt_verify( x509_crt *crt,
}
exit:
/* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback */
if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )
ret = POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;
if( ret != 0 )
{
*flags = (uint32_t) -1;

View file

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ while (my $line = <GREP>)
my $found_hl = grep $_ eq $module_name, @high_level_modules;
if (!$found_ll && !$found_hl)
{
polarssl_printf("Error: Do not know how to handle: $module_name\n");
printf("Error: Do not know how to handle: $module_name\n");
exit 1;
}

View file

@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/test-ca2.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":POLARSSL_
X509 CRT verify long chain (max intermediate CA + 1)
depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA256_C:POLARSSL_ECDSA_C:POLARSSL_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA+1:POLARSSL_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:-1
x509_crt_verify_max:"data_files/dir-maxpath/00.crt":"data_files/dir-maxpath":POLARSSL_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA+1:POLARSSL_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR:-1
X509 CRT verify chain #1 (zero pathlen intermediate)
depends_on:POLARSSL_SHA256_C:POLARSSL_RSA_C