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Parse HelloVerifyRequest: avoid buffer overread at the start
In ssl_parse_hello_verify_request, we read 3 bytes (version and cookie length) without checking that there are that many bytes left in ssl->in_msg. This could potentially read from memory outside of the ssl->receive buffer (which would be a remotely exploitable crash).
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@ -1417,6 +1417,19 @@ static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
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/* Check that there is enough room for:
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* - 2 bytes of version
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* - 1 byte of cookie_len
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*/
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if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
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( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) );
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mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
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}
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/*
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* struct {
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* ProtocolVersion server_version;
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