Merge pull request #3408 from AndrzejKurek/hamming-distance-improvements

Hamming distance improvements
This commit is contained in:
Andrzej Kurek 2020-06-22 08:28:55 +01:00 committed by GitHub
commit e5425a0944
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GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
5 changed files with 21 additions and 18 deletions

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@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ extern const uECC_word_t curve_b[NUM_ECC_WORDS];
* @param random OUT -- random integer in the range 0 < random < top
* @param top IN -- upper limit
* @param num_words IN -- number of words
* @return a random integer in the range 0 < random < top
* @return UECC_SUCCESS in case of success
* @return UECC_FAILURE upon failure
*/
int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
wordcount_t num_words);
@ -163,9 +164,9 @@ int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
/* uECC_RNG_Function type
* The RNG function should fill 'size' random bytes into 'dest'. It should
* return 1 if 'dest' was filled with random data, or 0 if the random data could
* not be generated. The filled-in values should be either truly random, or from
* a cryptographically-secure PRNG.
* return 'size' if 'dest' was filled with random data of 'size' length, or 0
* if the random data could not be generated. The filled-in values should be
* either truly random, or from a cryptographically-secure PRNG.
*
* A correctly functioning RNG function must be set (using uECC_set_rng())
* before calling uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign().
@ -181,8 +182,8 @@ typedef int(*uECC_RNG_Function)(uint8_t *dest, unsigned int size);
/*
* @brief Set the function that will be used to generate random bytes. The RNG
* function should return 1 if the random data was generated, or 0 if the random
* data could not be generated.
* function should return 'size' if the random data of length 'size' was
* generated, or 0 if the random data could not be generated.
*
* @note On platforms where there is no predefined RNG function, this must be
* called before uECC_make_key() or uECC_sign() are used.

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@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#endif
#define PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT 0x75555555
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
static int uecc_rng_wrapper( uint8_t *dest, unsigned int size )
{
@ -4736,7 +4738,7 @@ static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_platform_memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
{
return( 1 );
return( PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT );
}
return( 0 );
}
@ -4929,7 +4931,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
* future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
* handshake logic layer. */
if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
@ -6053,7 +6055,7 @@ static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
hs_buf->is_fragmented =
( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 );
( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == PROPER_HS_FRAGMENT );
/* We copy the message back into the input buffer
* after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.

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@ -1080,7 +1080,7 @@ int EccPoint_mult_safer(uECC_word_t * result, const uECC_word_t * point,
/* If an RNG function was specified, get a random initial Z value to
* protect against side-channel attacks such as Template SPA */
if (g_rng_function) {
if (!uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve_p, num_words)) {
if (uECC_generate_random_int(k2[carry], curve_p, num_words) != UECC_SUCCESS) {
r = UECC_FAILURE;
goto clear_and_out;
}
@ -1165,21 +1165,21 @@ int uECC_generate_random_int(uECC_word_t *random, const uECC_word_t *top,
bitcount_t num_bits = uECC_vli_numBits(top);
if (!g_rng_function) {
return 0;
return UECC_FAILURE;
}
for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) {
if (!g_rng_function((uint8_t *)random, num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
return 0;
if (g_rng_function((uint8_t *)random, num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) != num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
return UECC_FAILURE;
}
random[num_words - 1] &=
mask >> ((bitcount_t)(num_words * uECC_WORD_SIZE * 8 - num_bits));
if (!uECC_vli_isZero(random) &&
uECC_vli_cmp(top, random) == 1) {
return 1;
return UECC_SUCCESS;
}
}
return 0;
return UECC_FAILURE;
}

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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key)
/* Generating _private uniformly at random: */
uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
if (!rng_function ||
!rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
return UECC_FAILURE;
}

View file

@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int uECC_sign_with_k(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
uECC_vli_clear(tmp);
tmp[0] = 1;
}
else if (!uECC_generate_random_int(tmp, curve_n, num_n_words)) {
else if (uECC_generate_random_int(tmp, curve_n, num_n_words) != UECC_SUCCESS) {
return UECC_FAILURE;
}
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int uECC_sign(const uint8_t *private_key, const uint8_t *message_hash,
/* Generating _random uniformly at random: */
uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng();
if (!rng_function ||
!rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE)) {
rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) != 2*NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE) {
return UECC_FAILURE;
}