Fix heap-buffer overread in ALPN ext parsing

This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2018-01-09 10:43:43 +01:00
parent ecd9f79edf
commit f472a829c6
2 changed files with 20 additions and 9 deletions

View file

@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ Security
Reported by Marco Macchetti, Kudelski Group.
* Wipe stack buffer temporarily holding EC private exponent
after keypair generation.
* Fix a potential heap buffer overread in ALPN extension parsing
(server-side). Could result in application crash, but only if an ALPN
name larger than 16 bytes had been configured on the server.
Features
* Allow comments in test data files.

View file

@ -791,25 +791,33 @@ static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl_context *ssl,
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
/*
* Use our order of preference
* Validate peer's list (lengths)
*/
start = buf + 2;
end = buf + len;
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
cur_len = *theirs++;
/* Current identifier must fit in list */
if( cur_len > (size_t)( end - theirs ) )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
if( cur_len == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
/*
* Use our order of preference
*/
for( ours = ssl->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ )
{
ours_len = strlen( *ours );
for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len )
{
/* If the list is well formed, we should get equality first */
if( theirs > end )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
cur_len = *theirs++;
/* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */
if( cur_len == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
if( cur_len == ours_len &&
memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 )
{