Check sig_pk for signature verification

This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2013-08-12 10:39:28 +02:00
parent b4e9ca9650
commit f84b4d6498

View file

@ -3305,7 +3305,6 @@ int x509parse_revoked( const x509_cert *crt, const x509_crl *crl )
static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca, static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
x509_crl *crl_list) x509_crl *crl_list)
{ {
int ret;
int flags = 0; int flags = 0;
unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char hash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const md_info_t *md_info; const md_info_t *md_info;
@ -3346,14 +3345,12 @@ static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ); md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
if( ca->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) if( crl_list->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{ {
if( !rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC, if( ca->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
crl_list->sig_md, 0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) == 0 ) rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
crl_list->sig_md, 0, hash, crl_list->sig.p ) != 0 )
{ {
/*
* CRL is not trusted
*/
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break; break;
} }
@ -3361,17 +3358,14 @@ static int x509parse_verifycrl(x509_cert *crt, x509_cert *ca,
else else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */ #endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
if( pk_can_ecdsa( ca->pk ) ) { if( crl_list->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &ca->pk ) ) != 0 ) {
return( ret ); if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( ca->pk ) ||
pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &ca->pk ) != 0 ||
if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ca->pk.data, ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) ca->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size, hash, md_info->size,
crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 ) crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )
{ {
/*
* CRL is not trusted
*/
flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; flags |= BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break; break;
} }
@ -3490,9 +3484,10 @@ static int x509parse_verify_top(
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ); md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
if( trust_ca->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{ {
if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( trust_ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC, if( trust_ca->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( trust_ca->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 ) child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 )
{ {
trust_ca = trust_ca->next; trust_ca = trust_ca->next;
@ -3502,11 +3497,11 @@ static int x509parse_verify_top(
else else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */ #endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
if( pk_can_ecdsa( trust_ca->pk ) ) { if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &trust_ca->pk ) ) != 0 ) {
return( ret ); if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( trust_ca->pk ) ||
pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &trust_ca->pk ) != 0 ||
if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) trust_ca->pk.data, ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) trust_ca->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 ) child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{ {
@ -3588,9 +3583,10 @@ static int x509parse_verify_child(
md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ); md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
if( parent->pk.type == POLARSSL_PK_RSA ) if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_RSA )
{ {
if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( parent->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC, if( parent->pk.type != POLARSSL_PK_RSA ||
rsa_pkcs1_verify( pk_rsa( parent->pk ), RSA_PUBLIC,
child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 ) child->sig_md, 0, hash, child->sig.p ) != 0 )
{ {
*flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; *flags |= BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
@ -3599,11 +3595,11 @@ static int x509parse_verify_child(
else else
#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */ #endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */
#if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C) #if defined(POLARSSL_ECDSA_C)
if( pk_can_ecdsa( parent->pk ) ) { if( child->sig_pk == POLARSSL_PK_ECDSA )
if( ( ret = pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &parent->pk ) ) != 0 ) {
return( ret ); if( ! pk_can_ecdsa( parent->pk ) ||
pk_ec_to_ecdsa( &parent->pk ) != 0 ||
if( ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) parent->pk.data, ecdsa_read_signature( (ecdsa_context *) parent->pk.data,
hash, md_info->size, hash, md_info->size,
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 ) child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{ {