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https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
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Merge branch 'iotssl-521-keylen-check' into development
This commit is contained in:
Simon Butcher
commit
fa8094ea40
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@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ Features
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* Added a key extraction callback to accees the master secret and key
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block. (Potential uses include EAP-TLS and Thread.)
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Bugfix
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* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(_with_profile)() now also checks the key type and
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size/curve against the profile. Before that, there was no way to set a
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minimum key size for end-entity certificates with RSA keys. Found by
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Matthew Page of Scannex Electronics Ltd.
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Changes
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* Improved performance of mbedtls_ecp_muladd() when one of the scalars is 1
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or -1.
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@ -1442,6 +1442,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites_for_version( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
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/**
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* \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification
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*
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* \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the
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* chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered
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* by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes().
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*
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* \param conf SSL configuration
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* \param profile Profile to use
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*/
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@ -1603,16 +1607,14 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
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* On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any
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* use. The server can override our preference order.
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*
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* Both sides: limits the set of curves used by peer to the
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* listed curves for any use ECDHE and the end-entity
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* certificate.
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* Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
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* ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
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*
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* \note This has no influence on which curve are allowed inside the
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* \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
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* certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
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* for that. For example, if the peer's certificate chain is
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* EE -> CA_int -> CA_root, then the allowed curves for EE are
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* controlled by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() but for CA_int
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* and CA_root it's \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
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* for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key
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* will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list
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* and by the cert profile.
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*
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* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
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* (preferred curve first).
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@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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* security profile.
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*
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* \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves
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* for ECDSA) only applys to (intermediate) CAs, not to the
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* end-entity certificate.
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* for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root,
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* intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate.
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*
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* \param crt a certificate to be verified
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* \param trust_ca the trusted CA chain
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@ -186,8 +186,10 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
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if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ||
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pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
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pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH )
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{
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mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
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@ -2151,6 +2153,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
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mbedtls_x509_name *name;
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mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL;
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mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
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if( profile == NULL )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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@ -2209,6 +2212,15 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
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}
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}
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/* Check the type and size of the key */
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pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
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if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
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if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, pk_type, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
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*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
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/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
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for( parent = trust_ca; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
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{
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@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ x509_verify:"data_files/server6-ss-child.crt":"data_files/server5-selfsigned.crt
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X509 Certificate verification #75 (encoding mismatch)
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depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
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x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:"NULL"
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x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl.pem":"NULL":0:0:"NULL"
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X509 Certificate verification #76 (multiple CRLs, not revoked)
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depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
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@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ x509_verify:"data_files/server1.crt":"data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt":"data_files/
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X509 Certificate verification #81 (multiple CRLs, none relevant)
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depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C
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x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl_cat_rsa-ec.pem":"NULL":MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED:MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY:"NULL"
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x509_verify:"data_files/enco-cert-utf8str.pem":"data_files/enco-ca-prstr.pem":"data_files/crl_cat_rsa-ec.pem":"NULL":0:0:"NULL"
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X509 Certificate verification callback: trusted EE cert
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depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C:MBEDTLS_SHA256_C:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
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@ -6,6 +6,19 @@
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#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
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#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
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const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile compat_profile =
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{
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 ) |
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) |
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |
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MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ),
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0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */
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0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */
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1024,
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};
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int verify_none( void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth, uint32_t *flags )
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{
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((void) data);
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@ -191,7 +204,11 @@ void x509_verify( char *crt_file, char *ca_file, char *crl_file,
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TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( &ca, ca_file ) == 0 );
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TEST_ASSERT( mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file( &crl, crl_file ) == 0 );
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res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( &crt, &ca, &crl, cn_name, &flags, f_vrfy, NULL );
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//puts( "" );
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res = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( &crt, &ca, &crl, &compat_profile, cn_name, &flags, f_vrfy, NULL );
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//printf( "exp: -%04x, %08x\n", result, flags_result );
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//printf( "got: -%04x, %08x\n", res, flags );
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TEST_ASSERT( res == ( result ) );
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TEST_ASSERT( flags == (uint32_t)( flags_result ) );
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