This file had temporary MBEDTLS_xxx dependencies because it was created when
support for PSA_WANT_xxx was still incomplete. Switch to the PSA_WANT_xxx
dependencies
This fixes the bug that "PSA storage read: AES-GCM+CTR" was never executed
because there was a typo in a dependency.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
In order to for tests to pass from the previous commit (which it mandatory for all pk verify/sign
functions to be given a hash_len that is exactly equal to the message digest length of md_alg) the
hash_len that is supplied to the fucntion cannot be MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE. This would result in all tests failing. Since the md alg for all of these funtions are SHA256, we can use mbedtls functions to get
the required length of a SHA256 digest (32 bytes). Then that number can be used for allocating the
hash buffer.
Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nick.child@ibm.com>
It is enough only one test case for a key type, algorithm pair when
testing the implicit usage flags.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Add test cases validating that if a stored key only had the hash policy,
then after loading it psa_get_key_attributes reports that it also has the
message policy, and the key can be used with message functions.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Negative x coordinate was tested with the value -1. It happens to be one
of the low order points both for Curve25519 and Curve448 and might be
rejected because of that and not because it is negative. Make sure that
x < 0 is the only plausible reason for the point to be rejected.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
A test case for which the loop would take practically forever if it was
reached. The point would be to validate that the loop is not reached.
The test case should cause the CI to time out if starting with the
current code, ecp_check_pubkey_mx() was changed to call
ecp_check_pubkey_x25519() first and run the mbedtls_mpi_size(() test
afterwards, which would make no semantic difference in terms of memory
contents when the function returns, but would open the way for a DoS.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
We were already rejecting them at the end, due to the fact that with the
usual (x, z) formulas they lead to the result (0, 0) so when we want to
normalize at the end, trying to compute the modular inverse of z will
give an error.
If we wanted to support those points, we'd a special case in
ecp_normalize_mxz(). But it's actually permitted by all sources
(RFC 7748 say we MAY reject 0 as a result) and recommended by some to
reject those points (either to ensure contributory behaviour, or to
protect against timing attack when the underlying field arithmetic is
not constant-time).
Since our field arithmetic is indeed not constant-time, let's reject
those points before they get mixed with sensitive data (in
ecp_mul_mxz()), in order to avoid exploitable leaks caused by the
special cases they would trigger. (See the "May the Fourth" paper
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Modify tests to test mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t,
mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t and
mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t struct initialization macros.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Tests for psa_cipher_encrypt and psa_cipher_decrypt functions.
The psa_cipher_encrypt function takes no parameter for IV and always generates
it therefore there will be a randomness in the calculation and cannot be
validated by comparing the actual output with the expected output.
The function is tested by:
- doing a prtially randomized test with an encryption then a decryption
and validating the input with output of the decryption
- validating against the multipart encryption
The combination of this two methods provides enough coverage like a
known answer test.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Various functions for PSA hash operations call abort
on failure; test that this is done. The PSA spec does not require
this behaviour, but it makes our implementation more robust in
case the user does not abort the operation as required by the
PSA spec.
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Various functions for PSA cipher and mac operations call abort
on failure; test that this is done. The PSA spec does not require
this behaviour, but it makes our implementation more robust in
case the user does not abort the operation as required by the
PSA spec.
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
The cipher_bad_order test happened to pass, but was not testing the
failure case it intended to test.
Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
Tests for psa_mac_compute and psa_mac_verify functions.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The psa_verify_hash() is the pre-hashed version of the API and supposed
to work on hashes generated by the user. There were tests passing that
were getting "hashes" of sizes different from the expected.
Transform these into properly failing tests.
Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
