Only allow creating keys in the application (user) range. Allow
opening keys in the implementation (vendor) range as well.
Compared with what the implementation allowed, which was undocumented:
0 is now allowed; values from 0x40000000 to 0xfffeffff are now
forbidden.
Change the scope of key identifiers to be global, rather than
per lifetime. As a result, you now need to specify the lifetime of a
key only when creating it.
Split the testing into tests that exercise policies in
test_suite_psa_crypto and tests that exercise slot content (slot
states, key material) in test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management.
Test various cases of source and target policies with and without
wildcards. Missing: testing of the policy constraint on psa_copy_key
itself.
Test several key types (raw data, AES, RSA). Test with the
source or target being persistent.
Add failure tests (incompatible policies, source slot empty, target
slot occupied).
Remove the type and bits arguments to psa_allocate_key() and
psa_create_key(). They can be useful if the implementation wants to
know exactly how much space to allocate for the slot, but many
implementations (including ours) don't care, and it's possible to work
around their lack by deferring size-dependent actions to the time when
the key material is created. They are a burden to applications and
make the API more complex, and the benefits aren't worth it.
Change the API and adapt the implementation, the units test and the
sample code accordingly.
