When mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path() checks each object in the supplied path, it only processes regular files. This change makes it also accept a symlink to a file. Fixes#3005.
This was observed to be a problem on Fedora/CentOS/RHEL systems, where the ca-bundle in the default location is actually a symlink.
* origin/mbedtls-2.7:
Enable more test cases without MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
More accurate test case description
Clarify that the "FATAL" message is expected
Note that mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() must not be called twice
Fix CTR_DRBG benchmark
Changelog entry for xxx_drbg_set_entropy_len before xxx_drbg_seed
CTR_DRBG: support set_entropy_len() before seed()
CTR_DRBG: Don't use functions before they're defined
HMAC_DRBG: support set_entropy_len() before seed()
The functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() could return 0 if an AES function
failed. This could only happen with alternative AES
implementations (the built-in implementation of the AES functions
involved never fail), typically due to a failure in a hardware
accelerator.
Bug reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer
Lauri, Sectra.
* restricted/pr/666: (24 commits)
Add ChangeLog entry
mpi_lt_mpi_ct: fix condition handling
mpi_lt_mpi_ct: Add further tests
mpi_lt_mpi_ct: Fix test numbering
mpi_lt_mpi_ct perform tests for both limb size
ct_lt_mpi_uint: cast the return value explicitely
mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct: add tests for 32 bit limbs
mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct: simplify condition
Rename variable for better readability
mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct: Improve documentation
Make mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct more portable
Bignum: Document assumptions about the sign field
Add more tests for mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct
mpi_lt_mpi_ct test: hardcode base 16
Document ct_lt_mpi_uint
mpi_lt_mpi_ct: make use of unsigned consistent
ct_lt_mpi_uint: make use of biL
Change mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi_ct to check less than
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi_ct: remove multiplications
Remove excess vertical space
...
This issue has been reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai,
Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and
Dave Tian (Purdue University).
In AES encrypt and decrypt some variables were left on the stack. The value
of these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best
practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like
Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function.
In the case of *ret we might need to preserve a 0 value throughout the
loop and therefore we need an extra condition to protect it from being
overwritten.
The value of done is always 1 after *ret has been set and does not need
to be protected from overwriting. Therefore in this case the extra
condition can be removed.
The code relied on the assumptions that CHAR_BIT is 8 and that unsigned
does not have padding bits.
In the Bignum module we already assume that the sign of an MPI is either
-1 or 1. Using this, we eliminate the above mentioned dependency.
The signature of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi_ct() meant to support using it in
place of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(). This meant full comparison functionality
and a signed result.
To make the function more universal and friendly to constant time
coding, we change the result type to unsigned. Theoretically, we could
encode the comparison result in an unsigned value, but it would be less
intuitive.
Therefore we won't be able to represent the result as unsigned anymore
and the functionality will be constrained to checking if the first
operand is less than the second. This is sufficient to support the
current use case and to check any relationship between MPIs.
The only drawback is that we need to call the function twice when
checking for equality, but this can be optimised later if an when it is
needed.
Multiplication is known to have measurable timing variations based on
the operands. For example it typically is much faster if one of the
operands is zero. Remove them from constant time code.
The blinding applied to the scalar before modular inversion is
inadequate. Bignum is not constant time/constant trace, side channel
attacks can retrieve the blinded value, factor it (it is smaller than
RSA keys and not guaranteed to have only large prime factors). Then the
key can be recovered by brute force.
Reducing the blinded value makes factoring useless because the adversary
can only recover pk*t+z*N instead of pk*t.
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
The former test-only function mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len() is
no longer used, but keep it for strict ABI compatibility.
Move the definitions of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to after they are used. This makes the code
easier to read and to maintain.
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
According to SP800-90A, the DRBG seeding process should use a nonce
of length `security_strength / 2` bits as part of the DRBG seed. It
further notes that this nonce may be drawn from the same source of
entropy that is used for the first `security_strength` bits of the
DRBG seed. The present HMAC DRBG implementation does that, requesting
`security_strength * 3 / 2` bits of entropy from the configured entropy
source in total to form the initial part of the DRBG seed.
However, some entropy sources may have thresholds in terms of how much
entropy they can provide in a single call to their entropy gathering
function which may be exceeded by the present HMAC DRBG implementation
even if the threshold is not smaller than `security_strength` bits.
Specifically, this is the case for our own entropy module implementation
which only allows requesting at most 32 Bytes of entropy at a time
in configurations disabling SHA-512, and this leads to runtime failure
of HMAC DRBG when used with Mbed Crypto' own entropy callbacks in such
configurations.
This commit fixes this by splitting the seed entropy acquisition into
two calls, one requesting `security_strength` bits first, and another
one requesting `security_strength / 2` bits for the nonce.
Fixes#237.
* origin/mbedtls-2.7:
Changelog entry for HAVEGE fix
Prevent building the HAVEGE module on platforms where it doesn't work
Fix misuse of signed ints in the HAVEGE module
The failure of mbedtls_md was not checked in one place. This could have led
to an incorrect computation if a hardware accelerator failed. In most cases
this would have led to the key exchange failing, so the impact would have been
a hard-to-diagnose error reported in the wrong place. If the two sides of the
key exchange failed in the same way with an output from mbedtls_md that was
independent of the input, this could have led to an apparently successful key
exchange with a predictable key, thus a glitching md accelerator could have
caused a security vulnerability.
If int is not capable of storing as many values as unsigned, the code
may generate a trap value. If signed int and unsigned int aren't
32-bit types, the code may calculate meaningless values.
The elements of the HAVEGE state are manipulated with bitwise
operations, with the expectations that the elements are 32-bit
unsigned integers (or larger). But they are declared as int, and so
the code has undefined behavior. Clang with Asan correctly points out
some shifts that reach the sign bit.
Use unsigned int internally. This is technically an aliasing violation
since we're accessing an array of `int` via a pointer to `unsigned
int`, but since we don't access the array directly inside the same
function, it's very unlikely to be compiled in an unintended manner.
* restricted/pr/581:
Remove unnecessary empty line
Add a test for signing content with a long ECDSA key
Add documentation notes about the required size of the signature buffers
Add missing MBEDTLS_ECP_C dependencies in check_config.h
Change size of preallocated buffer for pk_sign() calls
* origin/pr/2713:
programs: Make `make clean` clean all programs always
ssl_tls: Enable Suite B with subset of ECP curves
windows: Fix Release x64 configuration
timing: Remove redundant include file
net_sockets: Fix typo in net_would_block()
