The current definition of PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN includes
PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW and PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY, which don't strictly
follow the hash-and-sign paradigm: the algorithm does not encode a hash
algorithm that is applied prior to the signature step. The definition in
fact encompasses what can be used with psa_sign_hash/psa_verify_hash, so
it's the correct definition for PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH. Therefore this commit
moves definition of PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN to PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, and
replace the definition of PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN by a correct one (based
on PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH, excluding the algorithms where the pre-signature
step isn't to apply the hash encoded in the algorithm).
In the definition of PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH, keep the condition for a nonzero
output to be PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN.
Everywhere else in the code base (definition of PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE, and
every use of PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN outside of crypto_values.h), we meant
PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH where we wrote PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN, so do a
global replacement.
```
git grep -l IS_HASH_AND_SIGN ':!include/psa/crypto_values.h' | xargs perl -i -pe 's/ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN/ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH/g'
```
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This is a variant of PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS which currently has exactly the same
behavior, but is intended to have a different behavior when verifying
signatures.
In a subsequent commit, PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS will change to requiring the salt
length to be what it would produce when signing, as is currently documented,
whereas PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT will retain the current behavior of
allowing any salt length (including 0).
Changes in this commit:
* New algorithm constructor PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT.
* New predicates PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT (corresponding to
PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS) and PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT (corresponding to
PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT).
* Support for the new predicates in macro_collector.py (needed for
generate_psa_constant_names).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Use the encoding from an upcoming version of the specification.
Add as much (or as little) testing as is currently present for Camellia.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Implementers and users would have to refer to the RFC for the detailed
specification of the algorithm anyway.
Keep a mention of the curves and hashes involved for avoidance of doubt.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The coordinates are over $F_{2^{255}-19}$, so by the general
definition of the bit size associated with the curve in the
specification, the value for size attribute of keys is 255.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The size attribute of a key is expressed in bits, so use bits in the
documentation. (The documentation of psa_export_key() describes the
export format, so it counts in bytes.)
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Call it “SHAKE256-512”, just like SHA3-512 has 512 bits of output.
SHAKE256-64 looks like it's 64 bits of output, but this is 64 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Define algorithms for PureEdDSA and for HashEdDSA, the EdDSA variants
defined by RFC 8032.
The encoding for HashEdDSA needs to encode the hash algorithm so that
the hash can be calculated by passing PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(sig_alg)
to psa_hash_compute() or psa_hash_setup(). As a consequence,
Ed25519ph (using SHA-512) and Ed448ph (using SHAKE256) need to have
different algorithm encodings (the key is enough to tell them apart,
but it is not known while hashing). Another consequence is that the
API needs to recognize the Ed448 prehash (64 bytes of SHAKE256 output)
as a hash algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Add an elliptic curve family for the twisted Edwards curves
Edwards25519 and Edwards448 ("Goldilocks"). As with Montgomery curves,
since these are the only two curves in common use, the family has a
generic name.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix places where Doxygen documentation uses \p to refer to a parameter
name and where the name used did not match the actual parameter name.
I used the following script to detect problematic cases:
```
perl -w -ne 'if (eof) { $. = 0; } if (m!^/\*\*!) { $in_doc = 1; %param = (); %p = (); } if (m!\*/!) { foreach $name (keys %p) { if (!$param{$name}) { foreach $line (@{$p{$name}}) { print "$ARGV:$line: $name\n" } } } $in_doc = 0; } if ($in_doc) { if (/\\param(?: *\[[^\[\]]*\])? +(\w+)/) { $param{$1} = 1; } foreach (/\\p +\*?(\w+)/) { push @{$p{$1}}, $.; } }' include/psa/*.h
```
This commits fixes all the remaining occurrences under include/psa,
which were just trivial name mismatches.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This brings them in line with PSA Crypto API 1.0.0
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH -> PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG
PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH -> PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
This algorithm replaces the pre-existing stream cipher algorithms.
The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type.
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
If the file is read correctly, but it contains data that isn't valid,
the crypto storage code returns PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID.
The PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT and PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE error codes are
replaced with PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID, except in the ITS subsystem.
Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
Move all the PSA crypto APIs using key handles
to use key identifiers but psa_key_open() and
psa_key_close(). This is done without modifying
any test as key handles and key identifiers are
now the same.
Update the library modules using PSA crypto APIs
to get rid of key handles.
Programs and unit tests are updated to not use
key handles in subsequent commits, not in this
one.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
