Add it in all files that use mbedtls_plaform_memset() but didn't already
include platfom_util.h.
In some configurations it just happened to work, either because it was
included indirectly or because the part of the code that used that function
was disabled, but it some configurations it broke, so let's fix it properly.
Steps:
1. sed -i 's/\bmemset(\([^)]\)/mbedtls_platform_memset(\1/g' library/*.c tinycrypt/*.c include/mbedtls/*.h scripts/data_files/*.fmt
2. Manually edit library/platform_util.c to revert to memset() in the
implementations of mbedtls_platform_memset() and mbedtls_platform_memcpy()
3. egrep -n '\<memset\>' library/*.c include/mbedtls/*.h tinycrypt/*.c
The remaining occurrences are in three categories:
a. From point 2 above.
b. In comments.
c. In the initialisation of memset_func, to be changed in a future commit.
As has been previously done for ciphersuites, this commit introduces
a zero-cost abstraction layer around the type
mbedtls_md_info const *
whose valid values represent implementations of message digest algorithms.
Access to a particular digest implementation can be requested by name or
digest ID through the API mbedtls_md_info_from_xxx(), which either returns
a valid implementation or NULL, representing failure.
This commit replaces such uses of `mbedtls_md_info const *` by an abstract
type `mbedtls_md_handle_t` whose valid values represent digest implementations,
and which has a designated invalid value MBEDTLS_MD_INVALID_HANDLE.
The purpose of this abstraction layer is to pave the way for builds which
support precisely one digest algorithm. In this case, mbedtls_md_handle_t
can be implemented as a two-valued type, with one value representing the
invalid handle, and the unique valid value representing the unique enabled
digest.
pkcs11_sign() reuses *sig to store the header and hash, but those might
be larger than the actual sig, causing a buffer overflow.
An overflow can occur when using raw sigs with hashlen > siglen, or when
the RSA key is less than 664 bits long (or less when using hashes
shorter than SHA512)
As siglen is always within the 'low realm' < 32k, an overflow of asnlen
+ hashlen is not possible.
This restores previous functionality, and thus still allows only RSA to be
used through PKCS#11.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Bakker <p.j.bakker@polarssl.org>
