* #3742 After input of a key as SECRET in the derivation, allow the
derivation result to be used as key.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
* #3741 Allow key agreement inside derivation with a key that's allowed
for the relevant agreement.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Test import and key generation, each followed by a key agreement. Only
good cases in this commit.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
... as opposed to PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE.
The spec on psa_cipher_finish() states that PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
should be returned when:
"The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for this
particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based on block
cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the total input size
is not a multiple of the block size."
Currently, there is a distinction between encryption and decryption
on whether INVALID_ARGUMENT or BAD_STATE is returned, but this is not
a part of the spec.
This fix ensures that PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT is returned
consistently on invalid cipher input sizes.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Strupe <fredrik.strupe@silabs.com>
To test the proper handling of owner identifier as of key
identifiers, add owner identifier(s) to tests having
key identifier(s) as test parameters. Just don't do it for
tests related to tests invalid values of key identifiers
as there is no owner identifier invalid values.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Fix PSA code and unit tests for the unit tests
to pass with key identifiers encoding owner
identifiers.
The changes in PSA code just make the enablement
of key identifiers encoding owner identifiers
platform independent. Previous to this commit,
such key identifiers were used only in the case
of PSA SPM platforms.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Since it is being dereferenced by free on exit it should be inited to NULL.
Also added a small test that would trigger the issue.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
PSA Crypto was checking the byte length of a to-be-imported public ECP key
against the expected length for Weierstrass keys, forgetting that
Curve25519/Curve448 exists.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING came in to the PSA Crypto API spec v1.0.0, but
was not implemented yet in the mbed TLS implementation.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Follow the PSA Crypto specification which was updated between 1.0 beta3
and 1.0.0.
Add corresponding test cases.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Rename PSA_ECC_CURVE_xxx to PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx, also rename
PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE to PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY and rename
psa_ecc_curve_t to psa_ecc_family_t. Old defines are provided in
include/crypto_compat.h for backward compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
Change the representation of psa_ecc_curve_t and psa_dh_group_t from
the IETF 16-bit encoding to a custom 24-bit encoding where the upper 8
bits represent a curve family and the lower 16 bits are the key size
in bits. Families are based on naming and mathematical similarity,
with sufficiently precise families that no two curves in a family have
the same bit size (for example SECP-R1 and SECP-R2 are two different
families).
As a consequence, the lower 16 bits of a key type value are always
either the key size or 0.
Don't rely on the bit size encoded in the PSA curve identifier, in
preparation for removing that.
For some inputs, the error code on EC key creation changes from
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT to PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or vice versa.
There will be further such changes in subsequent commits.
psa_hash_compare is tested for good cases and invalid-signature cases
in hash_compute_compare. Also test invalid-argument cases. Also run a
few autonomous test cases with valid arguments.
Rename some macros and functions related to signature which are
changing as part of the addition of psa_sign_message and
psa_verify_message.
perl -i -pe '%t = (
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN => PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY => PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE => PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE => PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE,
psa_asymmetric_sign => psa_sign_hash,
psa_asymmetric_verify => psa_verify_hash,
); s/\b(@{[join("|", keys %t)]})\b/$t{$1}/ge' $(git ls-files . ':!:**/crypto_compat.h')
Consolidate the invalid-handle tests from test_suite_psa_crypto and
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management. Start with the code in
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management and adapt it to test one invalid
handle value per run of the test function.
Add some ECDSA test cases where the hash is shorter or longer than the
key length, to check that the API doesn't enforce a relationship
between the two.
For the sign_deterministic tests, the keys are
tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem and tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem
and the signatures were obtained with Python Cryptodome:
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, SHA384
from Crypto.PublicKey import ECC
from Crypto.Signature import DSS
k2 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"))
SHA384.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k2, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA384.new(b'hello')))
k3 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3081a402010104303f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76aa00706052b81040022a16403620004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"))
SHA256.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k3, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA256.new(b'hello')))
If none of the inputs to a key derivation is a
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET passed with
psa_key_derivation_input_key(), forbid
psa_key_derivation_output_key(). It usually doesn't make sense to
derive a key object if the secret isn't itself a proper key.
After passing some inputs, try getting one byte of output, just to
check that this succeeds (for a valid sequence of inputs) or fails
with BAD_STATE (for an invalid sequence of inputs). Either output a
1-byte key or a 1-byte buffer depending on the test data.
The test data was expanded as follows:
* Output key type (or not a key): same as the SECRET input if success
is expected, otherwise NONE.
* Expected status: PSA_SUCCESS after valid inputs, BAD_STATE after any
invalid input.
Allow a direct input as the SECRET input step in a key derivation, in
addition to allowing DERIVE keys. This makes it easier for
applications to run a key derivation where the "secret" input is
obtained from somewhere else. This makes it possible for the "secret"
input to be empty (keys cannot be empty), which some protocols do (for
example the IV derivation in EAP-TLS).
Conversely, allow a RAW_DATA key as the INFO/LABEL/SALT/SEED input to a key
derivation, in addition to allowing direct inputs. This doesn't
improve security, but removes a step when a personalization parameter
is stored in the key store, and allows this personalization parameter
to remain opaque.
Add test cases that explore step/key-type-and-keyhood combinations.
This commit only makes derive_input more flexible so that the key
derivation API can be tested with different key types and raw data for
each input step. The behavior of the test cases remains the same.
