Fix some export related tests that were
relying on the fact that the size of the
output buffer was checked after other
parameters.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The compilation guards in key_management.c are now
accelerator compilation guards (MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xyz).
As a consequence when running the PSA driver wrapper
tests as part of test_psa_crypto_config_basic
and test_psa_crypto_drivers all.sh components all
key management cryptographic operations were handled by
the software builtin fallback, and not by the test driver
as intended in the first place.
This commits fixes this issue by:
. declaring an accelerator for ECC key pairs in
test_psa_crypto_config_basic.
. declaring an accelerator for both ECC and RSA
key pairs in test_psa_crypto_drivers.
It is possible to declare an accelerator for both
ECC and RSA key pairs in test_psa_crypto_drivers
and not in test_psa_crypto_config_basic because
in the case of test_psa_crypto_drivers the new
PSA configuration is not activated. That way,
the builtin fallback software implementation
is present to supply the transparent test driver
when some support is missing in it (mainly
RSA key generation).
Note that the declaration of accelerators does
much more than just "fixing" the execution flow of
driver wrapper tests, it makes all import and public
key export cryptographic operations in all unit
tests being handled by the transparent test driver
(provided that it supports the key type).
One test case related to key generation is
partially disabled. This will be fixed with the
rework of psa_generate_key along the lines
described in psa-crypto-implementation-structure.md.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The negative test cases for psa_copy_key() don't actually care whether
the target policy is supported. This is similar to _key_policy tests.
Add a similar rule.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The test function asymmetric_signature_key_policy combines positive
and negative tests inside the code, so it doesn't take a status as its
last argument.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Replace manually written dependencies on MBEDTLS_xxx with
PSA_WANT_xxx dependencies that are determined automatically from the
test data.
Run tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py on
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto*.data,
except for the dynamic secure element tests in
tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_se_driver_hal*.data.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
When using the test function persistent_key_load_key_from_storage with
DERIVE_KEY, there's a dependency on HKDF-SHA-256. Since this
dependency is in the code, declare it there rather than with the data.
If the depenency is not met, mark the test as skipped since it can't
create the key to be tested.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Move PSA key attributes tests to their own
test suite to be able to run them when
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled but
not MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
The lifetime of key attributes now encodes whether a key is
volatile/persistent or not AND its location.
Fix PSA code where the fact that the lifetime encodes
the key location was not taken into account properly.
Fix the impacted tests and add two non regression tests.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
* #3742 After input of a key as SECRET in the derivation, allow the
derivation result to be used as key.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
* #3741 Allow key agreement inside derivation with a key that's allowed
for the relevant agreement.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Test import and key generation, each followed by a key agreement. Only
good cases in this commit.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
... as opposed to PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE.
The spec on psa_cipher_finish() states that PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
should be returned when:
"The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for this
particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based on block
cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the total input size
is not a multiple of the block size."
Currently, there is a distinction between encryption and decryption
on whether INVALID_ARGUMENT or BAD_STATE is returned, but this is not
a part of the spec.
This fix ensures that PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT is returned
consistently on invalid cipher input sizes.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Strupe <fredrik.strupe@silabs.com>
To test the proper handling of owner identifier as of key
identifiers, add owner identifier(s) to tests having
key identifier(s) as test parameters. Just don't do it for
tests related to tests invalid values of key identifiers
as there is no owner identifier invalid values.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Fix PSA code and unit tests for the unit tests
to pass with key identifiers encoding owner
identifiers.
The changes in PSA code just make the enablement
of key identifiers encoding owner identifiers
platform independent. Previous to this commit,
such key identifiers were used only in the case
of PSA SPM platforms.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Since it is being dereferenced by free on exit it should be inited to NULL.
Also added a small test that would trigger the issue.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
PSA Crypto was checking the byte length of a to-be-imported public ECP key
against the expected length for Weierstrass keys, forgetting that
Curve25519/Curve448 exists.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING came in to the PSA Crypto API spec v1.0.0, but
was not implemented yet in the mbed TLS implementation.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Follow the PSA Crypto specification which was updated between 1.0 beta3
and 1.0.0.
Add corresponding test cases.
Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
Rename PSA_ECC_CURVE_xxx to PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx, also rename
PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE to PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY and rename
psa_ecc_curve_t to psa_ecc_family_t. Old defines are provided in
include/crypto_compat.h for backward compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
Change the representation of psa_ecc_curve_t and psa_dh_group_t from
the IETF 16-bit encoding to a custom 24-bit encoding where the upper 8
bits represent a curve family and the lower 16 bits are the key size
in bits. Families are based on naming and mathematical similarity,
with sufficiently precise families that no two curves in a family have
the same bit size (for example SECP-R1 and SECP-R2 are two different
families).
As a consequence, the lower 16 bits of a key type value are always
either the key size or 0.
Don't rely on the bit size encoded in the PSA curve identifier, in
preparation for removing that.
For some inputs, the error code on EC key creation changes from
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT to PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or vice versa.
There will be further such changes in subsequent commits.
psa_hash_compare is tested for good cases and invalid-signature cases
in hash_compute_compare. Also test invalid-argument cases. Also run a
few autonomous test cases with valid arguments.
Rename some macros and functions related to signature which are
changing as part of the addition of psa_sign_message and
psa_verify_message.
perl -i -pe '%t = (
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN => PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY => PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE => PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE => PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE,
psa_asymmetric_sign => psa_sign_hash,
psa_asymmetric_verify => psa_verify_hash,
); s/\b(@{[join("|", keys %t)]})\b/$t{$1}/ge' $(git ls-files . ':!:**/crypto_compat.h')
Consolidate the invalid-handle tests from test_suite_psa_crypto and
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management. Start with the code in
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management and adapt it to test one invalid
handle value per run of the test function.
Add some ECDSA test cases where the hash is shorter or longer than the
key length, to check that the API doesn't enforce a relationship
between the two.
For the sign_deterministic tests, the keys are
tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem and tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem
and the signatures were obtained with Python Cryptodome:
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, SHA384
from Crypto.PublicKey import ECC
from Crypto.Signature import DSS
k2 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"))
SHA384.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k2, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA384.new(b'hello')))
k3 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3081a402010104303f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76aa00706052b81040022a16403620004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"))
SHA256.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k3, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA256.new(b'hello')))
If none of the inputs to a key derivation is a
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET passed with
psa_key_derivation_input_key(), forbid
psa_key_derivation_output_key(). It usually doesn't make sense to
derive a key object if the secret isn't itself a proper key.
After passing some inputs, try getting one byte of output, just to
check that this succeeds (for a valid sequence of inputs) or fails
with BAD_STATE (for an invalid sequence of inputs). Either output a
1-byte key or a 1-byte buffer depending on the test data.
The test data was expanded as follows:
* Output key type (or not a key): same as the SECRET input if success
is expected, otherwise NONE.
* Expected status: PSA_SUCCESS after valid inputs, BAD_STATE after any
invalid input.
Allow a direct input as the SECRET input step in a key derivation, in
addition to allowing DERIVE keys. This makes it easier for
applications to run a key derivation where the "secret" input is
obtained from somewhere else. This makes it possible for the "secret"
input to be empty (keys cannot be empty), which some protocols do (for
example the IV derivation in EAP-TLS).
Conversely, allow a RAW_DATA key as the INFO/LABEL/SALT/SEED input to a key
derivation, in addition to allowing direct inputs. This doesn't
improve security, but removes a step when a personalization parameter
is stored in the key store, and allows this personalization parameter
to remain opaque.
Add test cases that explore step/key-type-and-keyhood combinations.
This commit only makes derive_input more flexible so that the key
derivation API can be tested with different key types and raw data for
each input step. The behavior of the test cases remains the same.
The current test generator code accepts multiple colons as a
separator, but this is just happenstance due to how the code, it isn't
robust. Replace "::" by ":", which is more future-proof and allows
simple separator-based navigation.
Make check-test-cases.py pass.
Prior to this commit, there were many repeated test descriptions, but
none with the same test data and dependencies and comments, as checked
with the following command:
for x in tests/suites/*.data; do perl -00 -ne 'warn "$ARGV: $. = $seen{$_}\n" if $seen{$_}; $seen{$_}=$.' $x; done
Wherever a test suite contains multiple test cases with the exact same
description, add " [#1]", " [#2]", etc. to make the descriptions
unique. We don't currently use this particular arrangement of
punctuation, so all occurrences of " [#" were added by this script.
I used the following ad hoc code:
import sys
def fix_test_suite(data_file_name):
in_paragraph = False
total = {}
index = {}
lines = None
with open(data_file_name) as data_file:
lines = list(data_file.readlines())
for line in lines:
if line == '\n':
in_paragraph = False
continue
if line.startswith('#'):
continue
if not in_paragraph:
# This is a test case description line.
total[line] = total.get(line, 0) + 1
index[line] = 0
in_paragraph = True
with open(data_file_name, 'w') as data_file:
for line in lines:
if line in total and total[line] > 1:
index[line] += 1
line = '%s [#%d]\n' % (line[:-1], index[line])
data_file.write(line)
for data_file_name in sys.argv[1:]:
fix_test_suite(data_file_name)
A test case for 32+0 was present three times, evidently overeager
copy-paste. Replace the duplicates by test cases that read more than
32 bytes, which exercises HKDF a little more (32 bytes is significant
because HKDF-SHA-256 produces output in blocks of 32 bytes).
I obtained the test data by running our implementation, because we're
confident in our implementation now thanks to other test cases: this
data is useful as a non-regression test.
The signature must have exactly the same length as the key, it can't
be longer. Fix#258
If the signature doesn't have the correct size, that's an invalid
signature, not a problem with an output buffer size. Fix the error code.
Add test cases.
In psa_asymmetric_sign, immediately reject an empty signature buffer.
This can never be right.
Add test cases (one RSA and one ECDSA).
Change the SE HAL mock tests not to use an empty signature buffer.
Add tests for derivation.
Test both 7 bits and 9 bits, in case the implementation truncated the
bit size down and 7 was rejected as 0 rather than because it isn't a
multiple of 8.
There is no corresponding test for import because import determines
the key size from the key data, which is always a whole number of bytes.
Test the behavior of the getter/setter functions.
Test that psa_get_key_slot_number() reports a slot number for a key in
a secure element, and doesn't report a slot number for a key that is
not in a secure element.
Test that psa_get_key_slot_number() reports the correct slot number
for a key in a secure element.
Add tests that call psa_generate_random() (possibly via
psa_generate_key()) with a size that's larger than
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST. This causes psa_generate_random() to
fail because it calls mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() without taking the
maximum request size of CTR_DRBG into account.
Non-regression test for #206
65528 bits is more than any reasonable key until we start supporting
post-quantum cryptography.
This limit is chosen to allow bit-sizes to be stored in 16 bits, with
65535 left to indicate an invalid value. It's a whole number of bytes,
which facilitates some calculations, in particular allowing a key of
exactly PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE to be created but not one bit
more.
As a resource usage limit, this is arguably too large, but that's out
of scope of the current commit.
Test that key import, generation and derivation reject overly large
sizes.
Add a few test cases to ensure that alg=0 in policy does not allow
using the key for an operation.
Add a test case to ensure that ANY_HASH does not have a wildcard
meaning for HMAC.
