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mbedtls/library/ssl_msg.c
Joe Subbiani ca8a7cf82d Implement byte reading macros to remaining files 
The previous commits cherry picked from the changes made with relation
to the development branch. This commit makes the appropriate chnages to
the files not present in the development branch.

Signed-off-by: Joe Subbiani <joe.subbiani@arm.com>
2021-08-03 16:42:42 +01:00

6065 lines
205 KiB
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/*
* Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions
* (record layer + retransmission state machine)
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
/*
* The SSL 3.0 specification was drafted by Netscape in 1996,
* and became an IETF standard in 1999.
*
* http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt
* http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/version.h"
#include "ssl_invasive.h"
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#endif
static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
/*
* Start a timer.
* Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs )
{
if( ssl->f_set_timer == NULL )
return;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs ) );
ssl->f_set_timer( ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs );
}
/*
* Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL )
return( 0 );
if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) );
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING)
static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len,
mbedtls_record *rec );
int mbedtls_ssl_check_record( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen )
{
int ret = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "record buffer", buf, buflen );
/* We don't support record checking in TLS because
* (a) there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it, and
* (b) In SSLv3 and TLS 1.0, CBC record decryption has state
* and we'd need to backup the transform here.
*/
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
else
{
mbedtls_record rec;
ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, buf, buflen, &rec );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret );
goto exit;
}
if( ssl->transform_in != NULL )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
goto exit;
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
exit:
/* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make
* sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, buflen );
/* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID
* as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID ||
ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_CHECKING */
#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0
#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */
static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint8_t slot );
static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record const *rec );
static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
#else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
if( mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len )
return( mtu );
return( out_buf_len );
}
static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left;
size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size( ssl );
/* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone
* past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */
if( bytes_written > mtu )
{
/* Should never happen... */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
return( (int) ( mtu - bytes_written ) );
}
static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t remaining, expansion;
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ssl );
if( max_len > mfl )
max_len = mfl;
/* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension
* only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory
* we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size
* MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's
* no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer.
*
* The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never
* write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead.
*/
if( max_len <= ssl->out_left )
return( 0 );
max_len -= ssl->out_left;
#endif
ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
remaining = (size_t) ret;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( ssl );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
expansion = (size_t) ret;
if( remaining <= expansion )
return( 0 );
remaining -= expansion;
if( remaining >= max_len )
remaining = max_len;
return( (int) remaining );
}
/*
* Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range,
* returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached.
*/
static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
uint32_t new_timeout;
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
return( -1 );
/* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1
* in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first
* retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes.
* This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be
* delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work
* on most non-IP stacks too. */
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min )
{
ssl->handshake->mtu = 508;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) );
}
new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
/* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */
if( new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ||
new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max )
{
new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max;
}
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
(unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
return( 0 );
}
static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "update timeout value to %lu millisecs",
(unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_init)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *key_enc, const unsigned char *key_dec,
size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *iv_enc, const unsigned char *iv_dec,
size_t ivlen,
const unsigned char *mac_enc, const unsigned char *mac_dec,
size_t maclen ) = NULL;
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int direction) = NULL;
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_reset)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
int (*mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_finish)( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) = NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
/*
* Encryption/decryption functions
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length( size_t len,
size_t granularity )
{
return( ( granularity - ( len + 1 ) % granularity ) % granularity );
}
/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content
* type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used
* in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect
* a record's content type.
*
* struct {
* opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length];
* ContentType real_type;
* uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
* } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext;
*
* Input:
* - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the
* plaintext to be wrapped.
* - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
* - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from
* `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`.
* - `rec_type`: The desired record content type.
*
* Output:
* - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
*
* Returns:
* - `0` on success.
* - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space
* for the expansion.
*/
static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext( unsigned char *content,
size_t *content_size,
size_t remaining,
uint8_t rec_type,
size_t pad )
{
size_t len = *content_size;
/* Write real content type */
if( remaining == 0 )
return( -1 );
content[ len ] = rec_type;
len++;
remaining--;
if( remaining < pad )
return( -1 );
memset( content + len, 0, pad );
len += pad;
remaining -= pad;
*content_size = len;
return( 0 );
}
/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */
static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( unsigned char const *content,
size_t *content_size,
uint8_t *rec_type )
{
size_t remaining = *content_size;
/* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */
do
{
if( remaining == 0 )
return( -1 );
remaining--;
} while( content[ remaining ] == 0 );
*content_size = remaining;
*rec_type = content[ remaining ];
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
/* `add_data` must have size 13 Bytes if the CID extension is disabled,
* and 13 + 1 + CID-length Bytes if the CID extension is enabled. */
static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( unsigned char* add_data,
size_t *add_data_len,
mbedtls_record *rec,
unsigned minor_ver )
{
/* Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2):
*
* additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type +
* TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length;
*
* For the CID extension, this is extended as follows
* (quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05):
*
* additional_data = seq_num + DTLSPlaintext.type +
* DTLSPlaintext.version +
* cid +
* cid_length +
* length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext;
*
* For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD
* and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead.
*/
unsigned char *cur = add_data;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
if( minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
{
((void) minor_ver);
memcpy( cur, rec->ctr, sizeof( rec->ctr ) );
cur += sizeof( rec->ctr );
}
*cur = rec->type;
cur++;
memcpy( cur, rec->ver, sizeof( rec->ver ) );
cur += sizeof( rec->ver );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
memcpy( cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
cur += rec->cid_len;
*cur = rec->cid_len;
cur++;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 );
cur += 2;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec->data_len, cur, 0 );
cur += 2;
}
*add_data_len = cur - add_data;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
#define SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES 20 /* MD-5 or SHA-1 */
/*
* SSLv3.0 MAC functions
*/
static void ssl_mac( mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx,
const unsigned char *secret,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
const unsigned char *ctr, int type,
unsigned char out[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES] )
{
unsigned char header[11];
unsigned char padding[48];
int padlen;
int md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info );
int md_type = mbedtls_md_get_type( md_ctx->md_info );
/* Only MD5 and SHA-1 supported */
if( md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 )
padlen = 48;
else
padlen = 40;
memcpy( header, ctr, 8 );
header[ 8] = (unsigned char) type;
header[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( len );
header[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( len );
memset( padding, 0x36, padlen );
mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, header, 11 );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, buf, len );
mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
memset( padding, 0x5C, padlen );
mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, secret, md_size );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, padding, padlen );
mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, out, md_size );
mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, out );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(
mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform )
{
return( transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen );
}
/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV )
*
* Concretely, this occurs in two variants:
*
* a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving
* IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv
*
* This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM.
*
* b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving
* IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv )
*
* This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly.
*
* See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform.
*
* This function has the precondition that
*
* dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len )
*
* which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition
* violated, the behavior of this function is undefined.
*/
static void ssl_build_record_nonce( unsigned char *dst_iv,
size_t dst_iv_len,
unsigned char const *fixed_iv,
size_t fixed_iv_len,
unsigned char const *dynamic_iv,
size_t dynamic_iv_len )
{
size_t i;
/* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */
memset( dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len );
memcpy( dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len );
dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len;
for( i = 0; i < dynamic_iv_len; i++ )
dst_iv[i] ^= dynamic_iv[i];
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int auth_done = 0;
unsigned char * data;
unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
size_t add_data_len;
size_t post_avail;
/* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
((void) ssl);
#endif
/* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used
* for CBC transformations in TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. */
#if !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) ) )
((void) f_rng);
((void) p_rng);
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> encrypt buf" ) );
if( transform == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no transform provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( rec == NULL
|| rec->buf == NULL
|| rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset
|| rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|| rec->cid_len != 0
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before encrypt: output payload",
data, rec->data_len );
mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
if( rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
rec->data_len,
(size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
/* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext
* structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID.
*
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
*
* Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
* `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
*
* Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously
* since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There
* is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
{
size_t padding =
ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
&rec->data_len,
post_avail,
rec->type,
padding ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/*
* Add CID information
*/
rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len;
memcpy( rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len );
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
size_t padding =
ssl_compute_padding_length( rec->data_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY );
/*
* Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure.
* See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information.
*
* Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence
* `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards.
*/
if( ssl_build_inner_plaintext( data,
&rec->data_len,
post_avail,
rec->type,
padding ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
post_avail = rec->buf_len - ( rec->data_len + rec->data_offset );
/*
* Add MAC before if needed
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM ||
( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
&& transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
#endif
) )
{
if( post_avail < transform->maclen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
unsigned char mac[SSL3_MAC_MAX_BYTES];
ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_enc, transform->mac_enc,
data, rec->data_len, rec->ctr, rec->type, mac );
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
add_data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
data, rec->data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len,
transform->maclen );
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
/*
* Encrypt
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including %d bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, 0 ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len,
data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char iv[12];
unsigned char *dynamic_iv;
size_t dynamic_iv_len;
int dynamic_iv_is_explicit =
ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform );
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
if( post_avail < transform->taglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
/*
* Build nonce for AEAD encryption.
*
* Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic
* part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and
* can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not
* agree with the record sequence number.
* However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes
* in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the
* dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the
* record sequence number here in all cases.
*/
dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr );
ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ),
transform->iv_enc,
transform->fixed_ivlen,
dynamic_iv,
dynamic_iv_len );
/*
* Build additional data for AEAD encryption.
* This depends on the TLS version.
*/
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (internal)",
iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used (transmitted)",
dynamic_iv,
dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
add_data, add_data_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including 0 bytes of padding",
rec->data_len ) );
/*
* Encrypt and authenticate
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
iv, transform->ivlen,
add_data, add_data_len,
data, rec->data_len, /* src */
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), /* dst */
&rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after encrypt: tag",
data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen,
transform->taglen );
/* Account for authentication tag. */
post_avail -= transform->taglen;
/*
* Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit.
*/
if( dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0 )
{
if( rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
memcpy( data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len );
rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len;
rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len;
}
auth_done++;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t padlen, i;
size_t olen;
/* Currently we're always using minimal padding
* (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */
padlen = transform->ivlen - ( rec->data_len + 1 ) % transform->ivlen;
if( padlen == transform->ivlen )
padlen = 0;
/* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */
if( post_avail < padlen + 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
for( i = 0; i <= padlen; i++ )
data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen;
rec->data_len += padlen + 1;
post_avail -= padlen + 1;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up as per
* Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246)
*/
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
if( f_rng == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
/*
* Generate IV
*/
ret = f_rng( p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
memcpy( data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc,
transform->ivlen );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"including %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding",
rec->data_len, transform->ivlen,
padlen + 1 ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc,
transform->iv_enc,
transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len,
data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
/*
* Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1
*/
memcpy( transform->iv_enc, transform->cipher_ctx_enc.iv,
transform->ivlen );
}
else
#endif
{
data -= transform->ivlen;
rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen;
rec->data_len += transform->ivlen;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
/*
* MAC(MAC_write_key, seq_num +
* TLSCipherText.type +
* TLSCipherText.version +
* length_of( (IV +) ENC(...) ) +
* IV + // except for TLS 1.0
* ENC(content + padding + padding_length));
*/
if( post_avail < transform->maclen)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len,
rec, transform->minor_ver );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
add_data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data,
add_data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_enc,
data, rec->data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_enc, mac );
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
memcpy( data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen );
rec->data_len += transform->maclen;
post_avail -= transform->maclen;
auth_done++;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
if( auth_done != 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= encrypt buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC)
/*
* Turn a bit into a mask:
* - if bit == 1, return the all-bits 1 mask, aka (size_t) -1
* - if bit == 0, return the all-bits 0 mask, aka 0
*
* This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
* with bit operations using masks.
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( size_t bit )
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
return -bit;
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
}
/*
* Constant-flow mask generation for "less than" comparison:
* - if x < y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
* - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
*
* This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
* with bit operations using masks.
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( size_t x, size_t y )
{
/* This has the most significant bit set if and only if x < y */
const size_t sub = x - y;
/* sub1 = (x < y) ? 1 : 0 */
const size_t sub1 = sub >> ( sizeof( sub ) * 8 - 1 );
/* mask = (x < y) ? 0xff... : 0x00... */
const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( sub1 );
return( mask );
}
/*
* Constant-flow mask generation for "greater or equal" comparison:
* - if x >= y, return all bits 1, that is (size_t) -1
* - otherwise, return all bits 0, that is 0
*
* This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
* with bit operations using masks.
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( size_t x, size_t y )
{
return( ~mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_lt( x, y ) );
}
/*
* Constant-flow boolean "equal" comparison:
* return x == y
*
* This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
* with bit operations - it can be used in conjunction with
* mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit().
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
static size_t mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( size_t x, size_t y )
{
/* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
const size_t diff = x ^ y;
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned integer types,
* but this is well-defined and precisely what we want to do here. */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
/* diff_msb's most significant bit is equal to x != y */
const size_t diff_msb = ( diff | -diff );
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
/* diff1 = (x != y) ? 1 : 0 */
const size_t diff1 = diff_msb >> ( sizeof( diff_msb ) * 8 - 1 );
return( 1 ^ diff1 );
}
/*
* Constant-flow conditional memcpy:
* - if c1 == c2, equivalent to memcpy(dst, src, len),
* - otherwise, a no-op,
* but with execution flow independent of the values of c1 and c2.
*
* This function is implemented without using comparison operators, as those
* might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
*/
static void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( unsigned char *dst,
const unsigned char *src,
size_t len,
size_t c1, size_t c2 )
{
/* mask = c1 == c2 ? 0xff : 0x00 */
const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( c1, c2 );
const unsigned char mask = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( equal );
/* dst[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dst[i] */
for( size_t i = 0; i < len; i++ )
dst[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dst[i] & ~mask );
}
/*
* Compute HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
*
* Only works with MD-5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384.
* (Otherwise, computation of block_size needs to be adapted.)
*/
MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac(
mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *add_data, size_t add_data_len,
const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len_secret,
size_t min_data_len, size_t max_data_len,
unsigned char *output )
{
/*
* This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone()
* extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour.
*
* HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means
* concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit
* patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx.
*
* We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to
* minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen
* finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result.
*
* Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done.
*/
const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type( ctx->md_info );
/* TLS 1.0-1.2 only support SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5,
* all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */
const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64;
const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx;
const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size;
const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_info );
unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
mbedtls_md_context_t aux;
size_t offset;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_md_init( &aux );
#define MD_CHK( func_call ) \
do { \
ret = (func_call); \
if( ret != 0 ) \
goto cleanup; \
} while( 0 )
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_setup( &aux, ctx->md_info, 0 ) );
/* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed,
* so we can start directly with the message */
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, add_data, add_data_len ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data, min_data_len ) );
/* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */
for( offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++ )
{
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_clone( &aux, ctx ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( &aux, aux_out ) );
/* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */
mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( output, aux_out, hash_size,
offset, data_len_secret );
if( offset < max_data_len )
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, data + offset, 1 ) );
}
/* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, aux_out ) );
/* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_starts( ctx ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, okey, block_size ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_update( ctx, output, hash_size ) );
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_finish( ctx, output ) );
/* Done, get ready for next time */
MD_CHK( mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( ctx ) );
#undef MD_CHK
cleanup:
mbedtls_md_free( &aux );
return( ret );
}
/*
* Constant-flow memcpy from variable position in buffer.
* - functionally equivalent to memcpy(dst, src + offset_secret, len)
* - but with execution flow independent from the value of offset_secret.
*/
MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE void mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset(
unsigned char *dst,
const unsigned char *src_base,
size_t offset_secret,
size_t offset_min, size_t offset_max,
size_t len )
{
size_t offset;
for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
{
mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
offset, offset_secret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC */
int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec )
{
size_t olen;
mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode;
int ret, auth_done = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
size_t padlen = 0, correct = 1;
#endif
unsigned char* data;
unsigned char add_data[13 + 1 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ];
size_t add_data_len;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */
((void) ssl);
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decrypt buf" ) );
if( rec == NULL ||
rec->buf == NULL ||
rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset ||
rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset;
mode = mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/*
* Match record's CID with incoming CID.
*/
if( rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len ||
memcmp( rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM )
{
padlen = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
transform->iv_dec,
transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len,
data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARC4_C || MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM ||
mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY )
{
unsigned char iv[12];
unsigned char *dynamic_iv;
size_t dynamic_iv_len;
/*
* Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption.
*
* Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic
* part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and
* can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not
* agree with the record sequence number.
*/
dynamic_iv_len = sizeof( rec->ctr );
if( ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( transform ) == 1 )
{
if( rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
rec->data_len,
dynamic_iv_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
dynamic_iv = data;
data += dynamic_iv_len;
rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len;
rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len;
}
else
{
dynamic_iv = rec->ctr;
}
/* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */
if( rec->data_len < transform->taglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ",
rec->data_len,
transform->taglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
rec->data_len -= transform->taglen;
/*
* Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts.
*/
ssl_build_record_nonce( iv, sizeof( iv ),
transform->iv_dec,
transform->fixed_ivlen,
dynamic_iv,
dynamic_iv_len );
/*
* Build additional data for AEAD encryption.
* This depends on the TLS version.
*/
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "additional data used for AEAD",
add_data, add_data_len );
/* Because of the check above, we know that there are
* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
* the debug message and the invocation of
* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len,
transform->taglen );
/*
* Decrypt and authenticate
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
iv, transform->ivlen,
add_data, add_data_len,
data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */
data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */
transform->taglen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
return( ret );
}
auth_done++;
/* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */
if( olen != rec->data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
if( mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
size_t minlen = 0;
/*
* Check immediate ciphertext sanity
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
/* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */
minlen += transform->ivlen;
}
#endif
/* Size considerations:
*
* - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence
* at least of size transform->ivlen.
*
* Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains
* the first of the two checks below.
*
* - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or
* encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC
* is used or not.
* - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix,
* the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC.
* - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence
* the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1
* because there is at least the padding length byte.
*
* As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the
* lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which
* we test for in the second check below.
*/
if( rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen ||
rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
"), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") "
"+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", rec->data_len,
transform->ivlen,
transform->maclen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
/*
* Authenticate before decrypt if enabled
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED )
{
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "using encrypt then mac" ) );
/* Update data_len in tandem with add_data.
*
* The subtraction is safe because of the previous check
* data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1.
*
* Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at
* least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to
* mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp() below.
*
* Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
/* Calculate expected MAC. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data,
add_data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data,
add_data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
data, rec->data_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect );
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len,
transform->maclen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect,
transform->maclen );
/* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */
if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( data + rec->data_len, mac_expect,
transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
auth_done++;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
/*
* Check length sanity
*/
/* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0,
* so the following check in particular implies that
* data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */
if( rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0",
rec->data_len, transform->ivlen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/*
* Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.1 and up
*/
if( transform->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
/* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */
memcpy( transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen );
data += transform->ivlen;
rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen;
rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen,
data, rec->data_len, data, &olen ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */
if( rec->data_len != olen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
{
/*
* Save IV in SSL3 and TLS1, where CBC decryption of consecutive
* records is equivalent to CBC decryption of the concatenation
* of the records; in other words, IVs are maintained across
* record decryptions.
*/
memcpy( transform->iv_dec, transform->cipher_ctx_dec.iv,
transform->ivlen );
}
#endif
/* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having
* subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point,
* data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually
* >= ivlen ). */
padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1];
if( auth_done == 1 )
{
const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
padlen &= mask;
}
else
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")",
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen,
padlen + 1 ) );
}
#endif
const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge(
rec->data_len,
transform->maclen + padlen + 1 );
correct &= mask;
padlen &= mask;
}
padlen++;
/* Regardless of the validity of the padding,
* we have data_len >= padlen here. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
/* This is the SSL 3.0 path, we don't have to worry about Lucky
* 13, because there's a strictly worse padding attack built in
* the protocol (known as part of POODLE), so we don't care if the
* code is not constant-time, in particular branches are OK. */
if( padlen > transform->ivlen )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding length: is %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", "
"should be no more than %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
padlen, transform->ivlen ) );
#endif
correct = 0;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
/* The padding check involves a series of up to 256
* consecutive memory reads at the end of the record
* plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and
* validity of the padding, always perform exactly
* `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account
* only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */
size_t pad_count = 0;
volatile unsigned char* const check = data;
/* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above
* that the subtraction is safe. */
size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen;
size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256;
size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks;
size_t idx;
for( idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++ )
{
/* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) &&
* (check[idx] == padlen - 1);
*/
const size_t mask = mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_ge( idx, padding_idx );
const size_t equal = mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( check[idx],
padlen - 1 );
pad_count += mask & equal;
}
correct &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_bool_eq( pad_count, padlen );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( padlen > 0 && correct == 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad padding byte detected" ) );
#endif
padlen &= mbedtls_ssl_cf_mask_from_bit( correct );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0
* and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid,
* padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion
* data_len >= padlen still holds. */
rec->data_len -= padlen;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "raw buffer after decryption",
data, rec->data_len );
#endif
/*
* Authenticate if not done yet.
* Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
if( auth_done == 0 )
{
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD];
/* If the initial value of padlen was such that
* data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen
* got reset to 1, and the initial check
* data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1
* guarantees that at this point we still
* have at least data_len >= maclen.
*
* If the initial value of padlen was such that
* data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have
* subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct)
* or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then,
* hence data_len >= maclen in any case.
*/
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record( add_data, &add_data_len, rec,
transform->minor_ver );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
ssl_mac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
transform->mac_dec,
data, rec->data_len,
rec->ctr, rec->type,
mac_expect );
memcpy( mac_peer, data + rec->data_len, transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( transform->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
/*
* The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of
* data_len over all padlen values.
*
* They're independent of padlen, since we previously did
* data_len -= padlen.
*
* Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer
* length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too.
*/
const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen;
const size_t min_len = ( max_len > 256 ) ? max_len - 256 : 0;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac( &transform->md_ctx_dec,
add_data, add_data_len,
data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len,
mac_expect );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cf_hmac", ret );
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_ssl_cf_memcpy_offset( mac_peer, data,
rec->data_len,
min_len, max_len,
transform->maclen );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen );
#endif
if( mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( mac_peer, mac_expect,
transform->maclen ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "message mac does not match" ) );
#endif
correct = 0;
}
auth_done++;
}
/*
* Finally check the correct flag
*/
if( correct == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
if( auth_done != 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL)
if( transform->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 )
{
/* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */
ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len,
&rec->type );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3_EXPERIMENTAL */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( rec->cid_len != 0 )
{
ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext( data, &rec->data_len,
&rec->type );
if( ret != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decrypt buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#undef MAC_NONE
#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT
#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
/*
* Compression/decompression functions
*/
static int ssl_compress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->out_msg;
ptrdiff_t bytes_written = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf;
size_t len_pre = ssl->out_msglen;
unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
#else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> compress buf" ) );
if( len_pre == 0 )
return( 0 );
memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->out_msg, len_pre );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->out_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before compression: output payload",
ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_in = msg_pre;
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_in = len_pre;
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.next_out = msg_post;
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out = out_buf_len - bytes_written;
ret = deflate( &ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
if( ret != Z_OK )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform compression (%d)", ret ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
}
ssl->out_msglen = out_buf_len -
ssl->transform_out->ctx_deflate.avail_out - bytes_written;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after compression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->out_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after compression: output payload",
ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= compress buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_decompress_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *msg_post = ssl->in_msg;
ptrdiff_t header_bytes = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf;
size_t len_pre = ssl->in_msglen;
unsigned char *msg_pre = ssl->compress_buf;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
#else
size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> decompress buf" ) );
if( len_pre == 0 )
return( 0 );
memcpy( msg_pre, ssl->in_msg, len_pre );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "before decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "before decompression: input payload",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_in = msg_pre;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_in = len_pre;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.next_out = msg_post;
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out = in_buf_len - header_bytes;
ret = inflate( &ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate, Z_SYNC_FLUSH );
if( ret != Z_OK )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "failed to perform decompression (%d)", ret ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COMPRESSION_FAILED );
}
ssl->in_msglen = in_buf_len -
ssl->transform_in->ctx_inflate.avail_out - header_bytes;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "after decompression: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", ",
ssl->in_msglen ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "after decompression: input payload",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= decompress buf" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
/*
* Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it.
* The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left.
*
* If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are
* available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code
* is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ).
*
* With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but
* with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want,
* since we always read a whole datagram at once.
*
* For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when
* they're done reading a record.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
#else
size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> fetch input" ) );
if( ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
"or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
if( nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "requesting more data than fits" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
uint32_t timeout;
/*
* The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we
* sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data.
* It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the
* header) and/or some other records in the same datagram.
*/
/*
* Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable
*/
if( ssl->next_record_offset != 0 )
{
if( ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset;
if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "next record in same datagram, offset: %"
MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->next_record_offset ) );
memmove( ssl->in_hdr,
ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset,
ssl->in_left );
}
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
/*
* Done if we already have enough data.
*/
if( nb_want <= ssl->in_left)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but
* are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something
* wrong.
*/
if( ssl->in_left != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Don't even try to read if time's out already.
* This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages
* that will end up being dropped.
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timer has expired" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
}
else
{
len = in_buf_len - ( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf );
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
else
timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout ) );
if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len,
timeout );
else
ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
if( ret == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF );
}
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "timeout" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake timeout" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
ret );
return( ret );
}
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
}
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->in_left = ret;
}
else
#endif
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
while( ssl->in_left < nb_want )
{
len = nb_want - ssl->in_left;
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( ssl ) != 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
else
{
if( ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL )
{
ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout( ssl->p_bio,
ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len,
ssl->conf->read_timeout );
}
else
{
ret = ssl->f_recv( ssl->p_bio,
ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_left, nb_want ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret );
if( ret == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
if ( (size_t)ret > len || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " were requested",
ret, len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->in_left += ret;
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= fetch input" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Flush any data not yet written
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> flush output" ) );
if( ssl->f_send == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() "
"or mbedtls_ssl_set_bio()" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
/* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */
if( ssl->out_left == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
return( 0 );
}
while( ssl->out_left > 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left ) );
buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left;
ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", ret );
if( ret <= 0 )
return( ret );
if( (size_t)ret > ssl->out_left || ( INT_MAX > SIZE_MAX && ret > (int)SIZE_MAX ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes were sent",
ret, ssl->out_left ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->out_left -= ret;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
}
else
#endif
{
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
}
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= flush output" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/*
* Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight
*/
static int ssl_flight_append( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_flight_append" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "message appended to flight",
ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
/* Allocate space for current message */
if( ( msg = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
if( ( msg->p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ssl->out_msglen ) ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed",
ssl->out_msglen ) );
mbedtls_free( msg );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
/* Copy current handshake message with headers */
memcpy( msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
msg->len = ssl->out_msglen;
msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype;
msg->next = NULL;
/* Append to the current flight */
if( ssl->handshake->flight == NULL )
ssl->handshake->flight = msg;
else
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight;
while( cur->next != NULL )
cur = cur->next;
cur->next = msg;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_flight_append" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Free the current flight of handshake messages
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight )
{
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight;
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next;
while( cur != NULL )
{
next = cur->next;
mbedtls_free( cur->p );
mbedtls_free( cur );
cur = next;
}
}
/*
* Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones
*/
static int ssl_swap_epochs( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform;
unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[8];
if( ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip swap epochs" ) );
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "swap epochs" ) );
/* Swap transforms */
tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out;
ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out;
ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform;
/* Swap epoch + sequence_number */
memcpy( tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, 8 );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, 8 );
/* Adjust to the newly activated transform */
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL )
{
int ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_OUTBOUND );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
}
#endif
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Retransmit the current flight of messages.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_resend" ) );
return( ret );
}
/*
* Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages.
*
* Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns
* WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later.
* This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialise flight transmission" ) );
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12;
ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING;
}
while( ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL )
{
size_t max_frag_len;
const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg;
int const is_finished =
( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED );
uint8_t const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ?
SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH;
/* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after
* sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ.
* Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */
if( is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == ( cur->p + 12 ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "swap epochs to send finished message" ) );
ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
max_frag_len = (size_t) ret;
/* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */
if( cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
if( max_frag_len == 0 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
continue;
}
memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len );
ssl->out_msglen = cur->len;
ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
/* Update position inside current message */
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len;
}
else
{
const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p;
const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12;
const size_t frag_off = p - ( cur->p + 12 );
const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off;
size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len;
if( ( max_frag_len < 12 ) || ( max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0 ) )
{
if( is_finished )
{
ret = ssl_swap_epochs( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
continue;
}
max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12;
cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ?
max_hs_frag_len : rem_len;
if( frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)",
(unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len,
(unsigned) max_hs_frag_len ) );
}
/* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented,
* copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields.
* Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */
memcpy( ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6 );
ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( frag_off );
ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( frag_off );
ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( frag_off );
ssl->out_msg[ 9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( cur_hs_frag_len );
ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( cur_hs_frag_len );
ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( cur_hs_frag_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12 );
/* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len );
ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12;
ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type;
/* Update position inside current message */
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len;
}
/* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */
if( ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len )
{
if( cur->next != NULL )
{
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12;
}
else
{
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL;
}
}
/* Actually send the message out */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, force_flush ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Update state and set timer */
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
else
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* We won't need to resend that one any more */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( ssl->handshake->flight );
ssl->handshake->flight = NULL;
ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL;
/* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */
ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
/* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */
ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
/* Clear future message buffering structure. */
mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( ssl );
/* Cancel timer */
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
}
else
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING;
}
/*
* To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout );
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED )
{
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED;
}
else
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Handshake layer functions
*/
/*
* Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message.
*
* - fill in handshake headers
* - update handshake checksum
* - DTLS: save message for resending
* - then pass to the record layer
*
* DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be
* actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend().
*
* Inputs:
* - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len
* (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS)
* - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc)
* - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body
*
* Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record():
* - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents
* (including handshake headers but excluding record headers)
* - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content)
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4;
const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write handshake message" ) );
/*
* Sanity checks
*/
if( ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
/* In SSLv3, the client might send a NoCertificate alert. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ! ( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 &&
ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ) )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
/* Whenever we send anything different from a
* HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */
if( ! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) &&
ssl->handshake == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake != NULL &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#endif
/* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds
* of the outgoing record buffer.
* This should never fail as the various message
* writing functions must obey the bounds of the
* outgoing record buffer, but better be safe.
*
* Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here.
*/
if( ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Record too large: "
"size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->out_msglen,
(size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Fill handshake headers
*/
if( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( hs_len );
ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( hs_len );
ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( hs_len );
/*
* DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer,
* between the length field and the actual payload:
* uint16 message_seq;
* uint24 fragment_offset;
* uint24 fragment_length;
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS handshake message too large: "
"size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
hs_len,
(size_t) ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12 ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
memmove( ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len );
ssl->out_msglen += 8;
/* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */
if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
{
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
++( ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq );
}
else
{
ssl->out_msg[4] = 0;
ssl->out_msg[5] = 0;
}
/* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation,
* so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */
memset( ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3 );
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */
if( hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST )
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen );
}
/* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
! ( ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ) )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_flight_append( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_flight_append", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write handshake message" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Record layer functions
*/
/*
* Write current record.
*
* Uses:
* - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS)
* - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers)
* - ssl->out_msg: record content
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush )
{
int ret, done = 0;
size_t len = ssl->out_msglen;
uint8_t flush = force_flush;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write record" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
if( ssl->transform_out != NULL &&
ssl->session_out->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_compress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_compress_buf", ret );
return( ret );
}
len = ssl->out_msglen;
}
#endif /*MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write()" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write( ssl );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_write", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
if( ret == 0 )
done = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
if( !done )
{
unsigned i;
size_t protected_record_size;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len;
#else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
/* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption,
* as it may change when using the CID extension. */
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, ssl->out_hdr + 1 );
memcpy( ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, 8 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( len, ssl->out_len, 0);
if( ssl->transform_out != NULL )
{
mbedtls_record rec;
rec.buf = ssl->out_iv;
rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf );
rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen;
rec.data_offset = ssl->out_msg - rec.buf;
memcpy( &rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, 8 );
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, rec.ver );
rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */
rec.cid_len = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( rec.data_offset != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/* Update the record content type and CID. */
ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID )
memcpy( ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0 );
}
protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed
* the remaining space in the datagram. */
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram( ssl );
if( ret < 0 )
return( ret );
if( protected_record_size > (size_t) ret )
{
/* Should never happen */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */
ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "output record: msgtype = %u, "
"version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1],
ssl->out_hdr[2], len ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size );
ssl->out_left += protected_record_size;
ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size;
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, ssl->transform_out );
for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
if( ++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "outgoing message counter would wrap" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH )
{
size_t remaining;
ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( ssl );
if( ret < 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram",
ret );
return( ret );
}
remaining = (size_t) ret;
if( remaining == 0 )
{
flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Still %u bytes available in current datagram", (unsigned) remaining ) );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
if( ( flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write record" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen ||
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3 ) != 0 ||
memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3 ) != 0 )
{
return( 1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
return( ( ssl->in_msg[9] << 16 ) |
( ssl->in_msg[10] << 8 ) |
ssl->in_msg[11] );
}
static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
return( ( ssl->in_msg[6] << 16 ) |
( ssl->in_msg[7] << 8 ) |
ssl->in_msg[8] );
}
static int ssl_check_hs_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len;
msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
if( frag_off > msg_len )
return( -1 );
if( frag_len > msg_len - frag_off )
return( -1 );
if( frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly)
*/
static void ssl_bitmask_set( unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len )
{
unsigned int start_bits, end_bits;
start_bits = 8 - ( offset % 8 );
if( start_bits != 8 )
{
size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8;
/* Special case */
if( len <= start_bits )
{
for( ; len != 0; len-- )
mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - len );
/* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */
return;
}
offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */
len -= start_bits;
for( ; start_bits != 0; start_bits-- )
mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( start_bits - 1 );
}
end_bits = len % 8;
if( end_bits != 0 )
{
size_t last_byte_idx = ( offset + len ) / 8;
len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */
for( ; end_bits != 0; end_bits-- )
mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << ( 8 - end_bits );
}
memset( mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8 );
}
/*
* Check that bitmask is full
*/
static int ssl_bitmask_check( unsigned char *mask, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
for( i = 0; i < len / 8; i++ )
if( mask[i] != 0xFF )
return( -1 );
for( i = 0; i < len % 8; i++ )
if( ( mask[len / 8] & ( 1 << ( 7 - i ) ) ) == 0 )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */
static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( size_t msg_len,
unsigned add_bitmap )
{
size_t alloc_len;
alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */
alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */
if( add_bitmap )
alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + ( msg_len % 8 != 0 ); /* Bitmap */
return( alloc_len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
return( ( ssl->in_msg[1] << 16 ) |
( ssl->in_msg[2] << 8 ) |
ssl->in_msg[3] );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ssl_get_hs_total_len( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "handshake message: msglen ="
" %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned int recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
if( ssl_check_hs_header( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid handshake header" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
( ( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ||
( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) ) )
{
if( recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)",
recv_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
}
/* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid
* too many retransmissions.
* Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */
if( recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 &&
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received message from last flight, "
"message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u",
recv_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "dropping out-of-sequence message: "
"message_seq = %u, expected = %u",
recv_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) );
}
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
}
/* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */
/* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future
* messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and
* future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the
* handshake logic layer. */
if( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "found fragmented DTLS handshake message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */
if( ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS handshake fragmentation not supported" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
return( 0 );
}
void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER && hs != NULL )
{
ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen );
}
/* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake != NULL )
{
unsigned offset;
mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
/* Increment handshake sequence number */
hs->in_msg_seq++;
/*
* Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure.
*/
/* Free first entry */
ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, 0 );
/* Shift all other entries */
for( offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS;
offset++, hs_buf++ )
{
*hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1);
}
/* Create a fresh last entry */
memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
}
#endif
}
/*
* DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6
*
* in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb).
* Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen.
*
* Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of
* in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0
* not seen yet).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
ssl->in_window_top = 0;
ssl->in_window = 0;
}
static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes( unsigned char *buf )
{
return( ( (uint64_t) buf[0] << 40 ) |
( (uint64_t) buf[1] << 32 ) |
( (uint64_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
( (uint64_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
( (uint64_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
( (uint64_t) buf[5] ) );
}
static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *original_in_ctr;
// save original in_ctr
original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr;
// use counter from record
ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl );
// restore the counter
ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr;
return ret;
}
/*
* Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl )
{
uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
uint64_t bit;
if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
return( 0 );
if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
return( 0 );
bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
if( bit >= 64 )
return( -1 );
if( ( ssl->in_window & ( (uint64_t) 1 << bit ) ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Update replay window on new validated record
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes( ssl->in_ctr + 2 );
if( ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED )
return;
if( rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top )
{
/* Update window_top and the contents of the window */
uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top;
if( shift >= 64 )
ssl->in_window = 1;
else
{
ssl->in_window <<= shift;
ssl->in_window |= 1;
}
ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum;
}
else
{
/* Mark that number as seen in the current window */
uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum;
if( bit < 64 ) /* Always true, but be extra sure */
ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
* Without any SSL context, check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with
* a valid cookie, and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message.
* Both input and output include full DTLS headers.
*
* - if cookie is valid, return 0
* - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not,
* fill obuf and set olen, then
* return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED
* - otherwise return a specific error code
*/
static int ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
void *p_cookie,
const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen )
{
size_t sid_len, cookie_len;
unsigned char *p;
/*
* Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers,
* and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be
* done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks
* avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier.
*
* 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake
* 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied
* 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0
* 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied
* 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored)
*
* 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored)
* 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored)
* 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied
* 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0
* 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored)
*
* 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored)
* 27-58 Random random; (ignored)
* 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content
* 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content
* ...
*
* Minimum length is 61 bytes.
*/
if( in_len < 61 ||
in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
in[3] != 0 || in[4] != 0 ||
in[19] != 0 || in[20] != 0 || in[21] != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
sid_len = in[59];
if( sid_len > in_len - 61 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len];
if( cookie_len > in_len - 60 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
if( f_cookie_check( p_cookie, in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len,
cli_id, cli_id_len ) == 0 )
{
/* Valid cookie */
return( 0 );
}
/*
* If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR.
*
* 0-0 ContentType type; copied
* 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied
* 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied
* 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied
* 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13
*
* 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request
* 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25
* 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied
* 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied
* 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25
*
* 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff
* 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie
*
* Minimum length is 28.
*/
if( buf_len < 28 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
/* Copy most fields and adapt others */
memcpy( obuf, in, 25 );
obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
obuf[25] = 0xfe;
obuf[26] = 0xff;
/* Generate and write actual cookie */
p = obuf + 28;
if( f_cookie_write( p_cookie,
&p, obuf + buf_len, cli_id, cli_id_len ) != 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
*olen = p - obuf;
/* Go back and fill length fields */
obuf[27] = (unsigned char)( *olen - 28 );
obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( *olen - 25 );
obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( *olen - 25 );
obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( *olen - 25 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 13, obuf, 11 );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet
* (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8).
*
* Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record
* that looks like a ClientHello.
*
* - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies,
* send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0
* - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie,
* reset the session of the current context, and
* return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
* - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code
*
* This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an
* unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the
* record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this
* includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected
* errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases).
*/
static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ||
ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL )
{
/* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer,
* drop the record. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no cookie callbacks, "
"can't check reconnect validity" ) );
return( 0 );
}
ret = ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
ssl->conf->f_cookie_write,
ssl->conf->f_cookie_check,
ssl->conf->p_cookie,
ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len,
ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left,
ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED )
{
int send_ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sending HelloVerifyRequest" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "output record sent to network",
ssl->out_buf, len );
/* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here.
* If the error is permanent we'll catch it later,
* if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */
send_ret = ssl->f_send( ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret );
(void) send_ret;
return( 0 );
}
if( ret == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "cookie is valid, resetting context" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "reset", ret );
return( ret );
}
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
static int ssl_check_record_type( uint8_t record_type )
{
if( record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT &&
record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* ContentType type;
* ProtocolVersion version;
* uint16 epoch; // DTLS only
* uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only
* uint16 length;
*
* Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected)
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected.
*
* With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will:
* 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0
* 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD
* 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value
* 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else.
* Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received
* the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others.
*/
static int ssl_parse_record_header( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len,
mbedtls_record *rec )
{
int major_ver, minor_ver;
size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0;
size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1;
size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset +
rec_hdr_type_len;
size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2;
size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint32_t rec_epoch;
size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset +
rec_hdr_version_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset +
rec_hdr_ctr_len;
size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */
size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2;
/*
* Check minimum lengths for record header.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len;
}
if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u",
(unsigned) len,
(unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
/*
* Parse and validate record content type
*/
rec->type = buf[ rec_hdr_type_offset ];
/* Check record content type */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
rec->cid_len = 0;
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 &&
rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID )
{
/* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID
* struct {
* ContentType special_type = tls12_cid;
* ProtocolVersion version;
* uint16 epoch;
* uint48 sequence_number;
* opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to
* // default DTLS record format
* uint16 length;
* opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length];
* } DTLSCiphertext;
*/
/* So far, we only support static CID lengths
* fixed in the configuration. */
rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len;
rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len;
if( len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u",
(unsigned) len,
(unsigned)( rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
/* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */
rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len;
memcpy( rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
{
if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type %u",
(unsigned) rec->type ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
}
/*
* Parse and validate record version
*/
rec->ver[0] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 0 ];
rec->ver[1] = buf[ rec_hdr_version_offset + 1 ];
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport,
&rec->ver[0] );
if( major_ver != ssl->major_ver )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "major version mismatch" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
if( minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "minor version mismatch" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
/*
* Parse/Copy record sequence number.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */
memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset,
rec_hdr_ctr_len );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
/* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */
memcpy( &rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len );
}
/*
* Parse record length.
*/
rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len;
rec->data_len = ( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 0 ] << 8 ) |
( (size_t) buf[ rec_hdr_len_offset + 1 ] << 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "input record: msgtype = %u, "
"version = [%d:%d], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
rec->type,
major_ver, minor_ver, rec->data_len ) );
rec->buf = buf;
rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len;
if( rec->data_len == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
/*
* DTLS-related tests.
* Check epoch before checking length constraint because
* the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec
* message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message,
* the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs
* to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than
* the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform.
* Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently,
* as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid
* record leads to the entire datagram being dropped.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
rec_epoch = ( rec->ctr[0] << 8 ) | rec->ctr[1];
/* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record
* of the advertised length. */
if( len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.",
(unsigned) len,
(unsigned)( rec->data_offset + rec->data_len ) ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
/* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded.
* (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in
* the caller). */
if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record from another epoch: "
"expected %u, received %lu",
ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch ) );
/* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering
* (concretely: early Finished messages). */
if( rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Consider record for buffering" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
}
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
/* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their
* sequence number has been seen before. */
else if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check( (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl,
&rec->ctr[0] ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
}
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
static int ssl_check_client_reconnect( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
unsigned int rec_epoch = ( ssl->in_ctr[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_ctr[1];
/*
* Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to
* access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we
* have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the
* fact that the record header len is 13 instead.
*/
if( rec_epoch == 0 &&
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER &&
ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
ssl->in_left > 13 &&
ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "possible client reconnect "
"from the same port" ) );
return( ssl_handle_possible_reconnect( ssl ) );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/*
* If applicable, decrypt record content
*/
static int ssl_prepare_record_content( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record *rec )
{
int ret, done = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input record from network",
rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "going for mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read()" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read( ssl );
if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_read", ret );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
if( ret == 0 )
done = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL */
if( !done && ssl->transform_in != NULL )
{
unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( ssl, ssl->transform_in,
rec ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID &&
ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid
== MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ignoring unexpected CID" ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
return( ret );
}
if( old_msg_type != rec->type )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "record type after decrypt (before %d): %d",
old_msg_type, rec->type ) );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "input payload after decrypt",
rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* We have already checked the record content type
* in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently
* dropping the record in the case of an unknown type.
*
* Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type
* might change during decryption, re-check the record
* content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */
if( ssl_check_record_type( rec->type ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "unknown record type" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
if( rec->data_len == 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
&& rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
/* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
ssl->nb_zero++;
/*
* Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack
* (excessive CPU consumption).
*/
if( ssl->nb_zero > 3 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received four consecutive empty "
"messages, possible DoS attack" ) );
/* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated,
* thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed
* by the configured bad MAC threshold. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
}
else
ssl->nb_zero = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */
}
else
#endif
{
unsigned i;
for( i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ); i-- )
if( ++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0 )
break;
/* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */
if( i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "incoming message counter would wrap" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
}
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl );
}
#endif
/* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against
* configured maximum. */
if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Read a record.
*
* Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well,
* RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found.
*
*/
/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */
static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned update_hs_digest )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read record" ) );
if( ssl->keep_current_message == 0 )
{
do {
ret = ssl_consume_current_message( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ssl_record_is_in_progress( ssl ) == 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
int have_buffered = 0;
/* We only check for buffered messages if the
* current datagram is fully consumed. */
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 0 )
{
if( ssl_load_buffered_message( ssl ) == 0 )
have_buffered = 1;
}
if( have_buffered == 0 )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ret = ssl_get_next_record( ssl );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING )
continue;
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_get_next_record" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
}
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
{
/* Buffer future message */
ret = ssl_buffer_message( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
} while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ||
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret );
if( 0 != ret )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
update_hs_digest == 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
}
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "reuse previously read message" ) );
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read record" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_load_buffered_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * hs_buf;
int ret = 0;
if( hs == NULL )
return( -1 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_messsage" ) );
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
/* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before.
* If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */
if( !hs->buffering.seen_ccs )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "CCS not seen in the current flight" ) );
ret = -1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Injecting buffered CCS message" ) );
ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
ssl->in_msglen = 1;
ssl->in_msg[0] = 1;
/* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */
ssl->in_left = 0;
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0;
goto exit;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
/* Debug only */
{
unsigned offset;
for( offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
{
hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset];
if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.",
hs->in_msg_seq + offset,
hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially" ) );
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
/* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the
* next handshake message. */
hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0];
if( ( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 ) && ( hs_buf->is_complete == 1 ) )
{
/* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */
size_t msg_len = ( hs_buf->data[1] << 16 ) |
( hs_buf->data[2] << 8 ) |
hs_buf->data[3];
/* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered
* a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */
if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message has been buffered - load" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)",
hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12 );
ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12;
ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12;
memcpy( ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen );
ret = 0;
goto exit;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered",
hs->in_msg_seq ) );
}
ret = -1;
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_message" ) );
return( ret );
}
static int ssl_buffer_make_space( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t desired )
{
int offset;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available",
(unsigned) desired ) );
/* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */
ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
/* Check if we have enough space available now. */
if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing future epoch record" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake
* message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space,
* starting with the most distant one. */
for( offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1;
offset >= 0; offset-- )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message",
offset ) );
ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, (uint8_t) offset );
/* Check if we have enough space available now. */
if( desired <= ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages" ) );
return( 0 );
}
}
return( -1 );
}
static int ssl_buffer_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
if( hs == NULL )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_buffer_message" ) );
switch( ssl->in_msgtype )
{
case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Remember CCS message" ) );
hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1;
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE:
{
unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset;
unsigned recv_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[5];
mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf;
size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12;
/* We should never receive an old handshake
* message - double-check nonetheless. */
if( recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq;
if( recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
{
/* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
( "Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, "
"buffering window %u - %u",
recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq,
ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1 ) );
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ",
recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset ) );
hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[ recv_msg_seq_offset ];
/* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */
if( !hs_buf->is_valid )
{
size_t reassembly_buf_sz;
hs_buf->is_fragmented =
( ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment( ssl ) == 1 );
/* We copy the message back into the input buffer
* after reassembly, so check that it's not too large.
* This is an implementation-specific limitation
* and not one from the standard, hence it is not
* checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */
if( msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
/* Ignore message */
goto exit;
}
/* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */
if( hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered >
MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size( msg_len,
hs_buf->is_fragmented );
if( reassembly_buf_sz > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
{
if( recv_msg_seq_offset > 0 )
{
/* If we can't buffer a future message because
* of space limitations -- ignore. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
goto exit;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n",
msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
}
if( ssl_buffer_make_space( ssl, reassembly_buf_sz ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Reassembly of next message of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " with bitmap) would exceed"
" the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes buffered) -- fail\n",
msg_len,
reassembly_buf_sz,
(size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto exit;
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "initialize reassembly, total length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
msg_len ) );
hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc( 1, reassembly_buf_sz );
if( hs_buf->data == NULL )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz;
/* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq,
* then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */
memcpy( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6 );
memset( hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3 );
memcpy( hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3 );
hs_buf->is_valid = 1;
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz;
}
else
{
/* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */
if( memcmp( hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4 ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Fragment header mismatch - ignore" ) );
/* Ignore */
goto exit;
}
}
if( !hs_buf->is_complete )
{
size_t frag_len, frag_off;
unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12;
/*
* Check and copy current fragment
*/
/* Validation of header fields already done in
* mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */
frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off( ssl );
frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
frag_off, frag_len ) );
memcpy( msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len );
if( hs_buf->is_fragmented )
{
unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len;
ssl_bitmask_set( bitmask, frag_off, frag_len );
hs_buf->is_complete = ( ssl_bitmask_check( bitmask,
msg_len ) == 0 );
}
else
{
hs_buf->is_complete = 1;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "message %scomplete",
hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet " ) );
}
break;
}
default:
/* We don't buffer other types of messages. */
break;
}
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_buffer_message" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
static int ssl_consume_current_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/*
* Consume last content-layer message and potentially
* update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents'
* consumption state.
*
* (1) Handshake messages:
* Remove last handshake message, move content
* and adapt in_msglen.
*
* (2) Alert messages:
* Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
*
* (3) Change cipher spec:
* Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0.
*
* (4) Application data:
* Don't do anything - the record layer provides
* the application data as a stream transport
* and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only.
*
*/
/* Case (1): Handshake messages */
if( ssl->in_hslen != 0 )
{
/* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data
* is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during
* ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */
if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
/*
* Get next Handshake message in the current record
*/
/* Notes:
* (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the
* current handshake content: If DTLS handshake
* fragmentation is used, that's the fragment
* size instead. Using the total handshake message
* size here is faulty and should be changed at
* some point.
* (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one
* has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen
* is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication.
* Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation.
* The following check is therefore mandatory, and
* should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion.
* Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of
* bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected
* sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
{
ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen;
memmove( ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen,
ssl->in_msglen );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "remaining content in record",
ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen );
}
else
{
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
}
ssl->in_hslen = 0;
}
/* Case (4): Application data */
else if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
{
return( 0 );
}
/* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */
else
{
ssl->in_msglen = 0;
}
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_record_is_in_progress( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen > 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static void ssl_free_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
if( hs == NULL )
return;
if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
{
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -=
hs->buffering.future_record.len;
mbedtls_free( hs->buffering.future_record.data );
hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL;
}
}
static int ssl_load_buffered_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
unsigned char * rec;
size_t rec_len;
unsigned rec_epoch;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len;
#else
size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN;
#endif
if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
return( 0 );
if( hs == NULL )
return( 0 );
rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data;
rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len;
rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch;
if( rec == NULL )
return( 0 );
/* Only consider loading future records if the
* input buffer is empty. */
if( ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram( ssl ) == 1 )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
if( rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffered record not from current epoch." ) );
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Found buffered record from current epoch - load" ) );
/* Double-check that the record is not too large */
if( rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t)( ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
memcpy( ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len );
ssl->in_left = rec_len;
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= ssl_load_buffered_record" ) );
return( 0 );
}
static int ssl_buffer_future_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_record const *rec )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
/* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */
if( hs == NULL )
return( 0 );
/* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested
* in Finished messages). */
if( rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
return( 0 );
/* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */
if( hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL )
return( 0 );
/* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */
if( rec->buf_len > ( MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING -
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" bytes buffered) -- ignore\n",
rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING,
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* Buffer record */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Buffer record from epoch %u",
ssl->in_epoch + 1U ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
/* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records
* of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */
hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1;
hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len;
hs->buffering.future_record.data =
mbedtls_calloc( 1, hs->buffering.future_record.len );
if( hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL )
{
/* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a
* record from the next epoch, just ignore. */
return( 0 );
}
memcpy( hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len );
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
static int ssl_get_next_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_record rec;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* We might have buffered a future record; if so,
* and if the epoch matches now, load it.
* On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to
* the length of the buffered record, so that
* the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will
* essentially be no-ops. */
ret = ssl_load_buffered_record( ssl );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form
* of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS,
* with no space for CIDs counted in). */
ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( ssl ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
return( ret );
}
ret = ssl_parse_record_header( ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec );
if( ret != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE )
{
ret = ssl_buffer_future_record( ssl, &rec );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
/* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD;
}
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records,
* assuming no CID and no offset between record content and
* record plaintext. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
/* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */
ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2;
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif
/* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */
ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding unexpected record "
"(header)" ) );
}
else
{
/* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_left = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record "
"(header)" ) );
}
/* Get next record */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
}
else
#endif
{
return( ret );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */
ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len;
if( ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "more than one record within datagram" ) );
}
}
else
#endif
{
/*
* Fetch record contents from underlying transport.
*/
ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, rec.buf_len );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->in_left = 0;
}
/*
* Decrypt record contents.
*/
if( ( ret = ssl_prepare_record_content( ssl, &rec ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Silently discard invalid records */
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
{
/* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here
* probably means something went wrong in the handshake
* (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED ||
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
}
#endif
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
if( ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 &&
++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "too many records with bad MAC" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
#endif
/* As above, invalid records cause
* dismissal of the whole datagram. */
ssl->next_record_offset = 0;
ssl->in_left = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "discarding invalid record (mac)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
}
return( ret );
}
else
#endif
{
/* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC );
}
#endif
return( ret );
}
}
/* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records,
* assuming no CID and no offset between record content and
* record plaintext. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
/* The record content type may change during decryption,
* so re-read it. */
ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type;
/* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately
* the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the
* record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating
* a renegotiation. */
ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type;
ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset;
ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
if( ssl->transform_in != NULL &&
ssl->session_in->compression == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_decompress_buf( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_decompress_buf", ret );
return( ret );
}
/* Check actual (decompress) record content length against
* configured maximum. */
if( ssl->in_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad message length" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* Handle particular types of records
*/
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen != 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid CCS message, content: %02x",
ssl->in_msg[0] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
if( ssl->handshake == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE );
}
#endif
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
{
if( ssl->in_msglen != 2 )
{
/* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert
to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't
currently support this. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
ssl->in_msglen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]",
ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
/*
* Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "is a fatal alert message (msg %d)",
ssl->in_msg[1] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a close notify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED)
if( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no renegotiation alert" ) );
/* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 &&
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING &&
ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "is a SSLv3 no_cert" ) );
/* Will be handled in mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate() */
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/* Silently ignore: fetch new message */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records,
* except at the beginning of renegotiations */
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA &&
ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
&& ! ( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO )
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "dropping unexpected ApplicationData" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL );
}
if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( ssl );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ) );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char level,
unsigned char message )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> send alert message" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message ));
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT;
ssl->out_msglen = 2;
ssl->out_msg[0] = level;
ssl->out_msg[1] = message;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= send alert message" ) );
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write change cipher spec" ) );
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
ssl->out_msglen = 1;
ssl->out_msg[0] = 1;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write change cipher spec" ) );
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse change cipher spec" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad change cipher spec message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1',
* so we don't need to check this here. */
/*
* Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound
* data.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) );
ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate;
ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( ssl );
#endif
/* Increment epoch */
if( ++ssl->in_epoch == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DTLS epoch would wrap" ) );
/* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so
treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 );
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
if( mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate != NULL )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CHANNEL_INBOUND ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_hw_record_activate", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
}
#endif
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse change cipher spec" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
* next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers.
*
* Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number
* (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr,
* and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
*/
static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len(
mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform )
{
if( transform->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
return( 0 );
return( transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen );
}
void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid;
if( transform != NULL )
ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len;
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + 8;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2;
}
else
#endif
{
ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr - 8;
ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len;
#endif
ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5;
}
ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv;
/* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */
if( transform != NULL )
ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( transform );
}
/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the
* next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers.
*
* Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number
* (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr,
* and the caller has to make sure there's space for this.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* This function sets the pointers to match the case
* of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv
* and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record
* content.
*
* When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg
* will be shifted to point to the beginning of the
* record plaintext.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
/* This sets the header pointers to match records
* without CID. When we receive a record containing
* a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in
* ssl_parse_record_header(). */
ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + 8;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2;
}
else
#endif
{
ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - 8;
ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len;
#endif
ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5;
}
/* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */
ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv;
}
/*
* Setup an SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf;
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8;
ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8;
}
/* Derive other internal pointers. */
mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */ );
mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers ( ssl );
}
/*
* SSL get accessors
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/*
* Case A: We're currently holding back
* a message for further processing.
*/
if( ssl->keep_current_message == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing" ) );
return( 1 );
}
/*
* Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram" ) );
return( 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Case C: A handshake message is being processed.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record" ) );
return( 1 );
}
/*
* Case D: An application data message is being processed
*/
if( ssl->in_offt != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed" ) );
return( 1 );
}
/*
* In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped.
* As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if
* we implement support for multiple alerts in single records.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_check_pending: nothing pending" ) );
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t transform_expansion = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out;
unsigned block_size;
size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( ssl );
if( transform == NULL )
return( (int) out_hdr_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
if( ssl->session_out->compression != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#endif
switch( mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc ) )
{
case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY:
case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM:
transform_expansion = transform->minlen;
break;
case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
&transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
/* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */
transform_expansion += transform->maclen;
/* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding;
* Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use
* more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */
transform_expansion += block_size;
/* For TLS 1.1 or higher, an explicit IV is added
* after the record header. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
transform_expansion += block_size;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
break;
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( transform->out_cid_len != 0 )
transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
return( (int)( out_hdr_len + transform_expansion ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/*
* Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit.
*/
static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( ssl );
int in_ctr_cmp;
int out_ctr_cmp;
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER ||
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING ||
ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED )
{
return( 0 );
}
in_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->in_ctr + ep_len,
ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
out_ctr_cmp = memcmp( ssl->cur_out_ctr + ep_len,
ssl->conf->renego_period + ep_len, 8 - ep_len );
if( in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "record counter limit reached: renegotiate" ) );
return( mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( ssl ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/*
* Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> read" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
if( ssl->handshake != NULL &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
#endif
/*
* Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is
* in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through
* if an unexpected packet is received while the client
* is waiting for the ServerHello.
*
* (There is no equivalent to the last condition on
* the server-side as it is not treated as within
* a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello
* after a renegotiation request.)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
/* Loop as long as no application data record is available */
while( ssl->in_offt == NULL )
{
/* Start timer if not already running */
if( ssl->f_get_timer != NULL &&
ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == -1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 &&
ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
/*
* OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received handshake message" ) );
/*
* - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST.
* - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO.
* - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST ||
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not HelloRequest)" ) );
/* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
continue;
}
#endif
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "handshake received (not ClientHello)" ) );
/* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
continue;
}
#endif
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */
if( ! ( ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED ||
( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) )
{
/*
* Accept renegotiation request
*/
/* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT )
{
ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING;
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( ssl );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO &&
ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation",
ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
/*
* Refuse renegotiation
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "refusing renegotiation, sending alert" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
/* SSLv3 does not have a "no_renegotiation" warning, so
we send a fatal alert and abort the connection. */
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
}
/* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation has been
* completed or not. The cases to consider are the following:
* 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record
* has been read yet.
* 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
* an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello.
* 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received
* a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting
* the ServerHello.
* In each of these case, looping will be the proper action:
* - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check
* if it's application data.
* - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data
* is present, hence continue is the same as break
* - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record
* will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client
* when expecting the ServerHello.
*/
continue;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
{
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 )
{
if( ++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
"but not honored by client" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad application data message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
/* We're going to return something now, cancel timer,
* except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( ssl, 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest.
* Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch
* again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request",
ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
}
n = ( len < ssl->in_msglen )
? len : ssl->in_msglen;
memcpy( buf, ssl->in_offt, n );
ssl->in_msglen -= n;
/* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data
from the memory. */
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->in_offt, n );
if( ssl->in_msglen == 0 )
{
/* all bytes consumed */
ssl->in_offt = NULL;
ssl->keep_current_message = 0;
}
else
{
/* more data available */
ssl->in_offt += n;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= read" ) );
return( (int) n );
}
/*
* Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max
* fragment length and buffer size.
*
* According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1:
*
* Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are
* potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure.
*
* Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the
* corresponding return code is 0 on success.
*/
static int ssl_write_real( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( ssl );
const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret;
if( ret < 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( len > max_len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "fragment larger than the (negotiated) "
"maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
" > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
len, max_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
else
#endif
len = max_len;
}
if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
{
/*
* The user has previously tried to send the data and
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially
* written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function
* (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
{
/*
* The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to
* copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure
* to keep track of partial writes
*/
ssl->out_msglen = len;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA;
memcpy( ssl->out_msg, buf, len );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
return( (int) len );
}
/*
* Write application data, doing 1/n-1 splitting if necessary.
*
* With non-blocking I/O, ssl_write_real() may return WANT_WRITE,
* then the caller will call us again with the same arguments, so
* remember whether we already did the split or not.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
static int ssl_write_split( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl->conf->cbc_record_splitting ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING_DISABLED ||
len <= 1 ||
ssl->minor_ver > MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 ||
mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( &ssl->transform_out->cipher_ctx_enc )
!= MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC )
{
return( ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len ) );
}
if( ssl->split_done == 0 )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, 1 ) ) <= 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->split_done = 1;
}
if( ( ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf + 1, len - 1 ) ) <= 0 )
return( ret );
ssl->split_done = 0;
return( ret + 1 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
/*
* Write application data (public-facing wrapper)
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write" ) );
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ( ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif
if( ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
ret = ssl_write_split( ssl, buf, len );
#else
ret = ssl_write_real( ssl, buf, len );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write" ) );
return( ret );
}
/*
* Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write close notify" ) );
if( ssl->out_left != 0 )
return( mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) );
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write close notify" ) );
return( 0 );
}
void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
{
if( transform == NULL )
return;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate );
inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate );
#endif
mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_cipher_free( &transform->cipher_ctx_dec );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_enc );
mbedtls_md_free( &transform->md_ctx_dec );
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( transform, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_transform ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
unsigned offset;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
if( hs == NULL )
return;
ssl_free_buffered_record( ssl );
for( offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++ )
ssl_buffering_free_slot( ssl, offset );
}
static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint8_t slot )
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake;
mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot];
if( slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS )
return;
if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
{
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len );
mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data );
memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Convert version numbers to/from wire format
* and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent.
*
* For TLS this is the identity.
* For DTLS, use 1's complement (v -> 255 - v, and then map as follows:
* 1.0 <-> 3.2 (DTLS 1.0 is based on TLS 1.1)
* 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
unsigned char ver[2] )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 )
--minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
ver[0] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( major - 2 ) );
ver[1] = (unsigned char)( 255 - ( minor - 1 ) );
}
else
#else
((void) transport);
#endif
{
ver[0] = (unsigned char) major;
ver[1] = (unsigned char) minor;
}
}
void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
const unsigned char ver[2] )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
*major = 255 - ver[0] + 2;
*minor = 255 - ver[1] + 1;
if( *minor == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1 )
++*minor; /* DTLS 1.0 stored as TLS 1.1 internally */
}
else
#else
((void) transport);
#endif
{
*major = ver[0];
*minor = ver[1];
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
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