mirror of
https://github.com/yuzu-emu/mbedtls.git
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4251 lines
140 KiB
C
4251 lines
140 KiB
C
/*
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* SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
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* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*
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* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
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*/
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
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#include "mbedtls/config.h"
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#else
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#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#else
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
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#define mbedtls_free free
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#endif
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#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
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#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
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#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
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#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
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#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
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static void ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t hostname_len;
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*olen = 0;
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if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
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return;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
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ssl->hostname ) );
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hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname );
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < hostname_len + 9 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions)
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*
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* In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an
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* extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The
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* "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain
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* "ServerNameList" where:
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*
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* struct {
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* NameType name_type;
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* select (name_type) {
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* case host_name: HostName;
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* } name;
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* } ServerName;
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*
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* enum {
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* host_name(0), (255)
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* } NameType;
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*
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* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
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*
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* struct {
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* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
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* } ServerNameList;
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*
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*/
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 5) ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( (hostname_len + 3) ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( hostname_len ) & 0xFF );
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memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len );
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*olen = hostname_len + 9;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
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static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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/* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
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* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
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* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
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if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
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return;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 + ssl->verify_data_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Secure renegotiation
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*/
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = 0x00;
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*p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 ) & 0xFF;
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*p++ = ssl->verify_data_len & 0xFF;
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memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
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*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
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/*
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* Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures.
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
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static void ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6;
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#endif
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*olen = 0;
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if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) !=
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MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
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{
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return;
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}
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS( hash )
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((void) hash);
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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sig_alg_len += 2;
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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sig_alg_len += 2;
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < sig_alg_len + 6 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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/*
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* Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2)
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*/
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sig_alg_len = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS( hash )
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = hash;
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA;
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = hash;
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA;
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SIG_HASH_TLS
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/*
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* enum {
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* none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
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* sha512(6), (255)
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* } HashAlgorithm;
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*
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* enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
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* SignatureAlgorithm;
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*
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* struct {
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* HashAlgorithm hash;
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* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
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* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
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*
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* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
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* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
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*/
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( sig_alg_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( sig_alg_len ) & 0xFF );
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*olen = 6 + sig_alg_len;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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static size_t ssl_get_ec_curve_list_length( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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{
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size_t ec_list_len = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID( tls_id )
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((void) tls_id);
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ec_list_len++;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID
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return( ec_list_len );
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}
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static void ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
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*olen = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) );
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/* Each elliptic curve is encoded in 2 bytes. */
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elliptic_curve_len = 2 * ssl_get_ec_curve_list_length( ssl );
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if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 )
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return;
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + elliptic_curve_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len + 2 ) ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( elliptic_curve_len ) ) & 0xFF );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID( tls_id )
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*p++ = tls_id >> 8;
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*p++ = tls_id & 0xFF;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_SUPPORTED_EC_TLS_ID
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*olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len;
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}
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static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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*olen = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = 0x00;
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*p++ = 2;
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*p++ = 1;
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*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
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*olen = 6;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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int ret;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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*olen = 0;
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/* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
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if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
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return;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
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if( end - p < 4 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF );
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/*
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* We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
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* We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
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* and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
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*/
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if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
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p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
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mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
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mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
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if( ret != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
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return;
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}
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
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if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) );
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return;
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}
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memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len );
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
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}
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else
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) );
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kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
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if( (size_t)( end - p - 2 ) < kkpp_len )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len );
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}
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF );
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*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
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static void ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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size_t ext_len;
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const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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/*
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* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
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* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
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*
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* struct {
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* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
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* } ConnectionId;
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*/
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*olen = 0;
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if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) ||
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ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
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{
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return;
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}
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) );
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/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
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* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
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if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
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return;
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}
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/* Add extension ID + size */
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID ) & 0xFF );
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ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF );
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*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
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memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
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*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
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|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 5 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 5;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac "
|
|
"extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret "
|
|
"extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) );
|
|
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
|
|
|
|
*olen += tlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
size_t alpnlen = 0;
|
|
const char **cur;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
|
|
alpnlen += (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF ) + 1;
|
|
|
|
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 6 + alpnlen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Skip writing extension and list length for now */
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
|
|
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
|
|
{
|
|
*p = (unsigned char)( strlen( *cur ) & 0xFF );
|
|
memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p );
|
|
p += 1 + *p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*olen = p - buf;
|
|
|
|
/* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */
|
|
buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF );
|
|
|
|
/* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */
|
|
buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate random bytes for ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
mbedtls_time_t t;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1)
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
|
|
#else
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
|
|
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
|
|
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context.
|
|
*
|
|
* \param suite_info cipher suite to validate
|
|
* \param ssl SSL context
|
|
* \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite
|
|
* \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite
|
|
*
|
|
* \return 0 if valid, else 1
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t suite_info,
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl,
|
|
int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver )
|
|
{
|
|
(void) ssl;
|
|
if( suite_info == MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_min_minor_ver( suite_info ) > max_minor_ver ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_max_minor_ver( suite_info ) < min_minor_ver )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
|
|
( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_flags( suite_info ) &
|
|
MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED &&
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_cipher( suite_info ) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( suite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
|
|
mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *q;
|
|
unsigned char offer_compress;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
int uses_ec = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
|
|
ssl->major_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf );
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER */
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
|
|
ssl->minor_ver = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf );
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "configured max major version is invalid, "
|
|
"consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 0 . 0 handshake type
|
|
* 1 . 3 handshake length
|
|
* 4 . 5 highest version supported
|
|
* 6 . 9 current UNIX time
|
|
* 10 . 37 random bytes
|
|
*/
|
|
buf = ssl->out_msg;
|
|
p = buf + 4;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]",
|
|
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_generate_random( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_generate_random", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32 );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 );
|
|
p += 32;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 38 . 38 session id length
|
|
* 39 . 39+n session id
|
|
* 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
|
|
* 40+n . .. DTSL only: cookie
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte)
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods
|
|
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We'll write a session of non-zero length if resumption was requested
|
|
* by the user, we're not renegotiating, and the session ID is of
|
|
* appropriate length. Otherwise make the length 0 (for now, see next code
|
|
* block for behaviour with tickets).
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 0 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len < 16 ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len > 32 )
|
|
{
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY
|
|
* generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello."
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL &&
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
|
|
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 );
|
|
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) n;
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
|
|
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i];
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* DTLS cookie
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) );
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie",
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
|
|
p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ciphersuite list
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
q = p;
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
|
|
ciphersuite_info )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)(
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) >> 8 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)(
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_id( ciphersuite_info ) );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, got %d ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO );
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE );
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 );
|
|
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
offer_compress = 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
offer_compress = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come
|
|
* in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one.
|
|
* We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is
|
|
* an actual need for it.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
|
|
offer_compress = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( offer_compress )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d",
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE, MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 2;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d",
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First write extensions, then the total length
|
|
//
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
|
ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
|
|
* even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED)
|
|
ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( uses_ec )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
|
|
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */
|
|
((void) olen);
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %d",
|
|
ext_len ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ext_len > 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF );
|
|
p += ext_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
|
|
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
|
|
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
|
|
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1,
|
|
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
|
|
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
{
|
|
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* server should use the extension only if we did,
|
|
* and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
|
|
len != 1 ||
|
|
buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t peer_cid_len;
|
|
|
|
if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport ) ||
|
|
/* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
|
|
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( len == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
|
|
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( len != peer_cid_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
|
|
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t list_size;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
list_size = buf[0];
|
|
|
|
p = buf + 1;
|
|
while( list_size > 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
|
|
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0];
|
|
#endif
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
list_size--;
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange(
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) )
|
|
!= MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache );
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t list_len, name_len;
|
|
const char **p;
|
|
|
|
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
|
|
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
|
*
|
|
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
|
|
if( len < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
|
|
if( list_len != len - 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
name_len = buf[2];
|
|
if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
|
|
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
|
|
{
|
|
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
|
|
memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
int major_ver, minor_ver;
|
|
unsigned char cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1)
|
|
* even is lower than our min version.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
|
|
minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ||
|
|
major_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
|
|
minor_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cookie_len = *p++;
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len );
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Start over at ClientHello */
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
size_t ext_len;
|
|
unsigned char *buf, *ext;
|
|
unsigned char comp;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
int accept_comp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
int extended_ms_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
int handshake_failure = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* The ciphersuite chosen by the server. */
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t server_suite_info;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* No alert on a read error. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = ssl->in_msg;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->renego_records_seen++;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
|
|
ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
|
|
"but not honored by server" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) );
|
|
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
|
|
{
|
|
if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
|
|
return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* We made it through the verification process */
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL;
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
|
|
buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 0 . 1 server_version
|
|
* 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
|
|
* 34 . 34 session_id length = n
|
|
* 35 . 34+n session_id
|
|
* 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
|
|
* 37+n . 37+n compression_method
|
|
*
|
|
* 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
|
|
* 40+n . .. extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
int major_ver, minor_ver;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->transport,
|
|
buf + 0 );
|
|
|
|
if( major_ver < mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
|
|
minor_ver < mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
|
|
major_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ) ||
|
|
minor_ver > mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server version out of bounds - "
|
|
" min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
major_ver, minor_ver,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER)
|
|
ssl->minor_ver = minor_ver;
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MINOR_VER */
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER)
|
|
ssl->major_ver = major_ver;
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_FIXED_MAJOR_VER */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
|
|
( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
|
|
( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
|
|
( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
|
|
( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) );
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
|
|
|
|
n = buf[34];
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
|
|
|
|
if( n > 32 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[39 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
|
|
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
ext_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ciphersuite (used later) */
|
|
i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read and check compression
|
|
*/
|
|
comp = buf[37 + n];
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
|
|
accept_comp = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_TLS( ssl->conf->transport );
|
|
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL &&
|
|
( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE || accept_comp == 0 ) )
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
|
|
#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize update checksum functions
|
|
*/
|
|
server_suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = server_suite_info;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if( server_suite_info == MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITE_INVALID_HANDLE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, server_suite_info );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the session can be resumed
|
|
*
|
|
* We're only resuming a session if it was requested (handshake->resume
|
|
* already set to 1 by mbedtls_ssl_set_session()), and further conditions
|
|
* are satisfied (not renegotiating, ID and ciphersuite match, etc).
|
|
*
|
|
* Update handshake->resume to the value it will keep for the rest of the
|
|
* handshake, and that will be used to determine the relative order
|
|
* client/server last flights, as well as in handshake_wrapup().
|
|
*/
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION)
|
|
if( n == 0 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_renego_status( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite( ssl->session_negotiate ) != i ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
|
|
memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION */
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) == 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Resume a session */
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Start a new session */
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE)
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONF_SINGLE_CIPHERSUITE */
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
|
|
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_resume( ssl->handshake ) ? "a" : "no" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_BEGIN_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE( ssl,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ),
|
|
ciphersuite_info )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_min_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info != server_suite_info )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
goto server_picked_valid_suite;
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_FOR_EACH_CIPHERSUITE
|
|
|
|
/* If we reach this code-path, the server's chosen ciphersuite
|
|
* wasn't among those advertised by us. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
|
|
server_picked_valid_suite:
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_name( server_suite_info ) ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( server_suite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
|
|
#endif
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
|
|
|
|
ext = buf + 40 + n;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d",
|
|
ext_len ) );
|
|
|
|
while( ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
|
|
| ( ext[1] ) );
|
|
unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
|
|
| ( ext[3] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch( ext_id )
|
|
{
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
|
|
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4,
|
|
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
extended_ms_seen = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)",
|
|
ext_id ) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
|
|
ext += 4 + ext_size;
|
|
|
|
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Renegotiation security checks
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_allow_legacy_renegotiation( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if extended master secret is being enforced
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
if( extended_ms_seen )
|
|
{
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED)
|
|
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCED */
|
|
}
|
|
else if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_ems_enforced( ssl->conf ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENFORCE_ENABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Peer not offering extended master "
|
|
"secret, while it is enforced") );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ServerDHParams;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8 < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %d < %d",
|
|
ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len * 8,
|
|
ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
|
|
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
|
|
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
|
|
#else
|
|
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
|
|
if( curve_info == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
|
|
#else
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 ||
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 )
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( -1 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ECParameters curve_params;
|
|
* ECPoint public;
|
|
* } ServerECDHParams;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
((void) ssl);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
|
|
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
|
|
*p += 2;
|
|
|
|
if( end - (*p) < (int) len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
|
|
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
|
|
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
|
|
* someone needs that feature.
|
|
*/
|
|
*p += len;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
|
|
/* This function assumes that `out` points to a writable buffer
|
|
* of size 48 Bytes if `add_length_tag == 0` and size 50 Bytes
|
|
* if `add_length_tag != 0`. */
|
|
static int ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char* out,
|
|
unsigned add_length_tag )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate (part of) the pre-master secret as
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* [ uint16 length(48) ]
|
|
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
|
|
* opaque random[46];
|
|
* } PreMasterSecret;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( add_length_tag )
|
|
{
|
|
out[0] = 0;
|
|
out[1] = 48;
|
|
out += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_major_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_max_minor_ver( ssl->conf ),
|
|
ssl->conf->transport, out );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf )
|
|
( mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), out + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt the randomly chosen part of the Premaster Secret with the
|
|
* server's RSA key and write it to the provided buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char const *ppms,
|
|
unsigned char *out, size_t buflen,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
size_t len_bytes = mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if( buflen < len_bytes )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* Because the peer CRT pubkey is embedded into the handshake
|
|
* params currently, and there's no 'is_init' functions for PK
|
|
* contexts, we need to break the abstraction and peek into
|
|
* the PK context to see if it has been initialized. */
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey.pk_info != NULL )
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
|
&peer_pk );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
if( peer_pk == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt the partial premaster secret and write it out.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
|
|
ppms, 48, out + len_bytes,
|
|
olen, buflen - len_bytes,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( len_bytes == 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
out[0] = (unsigned char)( *olen >> 8 );
|
|
out[1] = (unsigned char)( *olen );
|
|
*olen += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#else
|
|
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg )
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ssl);
|
|
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
*pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
|
|
|
|
/* Only in TLS 1.2 */
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( (*p) + 2 > end )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get hash algorithm
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) ) == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Server used unsupported "
|
|
"HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get signature algorithm
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) ) == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used unsupported "
|
|
"SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the hash is acceptable
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered",
|
|
*(p)[0] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", (*p)[0] ) );
|
|
*p += 2;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
|
&peer_pk );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
|
|
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
|
|
* operations like ECDHE. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#else
|
|
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
*
|
|
* STATE HANDLING: ServerKeyExchange
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Overview
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions. */
|
|
static int ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
|
|
/* Coordination:
|
|
* Check if a ServerKeyExchange message is expected, and skip if not.
|
|
* Returns a negative code on failure, or
|
|
* - SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP
|
|
* - SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED
|
|
* indicating if a ServerKeyExchange message is expected or not.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP 0
|
|
#define SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED 1
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
/* Preparation
|
|
* If applicable, prepare DH parameters from Server certificate. */
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
/* Parse SrvKeyExchange message and store contents
|
|
* (PSK or DH parameters) in handshake structure. */
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t buflen );
|
|
/* Update the handshake state */
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
((void) ciphersuite_info);
|
|
|
|
/* If applicable, extract static DH parameters from Server CRT. */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
/* The ServerKeyExchange message is not used for
|
|
* - RSA or
|
|
* - static ECDH
|
|
* ciphersuites.
|
|
* It MAY be used in PSK or RSA-PSK.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info ) ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
|
|
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint. Peek at next message to decide whether
|
|
* the ServerKeyExchange is being skipped or not.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE &&
|
|
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Current message is probably either
|
|
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
|
|
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t buflen )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
unsigned char *end;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
p = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
end = buf + buflen;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
} /* FALLTROUGH */
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
; /* nothing more to do */
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
static const uint16_t secp256r1_tls_id = 23;
|
|
static const unsigned char ecdh_group[] = {
|
|
MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE,
|
|
( secp256r1_tls_id >> 8 ) & 0xFF,
|
|
( secp256r1_tls_id >> 0 ) & 0xFF,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Check for fixed ECDH parameter preamble. */
|
|
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < sizeof( ecdh_group ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad server key exchange (too short)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( memcmp( p, ecdh_group, sizeof( ecdh_group ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Bad server key exchange (unexpected header)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
p += sizeof( ecdh_group );
|
|
|
|
/* Read server's key share. */
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ecdh_read_peerkey( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
p, end - p );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ret);
|
|
((void) p);
|
|
((void) end);
|
|
((void) ciphersuite_info);
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
|
|
unsigned char hash[64];
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
|
|
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
size_t params_len = p - params;
|
|
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
|
|
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( pk_alg != mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
|
|
|
|
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
|
|
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read signature
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( p > end - 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
if( p != end - sig_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute the hash that has been signed
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
hashlen = 36;
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
|
|
params_len );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
|
|
params, params_len,
|
|
md_alg );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
|
|
&peer_pk );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_acquire", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify signature
|
|
*/
|
|
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
|
|
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
|
|
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
|
|
* operations like ECDHE. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#else
|
|
mbedtls_x509_crt_pk_release( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE__ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Preparation:
|
|
* Potentially extract DH parameters from Server's certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* Consider: Why don't we do this as post-processing after
|
|
* the server certificate has been read?
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_prepare( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Coordination:
|
|
* Check if we expect a ServerKeyExchange */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_coordinate( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ret == SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_EXPECTED )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Reading step */
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_parse( ssl, ssl->in_msg,
|
|
ssl->in_hslen ) );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ret == SSL_SRV_KEY_EXCHANGE_SKIP )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update state */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_in_server_key_exchange_postprocess( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
|
|
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
size_t n = 0;
|
|
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
|
|
ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
* supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
* Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
|
|
* ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
|
|
* certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
|
|
* if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
|
|
* and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
|
|
* the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
|
|
* point we only have one hash available (see comments in
|
|
* write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
|
|
*
|
|
* However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
|
|
* superficially sane.
|
|
*/
|
|
buf = ssl->in_msg;
|
|
|
|
/* certificate_types */
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
|
|
n = cert_type_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
|
|
* * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
|
|
* SSL is 3),
|
|
* * distinguished name length otherwise.
|
|
* Both reach at most the index:
|
|
* ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
|
|
* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
|
|
* regardless of the actual code path.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* supported_signature_algorithms */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
unsigned char* sig_alg;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
|
|
* sig_alg[i + 1],
|
|
* where:
|
|
* sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
|
|
* max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
|
|
* Therefore the furthest access is:
|
|
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
|
|
* which reduces to:
|
|
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
|
|
* which is one less than we need the buf to be.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
|
|
for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d"
|
|
",%d", sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
|
/* certificate_authorities */
|
|
dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
n += dn_len;
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
|
|
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) )
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
*
|
|
* STATE HANDLING: Client Key Exchange
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Overview
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Main entry point; orchestrates the other functions */
|
|
static int ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
|
|
/* Preparation
|
|
* - For ECDH: Generate client params and derive premaster secret
|
|
* - For RSA-suites: Encrypt PMS
|
|
* - For ECJPAKE: Do Round 2
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t buflen,
|
|
size_t *olen );
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implementation
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> process client key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
|
|
goto cli_key_exchange_postprocess;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare CertificateVerify message in output buffer. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( ssl, ssl->out_msg,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN,
|
|
&ssl->out_msglen ) );
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate secrets and update state */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
|
|
|
|
cli_key_exchange_postprocess:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ret = ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( ssl );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( ret );
|
|
|
|
/* Dispatch message */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK( mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: For the new messaging layer, the postprocessing step
|
|
* might come after the dispatching step if the latter
|
|
* doesn't send the message immediately.
|
|
* At the moment, we must do the postprocessing
|
|
* prior to the dispatching because if the latter
|
|
* returns WANT_WRITE, we want the handshake state
|
|
* to be updated in order to not enter
|
|
* this function again on retry. */
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= process client key exchange" ) );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
((void) ret);
|
|
((void) ciphersuite_info);
|
|
|
|
/* TODO: The current API for DH and ECDH does not allow
|
|
* to separate public key generation from public key export.
|
|
*
|
|
* Ideally, we would like to pick the private (EC)DH keys
|
|
* in this preparation step, exporting the corresponding
|
|
* public key in the writing step only.
|
|
*
|
|
* The necessary extension of the (EC)DH API is being
|
|
* considered, but until then we perform the public
|
|
* generation + export in the writing step.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
/* For RSA-PSK, the premaster secret is composed of
|
|
* - Length tag with value 48, encoded as a uint16
|
|
* - 2 bytes indicating the TLS version
|
|
* - 46 randomly chosen bytes
|
|
* - the chosen PSK.
|
|
* The following call takes care of all but the PSK. */
|
|
ret = ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
1 /* Add length tag */ );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
/* For RSA, the premaster secret is composed of
|
|
* - 2 bytes indicating the TLS version
|
|
* - 46 randomly chosen bytes
|
|
* which the following call generates. */
|
|
ret = ssl_rsa_generate_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
0 /* Omit length tag */ );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Warning: Despite accepting a length argument, this function is currently
|
|
* still lacking some bounds checks and assumes that `buf` has length
|
|
* `MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN`. Eventually, it should be rewritten to work
|
|
* with any buffer + length pair, returning MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
|
|
* on insufficient writing space. */
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_write( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t buflen,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *end;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: This function will generate different messages
|
|
* when it's called multiple times, because it currently
|
|
* includes private/public key generation in case of
|
|
* (EC)DH ciphersuites.
|
|
*
|
|
* It is therefore not suitable to be registered as a callback
|
|
* for retransmission, if such get introduced at some point.
|
|
*
|
|
* Also see the documentation of ssl_out_client_key_exchange_prepare().
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
p = buf + 4;
|
|
end = buf + buflen;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
|
|
*/
|
|
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
|
|
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < n + 2 )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
|
|
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
|
|
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
|
|
p, n, mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
|
|
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_TINYCRYPT)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
const struct uECC_Curve_t * uecc_curve = uECC_secp256r1();
|
|
((void) n);
|
|
((void) ret);
|
|
|
|
if( !uECC_make_key( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ownpubkey,
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecdh_privkey,
|
|
uecc_curve ) )
|
|
{
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES + 2 )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES + 1;
|
|
*p++ = 0x04; /* uncompressed point presentation */
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->ecdh_ownpubkey, 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES );
|
|
p += 2 * NUM_ECC_BYTES;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* ECDH key exchange -- generate and send client public value
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: If we ever switch the ECDH stack/API to allow
|
|
* independent key generation and export, we should have
|
|
* generated our key share in the preparation step, and
|
|
* we'd only do the export here. */
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
&n, p, end - p,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
|
|
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
|
|
if( buflen < n + 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or "
|
|
"SSL buffer too short" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
|
|
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->conf->psk_identity, n );
|
|
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ret);
|
|
((void) end);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( ssl,
|
|
ssl->handshake->premaster + 2,
|
|
p, end - p, &n ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
|
|
*/
|
|
((void) end);
|
|
|
|
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
|
|
|
|
if( buflen < n + 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long"
|
|
" or SSL buffer too short" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p[0] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
|
|
p[1] = (unsigned char)( n );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
|
|
p, n, mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n,
|
|
p, buflen,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
|
|
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_rsa_encrypt_partial_pms( ssl, ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
p, end - p, &n ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_key_exchange( ciphersuite_info )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
p, end - p, &n,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ) );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
p += n;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ciphersuite_info);
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*olen = p - buf;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_out_client_key_exchange_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_build_pms( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_build_pms", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED)
|
|
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
|
|
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_handle_t ciphersuite_info =
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake );
|
|
size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
|
|
unsigned char hash[48];
|
|
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
size_t hashlen;
|
|
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
|
|
{
|
|
goto sign;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
|
|
|
|
sign:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* digitally-signed struct {
|
|
* opaque md5_hash[16];
|
|
* opaque sha_hash[20];
|
|
* };
|
|
*
|
|
* md5_hash
|
|
* MD5(handshake_messages);
|
|
*
|
|
* sha_hash
|
|
* SHA(handshake_messages);
|
|
*/
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
|
|
{
|
|
hash_start += 16;
|
|
hashlen -= 16;
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_get_minor_ver( ssl ) == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* digitally-signed struct {
|
|
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
|
|
* };
|
|
*
|
|
* Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
|
|
* PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
|
|
* algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
|
|
*
|
|
* Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
|
|
* shortcut.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and SHA224
|
|
* in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server side.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_suite_get_mac(
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_get_ciphersuite( ssl->handshake ) )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
|
|
{
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
|
|
hashlen = 0;
|
|
offset = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
|
|
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
|
|
ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n,
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_frng( ssl->conf ),
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_prng( ssl->conf ), rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msg[4 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
|
|
ssl->out_msg[5 + offset] = (unsigned char)( n );
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset;
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__CERT_REQ_ALLOWED__ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
uint32_t lifetime;
|
|
size_t ticket_len;
|
|
unsigned char *ticket;
|
|
const unsigned char *msg;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
|
|
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } NewSessionTicket;
|
|
*
|
|
* 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
|
|
* 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
|
|
* 6 . 5+n ticket content
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
|
|
ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
|
|
lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
|
|
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
|
|
|
|
ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
|
|
|
|
if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", ticket_len ) );
|
|
|
|
/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
|
|
* to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ticket_len == 0 )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
|
|
ssl->session->ticket_len );
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
|
|
ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
|
|
ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert( ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5077 section 3.4:
|
|
* "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
|
|
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client state: %d", ssl->state ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_IS_DTLS( ssl->conf->transport ) &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
/* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
|
|
* by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
switch( ssl->state )
|
|
{
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ==> ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
ret = ssl_write_client_hello( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* <== ServerHello
|
|
* Certificate
|
|
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
|
|
* ( CertificateRequest )
|
|
* ServerHelloDone
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
ret = ssl_process_in_server_key_exchange( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ==> ( Certificate/Alert )
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange
|
|
* ( CertificateVerify )
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
|
* Finished
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
ret = ssl_process_out_client_key_exchange( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
|
|
ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* <== ( NewSessionTicket )
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
|
* Finished
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|