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mbedtls/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs1_v21.function
Paul Bakker c70b982056 OID functionality moved to a separate module. 
A new OID module has been created that contains the main OID searching
functionality based on type-dependent arrays. A base type is used to
contain the basic values (oid_descriptor_t) and that type is extended to
contain type specific information (like a pk_alg_t).

As a result the rsa sign and verify function prototypes have changed. They
now expect a md_type_t identifier instead of the removed RSA_SIG_XXX
defines.

All OID definitions have been moved to oid.h
All OID matching code is in the OID module.

The RSA PKCS#1 functions cleaned up as a result and adapted to use the
MD layer.

The SSL layer cleanup up as a result and adapted to use the MD layer.

The X509 parser cleaned up and matches OIDs in certificates with new
module and adapted to use the MD layer.

The X509 writer cleaned up and adapted to use the MD layer.

Apps and tests modified accordingly
2013-04-07 22:00:46 +02:00

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BEGIN_HEADER
#include <polarssl/rsa.h>
#include <polarssl/md.h>
#include <polarssl/md2.h>
#include <polarssl/md4.h>
#include <polarssl/md5.h>
#include <polarssl/sha1.h>
#include <polarssl/sha2.h>
#include <polarssl/sha4.h>
END_HEADER
BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
depends_on:POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21:POLARSSL_RSA_C:POLARSSL_BIGNUM_C:POLARSSL_SHA1_C:POLARSSL_GENPRIME
END_DEPENDENCIES
BEGIN_CASE
pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_encrypt:mod:radix_N:input_N:radix_E:input_E:hash:message_hex_string:seed:result_hex_str:result
{
unsigned char message_str[1000];
unsigned char output[1000];
unsigned char output_str[1000];
unsigned char rnd_buf[1000];
rsa_context ctx;
size_t msg_len;
rnd_buf_info info;
info.length = unhexify( rnd_buf, {seed} );
info.buf = rnd_buf;
rsa_init( &ctx, RSA_PKCS_V21, {hash} );
memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output_str, 0x00, 1000 );
ctx.len = {mod} / 8 + ( ( {mod} % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, {radix_N}, {input_N} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.E, {radix_E}, {input_E} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 );
msg_len = unhexify( message_str, {message_hex_string} );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &ctx, &rnd_buffer_rand, &info, RSA_PUBLIC, msg_len, message_str, output ) == {result} );
if( {result} == 0 )
{
hexify( output_str, output, ctx.len );
TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, {result_hex_str} ) == 0 );
}
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
END_CASE
BEGIN_CASE
pkcs1_rsaes_oaep_decrypt:mod:radix_P:input_P:radix_Q:input_Q:radix_N:input_N:radix_E:input_E:hash:result_hex_str:seed:message_hex_string:result
{
unsigned char message_str[1000];
unsigned char output[1000];
unsigned char output_str[1000];
rsa_context ctx;
mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
size_t output_len;
mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 ); mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &G );
rsa_init( &ctx, RSA_PKCS_V21, {hash} );
memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output_str, 0x00, 1000 );
ctx.len = {mod} / 8 + ( ( {mod} % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.P, {radix_P}, {input_P} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.Q, {radix_Q}, {input_Q} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, {radix_N}, {input_N} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.E, {radix_E}, {input_E} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx.P, 1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx.Q, 1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx.E, &H ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx.D , &ctx.E, &H ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx.DP, &ctx.D, &P1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx.DQ, &ctx.D, &Q1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx.QP, &ctx.Q, &ctx.P ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 );
unhexify( message_str, {message_hex_string} );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &ctx, RSA_PRIVATE, &output_len, message_str, output, 1000 ) == {result} );
if( {result} == 0 )
{
hexify( output_str, output, ctx.len );
TEST_ASSERT( strncasecmp( (char *) output_str, {result_hex_str}, strlen( {result_hex_str} ) ) == 0 );
}
mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
END_CASE
BEGIN_CASE
pkcs1_rsassa_pss_sign:mod:radix_P:input_P:radix_Q:input_Q:radix_N:input_N:radix_E:input_E:digest:hash:message_hex_string:salt:result_hex_str:result
{
unsigned char message_str[1000];
unsigned char hash_result[1000];
unsigned char output[1000];
unsigned char output_str[1000];
unsigned char rnd_buf[1000];
rsa_context ctx;
mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
size_t msg_len;
rnd_buf_info info;
info.length = unhexify( rnd_buf, {salt} );
info.buf = rnd_buf;
mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 ); mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &G );
rsa_init( &ctx, RSA_PKCS_V21, {hash} );
memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( hash_result, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( output_str, 0x00, 1000 );
ctx.len = {mod} / 8 + ( ( {mod} % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.P, {radix_P}, {input_P} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.Q, {radix_Q}, {input_Q} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, {radix_N}, {input_N} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.E, {radix_E}, {input_E} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx.P, 1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx.Q, 1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx.E, &H ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx.D , &ctx.E, &H ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx.DP, &ctx.D, &P1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx.DQ, &ctx.D, &Q1 ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx.QP, &ctx.Q, &ctx.P ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_check_privkey( &ctx ) == 0 );
msg_len = unhexify( message_str, {message_hex_string} );
if( md_info_from_type( {digest} ) != NULL )
TEST_ASSERT( md( md_info_from_type( {digest} ), message_str, msg_len, hash_result ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_sign( &ctx, &rnd_buffer_rand, &info, RSA_PRIVATE, {digest}, 0, hash_result, output ) == {result} );
if( {result} == 0 )
{
hexify( output_str, output, ctx.len);
TEST_ASSERT( strcasecmp( (char *) output_str, {result_hex_str} ) == 0 );
}
mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
END_CASE
BEGIN_CASE
pkcs1_rsassa_pss_verify:mod:radix_N:input_N:radix_E:input_E:digest:hash:message_hex_string:salt:result_hex_str:result
{
unsigned char message_str[1000];
unsigned char hash_result[1000];
unsigned char result_str[1000];
rsa_context ctx;
size_t msg_len;
rsa_init( &ctx, RSA_PKCS_V21, {hash} );
memset( message_str, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( hash_result, 0x00, 1000 );
memset( result_str, 0x00, 1000 );
ctx.len = {mod} / 8 + ( ( {mod} % 8 ) ? 1 : 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.N, {radix_N}, {input_N} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( mpi_read_string( &ctx.E, {radix_E}, {input_E} ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_check_pubkey( &ctx ) == 0 );
msg_len = unhexify( message_str, {message_hex_string} );
unhexify( result_str, {result_hex_str} );
if( md_info_from_type( {digest} ) != NULL )
TEST_ASSERT( md( md_info_from_type( {digest} ), message_str, msg_len, hash_result ) == 0 );
TEST_ASSERT( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ctx, RSA_PUBLIC, {digest}, 0, hash_result, result_str ) == {result} );
rsa_free( &ctx );
}
END_CASE
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