mirror of
https://github.com/shchmue/Lockpick_RCM.git
synced 2024-12-22 14:55:28 +00:00
245 lines
8.9 KiB
C
245 lines
8.9 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2022 shchmue
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* Copyright (c) 2018 Atmosphère-NX
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
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* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
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* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
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* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
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* more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "../../keygen/tsec_keygen.h"
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#include "../config.h"
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#include "../hos/hos.h"
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#include <sec/se.h>
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#include <sec/se_t210.h>
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#include <sec/tsec.h>
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#include <soc/fuse.h>
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#include <utils/util.h>
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#include <string.h>
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extern hekate_config h_cfg;
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int key_exists(const void *data) {
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return memcmp(data, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8) != 0;
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}
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int run_ams_keygen() {
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tsec_ctxt_t tsec_ctxt;
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tsec_ctxt.fw = tsec_keygen;
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tsec_ctxt.size = sizeof(tsec_keygen);
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tsec_ctxt.type = TSEC_FW_TYPE_NEW;
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u32 retries = 0;
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u32 temp_key[SE_KEY_128_SIZE / 4];
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while (tsec_query(temp_key, &tsec_ctxt) < 0) {
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retries++;
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if (retries > 15) {
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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bool check_keyslot_access() {
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u8 test_data[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {0};
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const u8 test_ciphertext[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {0};
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se_aes_key_set(KS_AES_ECB, "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f", SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(KS_AES_ECB, DECRYPT, test_data, test_ciphertext);
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return memcmp(test_data, "\x7b\x1d\x29\xa1\x6c\xf8\xcc\xab\x84\xf0\xb8\xa5\x98\xe4\x2f\xa6", SE_KEY_128_SIZE) == 0;
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}
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bool test_rsa_keypair(const void *public_exponent, const void *private_exponent, const void *modulus) {
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u32 plaintext[SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE / 4] = {0},
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ciphertext[SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE / 4] = {0},
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work[SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE / 4] = {0};
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plaintext[63] = 0xCAFEBABE;
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se_rsa_key_set(0, modulus, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE, private_exponent, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE);
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se_rsa_exp_mod(0, ciphertext, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE, plaintext, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE);
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se_rsa_key_set(0, modulus, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE, public_exponent, 4);
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se_rsa_exp_mod(0, work, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE, ciphertext, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE);
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return memcmp(plaintext, work, SE_RSA2048_DIGEST_SIZE) == 0;
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}
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// _mgf1_xor() and rsa_oaep_decode were derived from Atmosphère
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static void _mgf1_xor(void *masked, u32 masked_size, const void *seed, u32 seed_size) {
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u8 cur_hash[0x20] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
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u8 hash_buf[0xe4] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
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u32 hash_buf_size = seed_size + 4;
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memcpy(hash_buf, seed, seed_size);
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u32 round_num = 0;
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u8 *p_out = (u8 *)masked;
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while (masked_size) {
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u32 cur_size = MIN(masked_size, 0x20);
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for (u32 i = 0; i < 4; i++)
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hash_buf[seed_size + 3 - i] = (round_num >> (8 * i)) & 0xff;
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round_num++;
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se_calc_sha256_oneshot(cur_hash, hash_buf, hash_buf_size);
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < cur_size; i++) {
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*p_out ^= cur_hash[i];
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p_out++;
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}
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masked_size -= cur_size;
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}
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}
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u32 rsa_oaep_decode(void *dst, u32 dst_size, const void *label_digest, u32 label_digest_size, u8 *buf, u32 buf_size) {
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if (dst_size <= 0 || buf_size < 0x43 || label_digest_size != 0x20)
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return 0;
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bool is_valid = buf[0] == 0;
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u32 db_len = buf_size - 0x21;
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u8 *seed = buf + 1;
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u8 *db = seed + 0x20;
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_mgf1_xor(seed, 0x20, db, db_len);
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_mgf1_xor(db, db_len, seed, 0x20);
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is_valid &= memcmp(label_digest, db, 0x20) ? 0 : 1;
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db += 0x20;
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db_len -= 0x20;
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int msg_ofs = 0;
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int looking_for_one = 1;
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int invalid_db_padding = 0;
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int is_zero;
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int is_one;
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for (int i = 0; i < db_len; ) {
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is_zero = (db[i] == 0);
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is_one = (db[i] == 1);
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msg_ofs += (looking_for_one & is_one) * (++i);
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looking_for_one &= ~is_one;
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invalid_db_padding |= (looking_for_one & ~is_zero);
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}
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is_valid &= (invalid_db_padding == 0);
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const u32 msg_size = MIN(dst_size, is_valid * (db_len - msg_ofs));
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memcpy(dst, db + msg_ofs, msg_size);
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return msg_size;
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}
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void derive_rsa_kek(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_rsa_kek, const void *kekek_source, const void *kek_source, u32 generation, u32 option) {
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u32 access_key[SE_KEY_128_SIZE / 4] = {0};
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generate_aes_kek(ks, keys, access_key, kekek_source, generation, option);
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get_device_unique_data_key(ks, out_rsa_kek, access_key, kek_source);
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}
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// Equivalent to spl::GenerateAesKek
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void generate_aes_kek(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_kek, const void *kek_source, u32 generation, u32 option) {
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bool device_unique = GET_IS_DEVICE_UNIQUE(option);
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u32 seal_key_index = GET_SEAL_KEY_INDEX(option);
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if (generation)
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generation--;
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u8 static_source[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(4)));
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for (u32 i = 0; i < SE_KEY_128_SIZE; i++)
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static_source[i] = aes_kek_generation_source[i] ^ seal_key_masks[seal_key_index][i];
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if (device_unique) {
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get_device_key(ks, keys, keys->temp_key, generation);
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} else {
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memcpy(keys->temp_key, keys->master_key[generation], sizeof(keys->temp_key));
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}
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se_aes_key_set(ks, keys->temp_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_unwrap_key(ks, ks, static_source);
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se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(ks, DECRYPT, out_kek, kek_source);
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}
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// Based on spl::LoadAesKey but instead of prepping keyslot, returns calculated key
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void load_aes_key(u32 ks, void *out_key, const void *access_key, const void *key_source) {
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se_aes_key_set(ks, access_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(ks, DECRYPT, out_key, key_source);
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}
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// Equivalent to spl::GenerateAesKey
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void generate_aes_key(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_key, u32 key_size, const void *access_key, const void *key_source) {
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u32 aes_key[SE_KEY_128_SIZE / 4] = {0};
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load_aes_key(ks, aes_key, access_key, aes_key_generation_source);
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se_aes_key_set(ks, aes_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_crypt_ecb(ks, DECRYPT, out_key, key_size, key_source, key_size);
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}
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// Equivalent to smc::PrepareDeviceUniqueDataKey but with no sealing
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void get_device_unique_data_key(u32 ks, void *out_key, const void *access_key, const void *key_source) {
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load_aes_key(ks, out_key, access_key, key_source);
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}
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// Equivalent to spl::DecryptAesKey.
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void decrypt_aes_key(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_key, const void *key_source, u32 generation, u32 option) {
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u32 access_key[SE_KEY_128_SIZE / 4] = {0};
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generate_aes_kek(ks, keys, access_key, aes_key_decryption_source, generation, option);
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generate_aes_key(ks, keys, out_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, access_key, key_source);
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}
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// Equivalent to smc::GetSecureData
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void get_secure_data(key_storage_t *keys, void *out_data) {
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se_aes_key_set(KS_AES_CTR, keys->device_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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u8 *d = (u8 *)out_data;
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se_aes_crypt_ctr(KS_AES_CTR, d + SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 0, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, secure_data_source, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, secure_data_counters[0]);
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se_aes_crypt_ctr(KS_AES_CTR, d + SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 1, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, secure_data_source, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, secure_data_counters[0]);
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// Apply tweak
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for (u32 i = 0; i < SE_KEY_128_SIZE; i++) {
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d[SE_KEY_128_SIZE + i] ^= secure_data_tweaks[0][i];
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}
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}
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// Equivalent to spl::GenerateSpecificAesKey
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void generate_specific_aes_key(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_key, const void *key_source, u32 generation) {
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if (fuse_read_bootrom_rev() >= 0x7F) {
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get_device_key(ks, keys, keys->temp_key, generation == 0 ? 0 : generation - 1);
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se_aes_key_set(ks, keys->temp_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_unwrap_key(ks, ks, retail_specific_aes_key_source);
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se_aes_crypt_ecb(ks, DECRYPT, out_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 2, key_source, SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 2);
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} else {
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get_secure_data(keys, out_key);
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}
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}
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void get_device_key(u32 ks, key_storage_t *keys, void *out_device_key, u32 generation) {
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if (generation == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_100 && !h_cfg.t210b01) {
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memcpy(out_device_key, keys->device_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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return;
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}
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if (generation >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400) {
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generation -= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400;
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} else {
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generation = 0;
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}
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u32 temp_key_source[SE_KEY_128_SIZE / 4] = {0};
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load_aes_key(ks, temp_key_source, keys->device_key_4x, device_master_key_source_sources[generation]);
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const void *kek_source = fuse_read_hw_state() == FUSE_NX_HW_STATE_PROD ? device_master_kek_sources[generation] : device_master_kek_sources_dev[generation];
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se_aes_key_set(ks, keys->master_key[0], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
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se_aes_unwrap_key(ks, ks, kek_source);
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se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(ks, DECRYPT, out_device_key, temp_key_source);
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}
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