In pk_sign_verify, if mbedtls_pk_sign() failed, sig_len was passed to
mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable() without having been initialized. This
worked only because in the only test case that expects signature to
fail, the verify implementation doesn't look at sig_len before failing
for the expected reason.
The value of sig_len if sign() fails is undefined, so set sig_len to
something sensible.
This issue has been reported by Tuba Yavuz, Farhaan Fowze, Ken (Yihang) Bai,
Grant Hernandez, and Kevin Butler (University of Florida) and
Dave Tian (Purdue University).
In AES encrypt and decrypt some variables were left on the stack. The value
of these variables can be used to recover the last round key. To follow best
practice and to limit the impact of buffer overread vulnerabilities (like
Heartbleed) we need to zeroize them before exiting the function.
It was not obvious before that `AES_KEY` and `RSA_KEY` were shorthand
for key material. A user copy pasting the code snippet would run into a
compilation error if they didn't realize this. Make it more obvious that
key material must come from somewhere external by making the snippets
which use global keys into functions that take a key as a parameter.
When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written
as an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak
about 1 bit of information on average, and could cause the value to be
1 byte too large for the output buffer.
Add pk_write test cases where the ASN.1 INTEGER encoding of the
private value would not have the mandatory size for the OCTET STRING
that contains the value.
ec_256_long_prv.pem is a random secp256r1 private key, selected so
that the private value is >= 2^255, i.e. the top bit of the first byte
is set (which would cause the INTEGER encoding to have an extra
leading 0 byte).
ec_521_short_prv.pem is a random secp521r1 private key, selected so
that the private value is < 2^519, i.e. the first byte is 0 and the
top bit of the second byte is 0 (which would cause the INTEGER
encoding to have one less 0 byte at the start).
The corner case tests were designed for 32 and 64 bit limbs
independently and performed only on the target platform. On the other
platform they are not corner cases anymore, but we can still exercise
them.
The corner case tests were designed for 64 bit limbs and failed on 32
bit platforms because the numbers in the test ended up being stored in a
different number of limbs and the function (correctly) returnd an error
upon receiving them.
In the case of *ret we might need to preserve a 0 value throughout the
loop and therefore we need an extra condition to protect it from being
overwritten.
The value of done is always 1 after *ret has been set and does not need
to be protected from overwriting. Therefore in this case the extra
condition can be removed.
The code relied on the assumptions that CHAR_BIT is 8 and that unsigned
does not have padding bits.
In the Bignum module we already assume that the sign of an MPI is either
-1 or 1. Using this, we eliminate the above mentioned dependency.
The signature of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi_ct() meant to support using it in
place of mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(). This meant full comparison functionality
and a signed result.
To make the function more universal and friendly to constant time
coding, we change the result type to unsigned. Theoretically, we could
encode the comparison result in an unsigned value, but it would be less
intuitive.
Therefore we won't be able to represent the result as unsigned anymore
and the functionality will be constrained to checking if the first
operand is less than the second. This is sufficient to support the
current use case and to check any relationship between MPIs.
The only drawback is that we need to call the function twice when
checking for equality, but this can be optimised later if an when it is
needed.
Multiplication is known to have measurable timing variations based on
the operands. For example it typically is much faster if one of the
operands is zero. Remove them from constant time code.
1. variable name accoriding to the Mbed TLS coding style;
2. add a comment explaining safety of the optimization;
3. safer T2 initialization and memory zeroing on the function exit;
Enabling memory_buffer_alloc is slow and makes ASan ineffective. We
have a patch pending to remove it from the full config. In the
meantime, disable it explicitly.
None of the test cases in tests_suite_memory_buffer_alloc actually
need MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG. Some have additional checks when
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG but all are useful even without it. So enable
them all and #ifdef out the parts that require DEBUG.
The test case "Memory buffer small buffer" emits a message
"FATAL: verification of first header failed". In this test case, it's
actually expected, but it looks weird to see this message from a
passing test. Add a comment that states this explicitly, and modify
the test description to indicate that the failure is expected, and
change the test function name to be more accurate.
Fix#309
Record checking fails if mbedtls_ssl_check_record() is called with
external buffer. Received record sequence number is available in the
incoming record but it is not available in the ssl contexts `in_ctr`-
variable that is used when decoding the sequence number.
To fix the problem, temporarily update ssl context `in_ctr` to
point to the received record header and restore value later.
You can't reuse a CTR_DRBG context without free()ing it and
re-init()ing it. This generally happened to work, but was never
guaranteed. It could have failed with alternative implementations of
the AES module because mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() calls
mbedtls_aes_init() on a context which is already initialized if
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() hasn't been called before, plausibly causing a
memory leak. Since the addition of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(),
the second call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() uses a nonsensical value as
the entropy nonce length.
Calling free() and seed() with no intervening init fails when
MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled and all-bits-zero is not a valid mutex
representation.
You can't reuse a CTR_DRBG context without free()ing it and
re-init()ing. This generally happened to work, but was never
guaranteed. It could have failed with alternative implementations of
the AES module because mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() calls
mbedtls_aes_init() on a context which is already initialized if
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() hasn't been called before, plausibly causing a
memory leak. Calling free() and seed() with no intervening init fails
when MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled and all-bits-zero is not a valid
mutex representation. So add the missing free() and init().
We want to explicitly disallow creating new transactions when a
transaction is already in progress. However, we were incorrectly
checking for the existence of the injected entropy file before
continuing with creating a transaction. This meant we could have a
transaction already in progress and would be able to still create a new
transaction. It also meant we couldn't start a new transaction if any
entropy had been injected. Check the transaction file instead of the
injected entropy file in order to prevent multiple concurrent
transactions.
The default entropy nonce length is either zero or nonzero depending
on the desired security strength and the entropy length.
The implementation calculates the actual entropy nonce length from the
actual entropy length, and therefore it doesn't need a constant that
indicates the default entropy nonce length. A portable application may
be interested in this constant, however. And our test code could
definitely use it.
Define a constant MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN and use it in
test code. Previously, test_suite_ctr_drbg had knowledge about the
default entropy nonce length built in and test_suite_psa_crypto_init
failed. Now both use MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN.
This change means that the test ctr_drbg_entropy_usage no longer
validates that the default entropy nonce length is sensible. So add a
new test that checks that the default entropy length and the default
entropy nonce length are sufficient to ensure the expected security
strength.
