Fix get_len_step when buffer_size==0. The intent of this test is to
ensure (via static or runtime buffer overflow analysis) that
mbedtls_asn1_get_len does not attempt to access beyond the end of the
buffer. When buffer_size is 0 (reached from get_len when parsing a
1-byte buffer), the buffer is buf[1..1] because allocating a 0-byte
buffer might yield a null pointer rather than a valid pointer. In this
case the end of the buffer is p==buf+1, not buf+buffer_size which is
buf+0.
The test passed because calling mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p,end,...) with
end < p happens to work, but this is not guaranteed.
Before the initial seeding, reseed_counter used to always be 0. Now, the
value depends on whether or not the user has explicitly set the amount
of data to get from the nonce (via e.g.
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). Add comments to clarify the possible
values reseed_counter can have before the initial seeding.
This is useful to inspect what the script does manually, in particular
to check that expected values do get tested. --keep-c provides the
same information but in a way that's harder to access.
Filter out non-ASCII characters in automatically processed headers.
Do this in a way that minimizes the code change: keep manipulating
strings, but strip off non-ASCII characters when reading lines, which
should only remove characters in comments that we don't parse anyway.
One of the error codes was already reserved, this commit just makes it
explicit. The other one is a new error code for initializing return
values in the library: `MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED` should
not be returned by the library. If it is returned, then it is surely a
bug in the library or somebody is tampering with the device.
The functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() and
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() could return 0 if an AES function
failed. This could only happen with alternative AES
implementations (the built-in implementation of the AES functions
involved never fail), typically due to a failure in a hardware
accelerator.
Bug reported and fix proposed by Johan Uppman Bruce and Christoffer
Lauri, Sectra.
We're going to create some edge cases where the attributes of a key
are not bitwise identical to the attributes passed during creation.
Have a test function ready for that.
When MBEDTLS_TEST_DEPRECATED is defined, run some additional tests to
validate deprecated PSA macros. We don't need to test deprecated
features extensively, but we should at least ensure that they don't
break the build.
Add some code to component_build_deprecated in all.sh to run these
tests with MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING enabled. The tests are also
executed when MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING and
MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED are both disabled.
Rename some macros and functions related to signature which are
changing as part of the addition of psa_sign_message and
psa_verify_message.
perl -i -pe '%t = (
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN => PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY => PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE => PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE,
PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE => PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE,
psa_asymmetric_sign => psa_sign_hash,
psa_asymmetric_verify => psa_verify_hash,
); s/\b(@{[join("|", keys %t)]})\b/$t{$1}/ge' $(git ls-files . ':!:**/crypto_compat.h')
Move backward compatibility aliases to a separate header. Reserve
crypto_extra.h for implementation-specific extensions that we intend
to keep supporting.
This is better documentation for users. New users should simply ignore
backward compatibility aliases, and old users can look at
crypto_compat.h to see what is deprecated without bothering about new
features appearing in crypto_extra.h.
This facilitates maintenance because scripts such as
generate_psa_constants that want to ignore backward compability
aliases can simply exclude crypto_compat.h from their parsing.
When gathering test cases from test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata, look up
the test function explicitly. This way test_psa_constant_names will
error out if we add a new test function that needs coverage here.
This change highlights an omission in the previous version:
asymmetric_signature_wildcard was silently ignored as a source of
algorithm expressions to test. Fix that.
Key agreement algorithms were excluded back when they were constructed
with a macro conveying the key agreement itself taking the KDF as an
argument, because that was hard to support. Now the encoding has
changed and key agreement algorithms are constructed with
PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT taking two arguments, one that identifies the
raw key agreement and one that identifies the KDF. This is easy to
process, so add support.
